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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, the IRS has made a concerted attempt to obtain as
broad a swath of client documents as possible.
The environment surrounding tax reporting and filing has changed. As a result,
and in order to properly defend a tax controversy, it is imperative for taxpayers to
understand the various information production privileges available to them. This
risk is one which cannot be ignored; increasingly, it is clear that what you say and
the thought processes and deliberations that went into that statement can and
will be used against you in a court of law.
There are a number of privileges that may protect the deliberative process from
inadvertent or involuntary disclosure to the IRS. The most significant privileges
are the attorney-client privilege (both as to communications with lawyers and
federally enrolled agents) and the work-product doctrine.
Recent practice has identified a number of situations where clients have been
forced to disclose to the IRS and other tax authorities their candid, honest and
internal discussions of tax risks related to business transactions. This forced
disclosure not only provided tax auditors with a road map, but it also gave the
government ammunition to use in challenging the company's tax position.
In most cases, what caused this forced disclosure of internal tax discussions was
inadvertent - and fully avoidable. It resulted from the failure of company
personnel to preserve privilege and confidentiality during their early-stage
discussions with third-parties. And, in several cases, it resulted in a waiver of
attorney-client privilege and attorney work product confidentiality for the entire
issue - meaning that the law department's files became subject to discovery.
A few years ago, the risk of unintended disclosure was possible as a theoretical
matter, but it seldom occurred. In today's new financial and tax reporting
environment, however, the risk has increased significantly. Taxing authorities'
have developed new "tools" to identify and challenge tax positions, such as new
IRS disclosure requirements for reportable transactions. In addition, the
enhanced PCAOB and SEC auditing and reporting rules have made it difficult for
companies to take uncertain tax positions that will not be examined in depth by a
seasoned team of government auditors who combine resources on a national
scale. This anticipated review heightens the need for companies to thoroughly
analyze, discuss and consider the tax risks in business transactions without fear
that their tax concerns, and the discussions which surround them, will be
introduced into evidence and used against them. In order to do this, companies
must develop an institutional sensitivity to the actions necessary to preserve
privilege and confidentiality.
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In the end, this is about managing risk - the. risk that the company's own words
will be used against it in litigation (or audit dispute), and ultimately, the risk that
the IRS or other taxing authorities will prevail. These risks can be minimized with
some fairly simple policies and procedures.
This outline will first lay out briefly, recent developments in IRS and agency
enforcement protocols, it will then lay out in some detail the specifics of the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, the accountant-client privilege
and, ultimately, will discuss how those privileges/doctrines may be preserved
and/or waived.
I1. THE CURRENT TAX ENVIRONMENT
A. IRS Initiatives
In the past few years, the IRS has dramatically expanded its efforts to curb
abusive tax transactions, including corporate tax shelters.
The most notable IRS efforts include:
" New, expansive definitions of "tax shelters" and "reportable transactions."
" New tax return disclosure requirements on taxpayers.
* New "reportable transaction" and list maintenance requirements on material
advisors.
* New nationally coordinated tax shelter examination teams.
* New penalty provisions.
Other expansions of IRS review of taxpayers include increased attempts to
access data and corporate records which, traditionally, the IRS has not sought,
including:
" E-mails and other correspondence describing the tax benefits - and the tax
risks - of specific transactions;
* Internal financial analysis of alternative tax strategies; and
" Management presentations regarding negotiation strategies.
The IRS is also expanding efforts to access auditor workpapers, including the
increasingly detailed FAS 5 tax accruals and valuation analysis.
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B. Sarbanes-Oxley and FASB Audit Guidelines
Risk of unintended tax disclosure and the scope of review of tax reporting
positions are aggravated by Sarbanes-Oxley and new SEC and FASB audit
guidelines. The only "certainty" in the new FIN 48 requirements requiring the
documentation of uncertain tax positions is that the records required to be kept
will provide a "road map" for tax auditors in determining and assessing
deficiencies.
In response to litigation risks and new SEC and FASB mandated audit
guidelines, outside auditors are expansively documenting uncertain tax positions
taken by companies.
For example, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
requires auditors to aggressively reviewing every aspect of a company's tax
analysis if necessary to support tax accrual workpapers, "notwithstanding
potential concerns regarding attorney-client ... privilege."
PCAOB has criticized two accounting firms for having inadequate support for
contingent liabilities, including tax reserves and valuation allowances.
The new FAS 5 pronouncement on Accounting for Uncertain Tax Positions will
further increase the risk that tax decisions will be reviewed in more detail by
auditors in response to FASB requirements.
C. The Changing Environment - A Time Line
Attached to this outline is a graphical time line of the various events that
have slowly converged to put greater stress on confidentiality and heighten the
risk of exposure of sensitive documents.
D. The Impact of the Changing Environment
The confluence of these recent developments highlights the need for companies
to implement procedures that:
" Permit companies to evaluate alternative tax positions and properly optimize
available tax benefits without the risk that the company's internal deliberations
will be misconstrued or mischaracterized on audit by the IRS or other taxing
authority, and
* Ensure public auditors have access to company information to the extent
necessary to properly conduct the audit - but with appropriate safeguards to
maintain to the maximum extent possible attorney-client privilege.
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To be effective, the new procedures must properly identify - and differentiate -
privileged communications from non-privileged communications.
Failure to do so will put it at a significant disadvantage in any tax audit or
litigation with the IRS or other tax authorities - and will unnecessarily subject the
company to legal risk and [its tax personnel to] embarrassment.
Unfortunately, the new "404 SOX" procedures being implemented by companies
- usually with the oversight of outside accounting firms - often ignore this
important issue.
Ill. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Introduction
1. Importance of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege represents perhaps the most important legal doctrine
that lawyers must learn.
The attorney-client privilege potentially applies every time that lawyers
communicate with their agents, their clients, or their clients' agents.
Because the privilege can be subtle and complicated, clients cannot be expected
to understand it.
* This means that lawyers necessarily play the primary role in properly creating
the privilege, teaching their clients about the privilege and avoiding its waiver.
Because the privilege often covers communications that are frank and self-critical
(which, as explained below, is the very purpose of the privilege), improperly
creating the privilege or losing it later can have disastrous results.
* Cases are lost every day because lawyers or improperly trained clients do not
correctly create the privilege, or lose the privilege
Lawyers making mistakes can lose their clients, be sued in malpractice cases
and (because of the ethical duty discussed below) sanctioned by the bar.
2. Difference Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Ethical Duty of
Confidentiality
The ethical duty of confidentiality sometimes parallels the attorney-client
privilege, but has a different source, a different purpose and a different scope.
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The ethical duty of confidentiality comes from each state's ethics rules (rather
than the common law).
The ethical duty applies at all times, and does not arise only when a third party
seeks access to attorney-client communications.
In contrast, the attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule that protects
certain limited communications from a disclosure if a third party seeks to
discover them.
Under most formulations of the ethical duty, lawyers must preserve the
confidentiality of "information relating to the representation of a client." ABA
Model Rule 1.6(a).
* The old ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility followed a different
approach. The ABA Model Code required lawyers to preserve the
confidentiality of "confidences" and "secrets." The old ABA Model Code
defined "confidence" as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law," and defined "secret" as "other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client." ABA Model Code DR 4-101(A).
" Some states continue to follow this old ABA Model Code approach. See,
e-q., Virginia Rule 1.6(a).
ABA Model Rule 1.6 cmt. [3] explains the relationship between the attorney-client
privilege (and work product doctrine) and the broader ethical duty of
confidentiality.
ABA Model Rule 1.6 cmt. [3] ("The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is
given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional
ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in
judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness
or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of
client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where
evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The
confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.").
Thus, the ethical duty will cover information that the privilege does not protect.
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Examples include the client's identity, the amount of fees paid, information
about a client obtained from public records or from some third party.
3. Source of Privilege Law
a. History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the law's oldest recognized protection from
disclosure.
* The privilege's roots go back at least to Elizabethan times. United States
v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1984).
b. State Law
Each state has developed its attorney-client privilege principles organically --
through the common law.
* Although some states have incorporated all or part of their privilege law in
statutes, most states continue to recognize the privilege in the common
law tradition. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 68 cmt. d
(2000).
* Some states express their privilege law through a mixture of statutory and
common law. Cline v. Reliance Trust Co., No. 1:04-CV-02079, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26066, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2005) (explaining that "Ohio's
attorney-client privilege laws can be found both in the Ohio Revised Code
and in the common law of the state"); In re Investigating Grand Jury, 887
A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (making the same observation about
Pennsylvania privilege law).
c. Federal Common Law
Federal courts have also developed a "federal common law" set of attorney-
client privilege principles. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399
(1998).
d. Extent and Effect of Variations in the Privilege Law
Thankfully for lawyers who are trying to directly apply the attorney-client
privilege, most states follow a standard formulation of the privilege. In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5494, at *19
n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2001).
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• Ironically, there is less variation among the states' attorney-client privilege
principles than among federal courts' interpretation of the identical federal
rule on the work product doctrine (discussed below).
On the other hand, some differences might create a problem for corporations.
* For instance, Illinois continues to follow the "control group" test for the
privilege.
" As explained below, this approach applies the privilege only to
communications between a company's lawyers and those with decision-
making authority (and those on whom the decision-makers rely for
providing advice about the decisions).
" A company litigating in Illinois might find that the Illinois court will apply the
Illinois privilege law -- meaning that the court will find unprotected
communications taking place in other states that both the lawyers and the
clients thought at the time would be protected by a law other than Illinois's.
4. Choice of Laws
As mentioned above, most jurisdictions follow essentially the same basic
principles governing the attorney-client privilege.
• This is welcome news, because determining exactly which law applies can be
a nightmare.
Because the attorney-client privilege is tested, vindicated, or lost in litigation, it is
helpful to examine what law courts addressing the privilege will select for
determining privilege issues.
• This is not to say that transactional lawyers can always rely on their litigation
colleagues to understand and apply privilege issues.
* On the contrary - transaction lawyers are much more responsible than
litigators for properly creating the privilege.
* They are also more likely than litigators to lose the privilege by either
themselves sharing privileged communications with someone outside the
intimate attorney-client relationship, or failing to warn their clients against
doing so.
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a. State Court Litigation
In state court litigation, courts use standard choice of law principles to
determine what state's privilege will apply.
* This might be an easy task in very certain limited litigation.
* For instance, a state court dealing with a company having employees only
in that state communicating between themselves (or with their lawyer) only
in that state will usually (but not always) apply that state's attorney-client
privilege law.
However, in today's world, such scenarios seem rare. In a more typical
situation, a company with headquarters in one state and manufacturing sites
or sales offices in many states will want to protect communications between
its employees and lawyers in yet other states, perhaps involving transactions
taking place elsewhere, sometimes even with a foreign element (discussed in
more detail below).
b. Federal Court Litigation
In federal court, the situation is even more complicated.
* Courts handling federal question cases in federal court will apply federal
common law to privilege issues. Kline v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 1:01-CV-213,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20603 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2001); In re Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. 238 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
" Most (but not all) federal court will also apply federal common law to any
state law issues they are handling under their ancillary jurisdiction.
* Patent cases present a more complicated choice of law issue, because
the Federal Circuit applies: (1) its own law to patent issues; and
(2) regional circuit law to non-patent procedural issues. MPT, Inc. v.
Marathon Durable LabelinQ Sys. LLC, No. 1:04 CV 2357, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4998, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2006) (concluding that "the
existence of the privilege will be determined by Federal Circuit law while
waiver and the community of interest doctrine [usually called the "common
interest" or "joint defense" doctrine] will be decided by Sixth Circuit law").
In diversity cases, federal courts will follow the choice of law rules of the state
in which they are sitting. Satcom Int'l Group, PLC v. Orbcomm Int'l Partners,
L. No. 98 CIV. 9095 (DLC), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 16, 1999).
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State or federal courts searching for the appropriate privilege law under these
choice-of-laws rules have applied the following privilege law:
" The law of the state where the privileged communication occurred. Nance
v. Thompson Med. Co., 173 F.R.D. 178,181 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
" The law of the state "where the evidence in question will be introduced at
trial." G-1 Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, No. 01 Civ. 0216 (RWS), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14128, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2005); Satcom Int'l
Group, PLC v. Orbcomm Int'l Partners, L.P., No. 98 CIV. 9095 (DLC),
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1553, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1999).
" The law of the state where the discovery "is taking place." CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 187 F.R.D. 555, 559 (N.D. III. 1999).
" The law of the state where "the defendant's attorney-client relationships
were formed." Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. 93 CIV. 7427
(DAB), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16605, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
" The law of the state indicated by the traditional "center of gravity" test.
Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehrinq Co., 455 F.2d 337, 341 (5 th Cir. 1972).
* The law of the state where (i) the attorney-client relationship arose; (ii) the
defendant was incorporated; (iii) the defendant had its principal place of
business; and (iv) the defendant's law firm was located. McNulty v. Bally's
Park Place, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 27, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
* The law of the state where a party's litigation conduct implicated the
waiver doctrine, rather than the state where the documents at issue were
created. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir.
2000).
* The law of the state where the defendant was headquartered and its in-
house counsel worked, rather than where its outside counsel was located.
Interphase Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. 3-96-CV-0290-L, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15111, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1998).
* The state law that the parties have designated as controlling. Bell
Microproducts Inc. v. Relational Funding Corp., No. 02 C 329, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18121, at *11 (N.D. II1. Sept 24, 2002).
Given this varied approach to the controlling law, clients and their lawyers can
have little confidence that they will be able to predict what privilege law will
apply.
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c. Possible Application of Foreign Law
To make matters even more complicated, American courts (both state and
federal) sometimes look to foreign law when applying the attorney-client
privilege.
* As with courts' search for the correct American privilege law, the results
are unpredictable.
American courts have looked to the following foreign law:
* Foreign criminal laws, but only if they are analogous to American criminal
laws. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135,148 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
* Foreign privilege law from the country where the pertinent document was
written. SmithKline Beecham Corp., v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., No. 00 C
2855, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18281, at *17 (N.D. II1. Nov. 5, 2001).
* Foreign law, but only if the communications relate to an activity in the
foreign country, and do not "touch base" with the United States -- which
would require the application of United States privilege law. Tulip
Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 210 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D. Del.
2002).
* Foreign law, under general standards of international comity (if the foreign
country has the most direct or compelling interest in the communication).
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 2d 874, 884
(N.D. II1. 2002).
* Foreign law, to the extent that documents would generally not be subject
to discovery in a foreign country -- even if the immunity from discovery is
based on the narrow scope of discovery in the foreign country, rather than
on its recognition of some privilege covering the documents. Astra
Aktiebolaq v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 92, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
5. Other Countries' Laws
In an increasingly worldwide economy, companies doing business in other
countries should remember that not every country follows the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition.
As explained above, American courts sometimes look to foreign law in
determining if communications deserve privilege protection.
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* Clients and their lawyers should also remember that privilege issues can arise
both in American courts and in foreign courts or other tribunals.
In some situations, other countries follow attorney-client privilege principles that
prove more restrictive than those in the United States
" This is most pronounced in the case of in-house lawyers.
" Many European countries (especially those following the Napoleonic Code or
civil tradition) generally do not protect communications to or from in-house
lawyers.
* These countries apparently reason that in-house lawyers are not independent
enough to deserve privilege protection.
This unfriendly approach often means that communications that would be
privileged in the United States will be subject to discovery in Europe.
" The good news is that European discovery generally is fairly limited, so
perhaps the risk is not as great as one might think at first blush.
* Still, in-house lawyers in the United States dealing with European affiliates or
employees should remember that the files of those clients might be subject to
discovery and ineligible for privilege protection.
On the other hand, communications that would not be privileged in the United
States might deserve privilege protection if they occur in Europe.
* Lawyers working for accounting firms can give legal advice in Europe, which
would deserve privilege protection.
* In the United States, lawyers working for accounting firms cannot
independently give legal advice, so the only way their communications can
deserve privilege protection is if they are assisting another lawyer in providing
legal advice to a client (this would be very difficult to establish in most
circumstances).
In some ways application of foreign law can expand a company's privilege
protection in other ways.
* This is because American courts will often apply American privilege law to
communications with foreign company agents that do not have a law
degree -- but who perform jobs in their countries that are analogous to what
lawyers perform in the United States (see below).
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" For instance, American courts often will protect communications with foreign
patent agents.
" This extension of the privilege is discussed below, in the "Lawyer
Participants" section.
In-house lawyers working for companies with overseas operations should check
the privilege law of the countries in which their clients operate.
" ACCA has compiled a useful appendium of how countries treat
communications to and from in-house lawyers.
* Lex Mundi has also made data like this available on the Internet.
6. Competing Principles Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege
Many counter-intuitive aspects of the attorney-client privilege come from the
basic societal purpose of the privilege, and the tension inherent in its application.
The attorney-client privilege provides absolute protection when clients and
lawyers follow the rules. In re Dow Corning Corp., 261 F.3d 280, 284 (2d Cir.
2001).
* Society provides this protection to encourage clients to provide all necessary
facts to their lawyers, so that lawyers will guide their clients' conduct in the
right direction, and resolve disputes. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Liti g., 270
F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871,
873-74 (4th Cir. 1984).
" The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion of any "balancing
test" in applying the attorney-client privilege. Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 399,409 (1998).
* Another federal court recently affirmed the importance of the attorney-client
privilege by prohibiting a patent holder from arguing any adverse inference
based on an alleged infringer's assertion of the privilege and refusal to
produce a non-infringement opinion. Knorr-Bremse Systeme For
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 7.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
However, society pays a price for this protection -- because the privilege
undeniably hampers the search for truth. In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 627 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984).
The attorney-client privilege case law thus reflects a tension between this grand
societal benefit (encouraging clients to disclose facts so that their lawyers will
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foster a lawful society) and the cost (keeping out of view forever what could be
the most relevant communication).
As a result, the privilege is very difficult to create, is surprisingly fragile, and can
be easy lost.
7. Key Concepts Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege
Those considering the privilege should keep in mind the three key elements of
the privilege -- doing so will often guide the analysis.
* The attorney-client privilege rests on the intimacy of the attorney-client
relationship.
* The attorney-client privilege rests on the confidentiality within that intimate
relationship.
• The attorney-client privilege rests on communications within that intimate
relationship.
8. Basic Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Under the most common formulation, determining if a communication deserves
protection under the attorney-client privilege requires an analysis of six separate
elements -- all of which must be satisfied for the privilege to apply.
The attorney-client privilege protects:
(1) Communications from a client.
(2) To a lawyer.
(3) Related to the rendering of legal advice.
(4) Made with the expectation of confidentiality.
(5) Not in furtherance of a future crime or fraud.
(6) As long as the privilege has not been waived.
It seems more logical to address the privilege in a slightly different fashion.
" The communication must involve two types of participants: clients and
lawyers.
* The communication's content must directly involve legal advice.
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" The communication must be made in the context of confidentiality.
* The use of the communication must not forfeit (waive) the protection.
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B. Participants: Clients
1. Communications
a. Acts as Communications
The "communications" element can include a client's actions (such as moving
documents), United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980),
or demeanor. Eason v. Eason, 123 S.E.2d 361, 367 (Va. 1962).
b. Uncommunicated Client Statements
Although the privilege generally rests on communications between clients and
their lawyers, the privilege can sometimes protect statements that the client
has not communicated to the lawyer -- if the client created the statement with
the original intent to communicate it to a lawyer.
For instance, the privilege can protect a client's "diary" or journal that the
client creates at a lawyer's direction (to assist the lawyer in providing legal
advice to the client) -- even if the client does not send the diary to the
lawyer. Mason C. Day Excavating, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co..
143 F.R.D. 601, 607-09 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (addressing daily notes prepared
by both the plaintiff and the defendant in a large construction case; holding
that the privilege protected the plaintiffs log because the plaintiff created
the log at the direction of a lawyer to assist the lawyer in giving legal
advice; holding that the privilege did no.t protect the defendant's log,
because the defendant created the log in the ordinary course of its
business rather than to help a lawyer provide legal advice).
2. Individual Clients
The attorney-client privilege evolved over several hundred years with individuals
as the "client" for analytical purposes.
Some basic attorney-client principles developed during this earlier time continue
to apply (both to individuals and to corporations).
* The privilege belongs to the client and not to the lawyer (meaning that the
client can assert or waive the privilege regardless of the lawyer's desires).
United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 33 F.3d 342, 348
(4th Cir. 1994).
* The privilege normally covers communications between a lawyer and a
prospective client. Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.
Kan. 1998).
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" Lawyers representing more than one client on the same matter must (absent
some agreement to the contrary) share information learned from one client
with the other jointly represented client. Restatement (Third) of Law
Governing Lawyers § 75 cmt. e (2000).
* The privilege extends beyond the client's death, and lasts forever. Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
* If it has been properly created and not waived, the privilege provides absolute
protection. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (rejecting
the notion of any "balancing test").
3. Joint Representation of Multiple Clients
Lawyers sometimes represent more than one client on the same matter -- which
is called a "joint representation."
* This is different from the "joint defense" or "common interest" doctrine, which
involves separately represented clients cooperating in connection with
litigation or anticipated litigation (discussed below).
As a matter of ethics and privilege, generally there can be no secrets among
jointly represented clients -- so that the lawyer must share with each client
whatever the lawyer learns from one of the jointly represented clients.
Restatement Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 75 cmt. d at 580-81 (1998);
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 439 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In a joint client situation, there is no secrecy between the two
parties at the time of communication.").
With full disclosure, the clients can consent to an arrangement under which
their common lawyer does not share such information, but there are ethical
limitations on such an arrangement. Restatement Third) of Law Governinq
Lawyers § 75 cmt. d at 581 (1998).
Because there generally can be no secrets among jointly represented clients,
any of the clients can obtain access to the lawyer's files, and access to
communications that the lawyer had with the other clients even if the client
seeking the access was not present at the time. Franklin v. Callum, 804 A.2d
444, 447 (N.H. 2002); Felix v. Balkin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
* For instance, if a lawyer jointly represents a husband and wife in estate
planning, the wife can discover what her husband and the lawyer discussed
about their estate planning even if she was not present.
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These basic concepts make sense in a situation involving individuals, but
applying them in the corporate context can yield some surprising and even
frightening results (these are discussed below).
4. Corporate Clients
a. General Rule
In the case of corporate clients, the basic principles are somewhat more
difficult to apply.
Every state recognizes that corporations can enjoy attorney-client relationship
with a lawyer. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir.
2000).
* The privileged nature of communications with current and former
corporate employees, and independent contractors hired by the
corporation, are discussed below.
In some situations it may difficult to tell whether a lawyer represents a
corporation or a separate group of constituents of the corporation.
* Ex parte Smith, No. 1050607, 2006 Ala. LEXIS 107 (Ala. May 12, 2006)
(assessing a bankrupt company's trustee's motion for access to
pre-bankruptcy communications between a group of outside directors and
the group's law firm Skadden Arps; noting that the trustee argued that
Skadden represented the corporation, which he now controlled;
acknowledging that the company paid Skadden's bills, but also pointing to
an explicit engagement letter indicating that the law firm represented just
the outside directors and not the company; ultimately denying the trustee's
request for access to the documents).
b. Communications among Affiliated Corporations
Most courts protect communications among related companies, even if they
are not wholly-owned affiliates of each other. Admiral Ins. Co. v. United
States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989); Cary Oil Co. v.
MG Ref. & Mktq., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 1725 (VM) (DFE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17587, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2000).
c. Corporate Successors' Ownership of the Privilege
As a corporate asset, the privilege generally passes to corporate successors
(who can assert or waive the privilege) -- including bankruptcy trustees.
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Commodity Futures Tradinq Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985);
United States v. Campbell, 73 F.3d 44, 47 (5 t" Cir. 1996).
0 However, a purchaser of a bankrupt company's stock (or even assets, as
explained below) might be found to control the privilege.
d. Defunct Corporations
Courts disagree about whether a defunct corporation can assert the
attorney-client privilege. Lewis v. United States, No. 02-2958 B/An, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26680, at *12, *10, *14 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2004) (holding
that Baker Donelson could not assert the attorney-client privilege in
responding to an IRS subpoena, because the law firm's former client "has no
assets, liabilities, directors, shareholders, or employees"; noting that "courts
are split over whether a corporation is entitled to protection from the
attorney-client privilege after the corporation's 'death,"' the court concluded
that "[t]he attorney-client cannot be applied to a defunct corporation.").
e. Corporate Transactions Involving Stock Sales
The purchaser of a corporation's stock generally steps into the shoes of the
previous owner, and may assert or waive the privilege. Bass Public Ltd. Co.
v. Promus Cos., No. 92 Civ. 0969 (SWK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5474, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1994) (finding that the former owner of a corporate
subsidiary could not block the current owner from seeking documents from
the subsidiary's law firm that were generated before the transaction; noting
that the former owner of the subsidiary could have avoided this result by
addressing the issue in the transactional documents); Rayman v. Am. Charter
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Neb. 1993) ("a surviving
corporation following a merger possesses all of the privileges of the pre-
merger companies"); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 245 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) ("[T]he purchaser of a corporate entity buys not only its material
assets but also its privileges .... Since the attorney-client privilege over a
corporation belongs to the inanimate entity and not to individual directors or
officers, control over privilege should pass with control of the corporation,
regardless of whether or not the new corporate officials were privy to the
communications in issue."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John
Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that the new
management of a subsidiary created by divestiture could waive the privilege);
Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
("Polycast acquired this authority to waive the joint privilege when it
purchased the stock of Plastics. The power to waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege rests with corporate management, who must exercise
this power consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the
corporation. Just as Plastics' new management has an obligation to waive or
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preserve the corporation's privileges in a manner consistent with their
fiduciary duty to protect corporate interests, Polycast, as parent and sole
shareholder, has the power to determine those interests. Because there are
ample grounds for a finding that the privilege is held jointly by Polycast and
Uniroyal, and because Polycast acquired control over Plastics' privilege rights
when it purchased the company, Polycast and Plastics' new management
may now waive the privilege at their discretion." (internal citations omitted);
finding that the purchaser of a subsidiary of Uniroyal was entitled to obtain
copies of notes of the subsidiary's vice president that he prepared before the
transaction).
The purchaser and seller of the corporation's stock might be able to vary
this rule in the purchase agreement. Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter
Travenol Labs, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 66, 70 (N.D. II1. 1988).
f. Corporate Transactions Involving Asset Sales
Purchasers of a corporation's assets generally do not acquire the
corporation's attorney-client privilege rights. Yosemite Inv., Inc. v. Floyd Bell,
Inc., 943 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
89-3 & 89-4 & 89-129, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 n.3 (E.D. Va.), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990).
" Some courts look at the "practical consequences" of the corporate
transaction rather than recognizing a strict dichotomy between stock and
asset purchases. Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663,
669 (N.Y. 1996).
" One recent case applied the "practical consequences" rule to deny a
bankruptcy trustee's effort to control the privilege. Coffin v. Bowater Inc.,
No. 03-277-P-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9395, at *7, *9 (D. Me. May 13,
2005) (rejecting a bankruptcy trustee's attempt to waive a bankrupt
company's privilege; rejecting a "bright-line rule" that only a stock sale
conveyed the privilege; finding that privilege now belonged to the
purchaser of the company's assets (including all the company's "tangible
and intangible rights"); explaining that because the "practical
consequences" of the asset purchase "was to transfer virtually all control
and continuation of the [company's] business" to the new owner, the new
owner -- not the company's bankruptcy trustee - had the right to waive or
assert the privilege).
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g. Effect of a Joint Representation of Corporate Affiliates in Later
Adversity between the Former Clients
In many (if not most) transactions in which one member of a corporate
"family" becomes an independent company through either a stock or asset
sale, the same law firm represents both entities while they are still members
of the same corporate "family."
Because jointly represented clients generally must be given access to the
files generated by the lawyer representing the clients, this means that the
newly independent company generally may obtain access to the files
generated by the law firm that jointly represented the companies while they
were still members of the same corporate "family."
* If the newly independent company declares bankruptcy, a bankruptcy
trustee can thus generally call upon the law firm to produce all of its files
during the former joint representation -- including communications
between the law firm and the parent that the law firm also represented
during the "transaction."
* Some large well-known law firms have found themselves dealing with this
very troubling situation. In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2005) (requiring the Troutman Sanders law firm to produce files
it generated while jointly representing the firm's long-time client The
Southern Company and the subsidiary which became known as Mirant
when it became an independent company and later declared bankruptcy;
rejecting Troutman Sanders' argument that Mirant's bankruptcy trustee
was not entitled to communications between Troutman Sanders and The
Southern Company created during the joint representation; noting that "[i]t
is well established that, in a case of a joint representation of two clients by
an attorney, one client may not invoke the privilege against the other client
in litigation between them arising from the matter in which they were jointly
represented").
* An even more recent case provides another frightening example of this
principle. Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp. v. BCE, Inc. (In re Teleglobe
Commc'ns Corp.), Civ. No. 04-1266-SLR, at *7, *8 (D. Del. June 2, 2006),
(holding that bankrupt companies and their Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors could obtain access to: (1) files generated by the
law firm that jointly represented the companies' Canadian parent
Teleglobe and Teleglobe's parent BCE (Canada's largest communications
company); and (2) privileged documents sent to or from other law firms
(including Shearman & Sterling) which had only represented the ultimate
parent BCE, but which had shared the documents with BCE's in-house
lawyer -- who "jointly represented BCE and Teleglobe [BCE's subsidiary
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and the bankrupt companies' parent]"; acknowledging that allowing such
discovery would force a company like BCE to "either forego the valuable
advice of its in-house counsel, or forego the protection of the
attorney-client privilege with its retained counsel"; nevertheless explaining
that the law is so clear that a lawyer representing two clients in a matter
cannot withhold relevant information from either client; "it should come as
no surprise to BCE that information channeled through its in-house
counsel would have to be disclosed to Teleglobe"; also explaining that
BCE "had the opportunity to isolate its privileged communications with
retained counsel from in-house counsel, or to clearly terminate the
attorney-client relationship between its in-house counsel and [its
subsidiary] Teleglobe").
A number of other cases have dealt with such adversity between a parent and
a former subsidiary (or its new owner), with differing results. Fogel v. Zell (In
re Madison Mqmt. Group, Inc.), 212 B.R. 894 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1997) (the
same lawyers represented a parent and a subsidiary; when the subsidiary
went bankrupt, the trustee for the subsidiary sought to give to a third party (a
creditor) documents created during the time of the joint representation; the
court distinguished the situation from that in Santa Fe (in which the former
subsidiary wanted to obtain documents for itself), and held that the parent
could block the trustee for the former subsidiary from providing privileged
documents to the third party creditor (although the parent and the former
subsidiary were now adverse to one another)); Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173
F.R.D. 459 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (Glidden (now called Grow) sold its subsidiary
(Perrigo) to the subsidiary's management; Grow then sued its old subsidiary
and the subsidiary's management; the court ordered the former subsidiary to
produce all of the requested documents to the former parent; the court also
rejected the argument that the former subsidiary's management could assert
their own privilege); Bass Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Promus Cos., No. 92 Civ. 0969
(SWK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5474 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1994) (Latham &
Watkins represented both the parent (Promus) and a subsidiary (Holiday Inn),
which was sold to Bass; the former subsidiary (which was merged into Bass)
sought documents from Latham & Watkins dating from the time of the joint
representation; although the court found that the documents were not created
as part of a joint litigation defense effort, it ordered Latham & Watkins to
produce the documents, finding that the jointly represented subsidiary was
entitled to them); In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 121 B.R. 794 (Bankr. N.D.
III. 1990) (in-house lawyers represented both a parent and a subsidiary; the
former subsidiary went bankrupt, and its trustee sought documents from the
former parent; although the court found that the situation did not involve a
joint litigation defense arrangement (but instead was a joint representation),
the court held that the former subsidiary could obtain documents from the
parent that were created before the closing of the spin (and certain document
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created after that date)); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4 & 89-129,
734 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1990) (a parent waives any attorney-client
privilege applicable to documents by leaving those documents with the spun
subsidiary); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 51
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Uniroyal sold its subsidiary (Plastics) to a company called
Polycast; Polycast sued Uniroyal for fraud; the court found that
communications among the lawyers who jointly represented Uniroyal and its
then-subsidiary Plastics did not involve a joint litigation defense, meaning that
the new management of Plastics (now owned by Polycast) could obtain the
documents); Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 120 F.R.D.
66 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (the parent (Baxter) sold all of the stock of its subsidiary
Medcom to Medcom Holding; Medcom Holding later sued Baxter for
securities fraud; the court found that the same lawyers represented Baxter
and Medcom during the relevant time; the court held that Medcom's new
management had the power to waive the privilege as to some of the
documents; however, the court held that documents created during an earlier
litigation when Baxter and its subsidiary were jointly represented could not be
obtained by the subsidiary's new parent unless Baxter itself consented, even
though adversity had developed between Baxter and the new owners of its
former subsidiary).
h. Courts' Suggestions about Changing these General Rules when Selling
Subsidiaries
A number of decisions have explained how companies may change the
application of these general rules if they are planning to sell a subsidiary.
First, one court has held that a parent wishing to avoid the possibility of a
spun subsidiary waiving the privilege that otherwise protects communications
with lawyers working for both parent and the spun company may avoid that
result by hiring separate lawyers to represent the subsidiary before the spin.
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs. Inc., 120 F.R.D. 66 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (a parent wishing to avoid the possibility of a spun subsidiary waiving
the privilege that otherwise protects communications with lawyers working for
both parent and the spun company may avoid that result by hiring separate
lawyers to represent the subsidiary before the spin).
Second, one court has suggested that a parent wishing to maintain all of the
privilege rights could sell a subsidiary's assets rather than its stock. Bass
Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Promus Cos., No. 92 Civ. 0969 (SWK), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5474 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1994) ("Had Promus [parent] wished, it could
have sold only Holiday Inn's [subsidiary's] physical assets, which would have
avoided the consequences [of allowing new management of the subsidiary to
waive the privilege]").
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Third, one court has suggested that a parent spinning off a subsidiary should
contractually retain access rights to documents the spun company acquires in
the spin. Bass Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Promus Cos., No. 92 Civ. 0969 (SWK), 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5474, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1994); Medcom Holding Co.
v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 120 F.R.D. 66 (N.D. III 1988) (a parent
spinning off a subsidiary should contractually retain access rights to
documents the spun company acquires in the spin).
Fourth, one court has suggested that a parent may retain the right to veto a
newly spun subsidiary's waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4 & 89-129, 734 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1990) (a
parent waives any attorney-client privilege applicable to documents by leaving
those documents with the spun subsidiary).
Fifth, one court has held that a parent waives any attorney-client privilege
applicable to documents by leaving those documents with the spun
subsidiary. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4 & 89-129, 734 F. Supp.
1207 (E.D. Va. 1990) (a parent waives any attorney-client privilege applicable
to documents by leaving those documents with the spun subsidiary).
Thus, a parent spinning off a subsidiary may want to consider reviewing all
of its files, and removing any documents that the parent wishes to remain
privileged.
5. Current and Former Corporate Employees
a. General Rule
As indicated above, lawyers representing corporations actually represent the
incorporeal entity that is the corporation. Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705
F. Supp. 666, 680 n.4 (D.D.C. 1989) ("A corporate attorney's 'client' is the
corporate entity, and not individual officers or directors."), affd, 70 F.3d 637
(D.C. Cir. 1995); ABA Model Rule 1.13(a).
* As a matter of ethics, lawyers must very carefully guard against
accidentally creating an attorney-client relationship with some of the
human beings with whom they deal while representing the corporation
(this is discussed above).
" Mistakes in this process can create duties of loyalty and confidentiality to
someone other than the institution, possibly creating conflicts that prevent
the lawyer from representing the only client that the lawyer wanted to
represent (the corporation).
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The importance of carefully defining the client also has privilege ramifications,
but these are generally much less consequential than the ethics issues.
" Communications between a lawyer and an accidentally created individual
client will almost surely still deserve protection under the attorney-client
privilege. However, the key is who owns that privilege.
* The careful lawyer should take the steps mentioned above (in the ethics
discussion) to assure that the corporate client always owns the privilege --
except in certain limited circumstances in which the lawyer intends to
create an attorney-client relationship with someone else connected to the
corporation.
b. "Control Group" Test
Most states formerly held that only a corporation's upper management (and
those upon whom they rely) could speak for the corporation, so that only
communications with those officials deserved attorney-client privilege
protection. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68
F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
" Some states (including Illinois) continue to follow the control group test.
Joan C. Rogers, Analysis & Perspective: Although Corporate Attorney-
Client Privileqe Is Established, Challengqes Persist, 16 ABA/BNA Law.
Manual on Prof. Conduct [Current Reports] 335, at 337 (July 5, 2000).
* The control group test is not quite as narrow as many lawyers believe -- it
covers communications to and from those in the upper corporate hierarchy
and underlings who provide advice (not just facts) upon which the upper
decision-makers rely.
* Still, the "control group" test clearly provides less protection to corporate
clients than the newer "Upjohn" approach, both in the original
communication (which can involve a much smaller number of corporate
employees than under Upiohn) and in the waiver analysis (because the
"control group" approach places many more corporate employees outside
the "need to know" group, so that sharing the communications within the
corporation is more likely to waive the privilege).
c. "Upjohn" Test
The United States Supreme Court rejected the control group test in Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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In essence, the Supreme Court abandoned the former "hierarchical"
approach (in which the privilege's applicability depended on the company
employee's level in the corporate hierarchy) in favor of a much looser
"functionality" test. Under this new test, the privilege's applicability
depends on what role the corporate employees play, not their spot in the
bureaucracy.
Under the Upiohn approach, employees of any level within a corporation are
entitled to have privileged conversations with the company's lawyer, provided
that the company lawyer undertake certain specified steps (described below).
Thus, the Upiohn approach focuses on the nature of the employees'
function and information, rather than on the strict hierarchical approach of
the "control group" test. Federal courts and most state courts now follow
the Upiohn approach.
To assure that the attorney-client privilege protection covers the
communication, company lawyers should explain (and perhaps provide a
written explanation of) the Upoohn factors: the company's lawyers have been
asked to provide legal advice to their client (the company); the employee has
factual knowledge that the company lawyers require; that information is not
readily available elsewhere; the employees should keep all of their
communications with the company lawyers confidential (even within the
company).
d. Former Employees
Once courts adopted the "functionality" test, it was an easy step for them to
extend the privilege to communications to and from company employees who
are not currently in the hierarchy, but whose function when they worked at the
corporation met the Upiohn standard.
Thus, the attorney-client privilege probably covers communications with the
company's former employees (In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 72 (2d
Cir. 1999); Better Gov't Bureau v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 605-06
& n.14 (4th Cir. 1997)), although courts take different positions on this issue.
City of New York v. Coastal Oil New York, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1010, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2000).
Former employees should receive a modified Upiohn explanation, which
emphasizes that the interview will cover facts related to the employee's
time at the company.
The ethical implications of ex parte communications with an adverse
corporation's employees are discussed above.
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6. Independent Contractors and Other Client Agents
As mentioned above, the attorney-client privilege exists only within the intimacy
of the attorney-client relationship.
Under the Upeohn standard, corporate employees fall within this intimate
relationship if they have information that a lawyer representing the corporation
needs to serve the institutional client. However, those acting on behalf of or for
corporation that have a more attenuated relationship with a corporation deserve
much more careful scrutiny.
Client agents involve a spectrum of relationships with the client -- starting with
independent contractors who are essentially acting as full-time employees, and
ending with consultants who occasionally work for the client.
a. Independent Contractors
Courts disagree about the attorney-client privilege protection's applicability to
communications with a corporation's independent contractors.
" In a fairly recent trend that holds promise for corporations which outsource
corporate functions, courts increasingly treat as corporate employees
those independent contractors who are the "functional equivalent" of
employees. Viacom, Inc. v. Sumitoma Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust
Litii., 200 F.R.D. 213, 216, 220 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (public relations
advisors); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994).
* Other courts are more reluctant to expand the attorney-client privilege
beyond actual corporate employees. Horton. v. United States, 204 F.R.D.
670, 672, 673 (D. Colo. 2002); Miramar Constr. Co. v. Home Depot, Inc.,
167 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D.P.R. 2001).
* As this new trend develops, courts have begun to analyze the facts
required to support the "functional equivalent" doctrine. Export-Import
Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), (explaining that in determining whether a consultant
meets the functional equivalent standard, courts "look to whether the
consultant had primary responsibility for a key corporate job .... whether
there was a continuous and close working relationship between the
consultant and the company's principals on matters critical to the
company's position in litigation,... and whether the consultant is likely to
possess information possessed by no one else at the company," rejecting
defendant's contention that its financial advisor deserved this status,
noting that the financial consultant (1) apparently never used an office
made available to him in defendant's premises, and (2) was able to "start
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and build a successful consulting business" despite spending 80 - 85
percent of his time working on a restructuring deal for defendant).
b. Agents
Agents assisting corporations in some way act further along the continuum
that starts with full-time employees and includes independent contractors who
are the "functional equivalent" of employees.
* The status of agents can have a critical effect on the attorney-client
privilege, in a number of settings: communications between the
company's employees or lawyers and the agents may or may not be
privileged ab initio, depending on the agents' status; having agents
present during communications between the company's employees and
the company's lawyers may or may not prevent the privilege from even
protecting those communications, depending on the agents' status; later
sharing privileged communications with agents may or may not waive the
privilege, depending on the agents' status.
Agents Necessary for the Transmission of the Communications. Every
court applies the attorney-client privilege to client agents who assist in the
transmission of the attorney-client communications.
0 This type of client agent includes translators, interpreters, etc.
Other Agents (Not Necessary for the Transmission of the
Communications). Courts take differing positions on the attorney-client
privilege implications of involving client agents who are not necessary for the
transmission of the attorney-client communications. Some authorities take a
fairly liberal approach, but the vast majority apply the privilege more narrowly.
The Restatement and a few courts take a fairly liberal approach.
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 70 cmt. f (2000). ("An
agent for communication need not take a direct part in client-lawyer
communications, but may be present because of the Client's psychological
or other need. A business person may be accompanied by a business
associate or expert consultant who can assist the client in interpreting the
legal situation.").
Courts taking this liberal view have protected communications to and from
the following agents: financial and tax advisors (Segerstrom v. United
States, No. C 00-0833 SI, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2949 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2001)); litigation consultants (Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs.,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 263 (N.D. III. 2000)); crisis management public relations
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firm employee (Viacom, Inc. v. Sumitoma Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust
Lt., 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); outside coordinator of legal services
(Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs. Inc., 192 F.R.D. 263, 264
(N.D. II1. 2000)); a company owner's son acting as his father's
"representative" (Nat'l Converting & Fulfillment Corp. v. Bankers Trust Corp.,
134 F. Supp. 2d 804 (N.D. Tex. 2001)); engineer (Sunnyside Manor, Inc. v.
Twp. of Wall, Civ. A. No. 02-2902 (MLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36438
(D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2005)).
The vast majority of courts have taken a much narrower view, refusing to
provide privilege protection to client agents who are not assisting in the
transmission of information, but instead providing their own independent
advice to the clients.
" In discussing waiver (a concept addressed later in this outline), one court
coined a useful phrase. United State v. Morrell-Corrada, 343 F. Supp. 2d
80, 88 (D.P.R. 2004) ("Where a client chooses to share communications
between himself and his lawyer outside the 'magic circle' of secretaries
and interpreters, the courts have usually found a waiver of the privilege.").
* Courts taking this majority -- narrow -- view have refused to protect
communications to and from the following agents: accountant (In re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); United
States v. Rosenthal, 142 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)); investment banker
(United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999); National Educ.
Training Group, Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85(WHP) 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8680 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1999)); litigation consultant (Blumenthal v.
Drud-ge, 186 F.R.D. 236 (D.D.C. 1999)); environmental consultant (United
States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156
(E.D.N.Y. 1994)); financial advisor (Bowne of New York City, Inc. v.
AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); union official with whom
police union members spoke before they hired a lawyer (In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1998));
reorganization consultant (Kaminski v. First Union Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 98-
CV-1623, 98-CV-6318, 99-CV-1509, 99-CV-4783, 99-CV-6523, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9688 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2001)).
A recent case applied this narrow approach to a large company's disclosure
of documents to its insurance broker. Cellco P'ship v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, Civ. A. No. 05-3158 (SRC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28877, at
*7, *11 (D.N.J. May 11, 2006) (explaining that "just because a communication
between an attorney and a specialist prove[s] helpful to the attorney's
representation of his/her client does not mean that the communications are
necessarily privileged"; holding that the privilege did not protect
communications between Verizon Wireless and employees of its insurance
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broker Aon; "Aon did not act as an agent of the attorney or [Verizon Wireless]
for purposes of providing or interpreting legal advice. While the information
that Aon provided may have proved helpful, it was not needed to interpret
complex issues in order to provide competent legal advice or to facilitate the
attorney-client relationship.").
Courts taking this narrow approach also generally hold: (1) that the
presence of such agents during an otherwise privileged attorney-client
communication prevents the privilege from ever arising; and (2) that
sharing a privileged communication with such an agent waives the
privilege -- this Outline covers these concepts below.
Importance of the Majority (Narrow) View of Client Agents. The general
inability of a client's agent to engage in privileged communications with
corporate clients or their lawyers (and the waiver implications of sharing
privileged communications with those agents) represents perhaps the most
counter-intuitive aspect of the attorney-client privilege.
" Corporate officers and employees might logically assume that members of
their problem-solving "teams" such as environmental consultants, outside
accountants, financial advisors, etc. -- who have fiduciary duties of loyalty
and confidentiality to the clients just like lawyers do -- should be able to
participate in joint communications, learn what the lawyer member of the
"team" has to say, etc.
" Lawyers must educate their clients about the erroneous nature of this
assumption.
For instance, lawyers should remind their clients that Martha Stewart lost the
privilege protection that covered an e-mail to her lawyer by sharing the e-mail
with her own daughter. United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
* If a client's only daughter is not within the intimate attorney-client
relationship, surely other professional advisors fall outside as well.
7. Multiple Representations of Corporations and Corporate Employees
a. Ethical Considerations
Lawyers who represent corporations generally should not attempt to
represent any other corporate constituent.
* Such activity risks compromising the lawyer's duty of loyalty and
confidentiality to the lawyer's primary client -- the institution.
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Doing so accidentally can have disastrous results.
For obvious reasons, lawyers dealing with company employees who might
misunderstand the lawyer's role must "explain the identity of the client when
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."
ABA Model Rule 1.13(f).
" In one recent celebrated case, a court criticized (but ultimately found
effective) a "corporate Miranda warning" given by a company's in-house
lawyers and outside lawyers to an executive that they were interviewing --
the lawyers advised the executive that they represented the company, but
that they "could" also represent the executive "as long as no conflict
appeared." Under Seal v. United States (In re United States Grand Jury
Subpoena), 415 F.3d 333, 336 (4 th Cir. 2005) (holding that the company
alone controlled the privilege despite the looseness of the warning given
to the executive; pointing to a separate part of the warning explaining that
the privilege belonged to the company and not to the executive).
* Most courts are reluctant to find that company lawyers also represent
company executives -- unless the relationship has been clearly
established. Applied Tech. Int'l, Ltd. v. Goldstein, Civ. A. No. 03-848,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1818 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2005).
b. Attorney-Client Privilege Ramifications
Such multiple representations have privilege implications too.
As mentioned above, absent a contractual understanding to the contrary,
there can be no secrets among jointly represented clients on the same
matter. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433,
439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
• Lawyers who jointly represent a client do not have to worry about the
efficacy of a "joint defense" or "common interest" agreement (discussed
below), because the privilege generally covers communication between
lawyers and jointly represented clients, or between jointly represented
clients who are anticipating communicating with the lawyer or discussing
legal advice the lawyer has already given them. Kroha v. Lamonica No.
X02CV980160366S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 81, at *12 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 3, 2001) (unreported decision).
* Of course, to the extent that a corporation's constituents act as agents of
the institutional corporation, most of these protections arise even if there is
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no separate attorney-client relationship between the corporation's lawyer
and the individual corporate constituent.
The privilege's ownership can become critically important if the company
wants to waive the privilege covering its lawyers' communications with an
executive (for instance, to cooperate with a government investigation), while
the executive wants to assert the privilege.
If the company's lawyer has jointly represented the company and the
executive, the executive generally has a "veto power" over the company's
right to waive the privilege. Under Seal v. United States (In re United
States Grand Jury Subpoena), 415 F.3d 333 (4t h Cir. 2005) (ultimately
finding that the company executive could not assert the veto power
because the company's lawyers did not jointly represent the company and
the executive).
" To the extent that the company and the executive become litigation
adversaries, neither can assert the privilege to avoid disclosure of
communications that occurred during a joint representation.
* It is also worth remembering that a "common interest agreement"
(explained below) can also give a "veto power" even to a separately
represented company executive. Under Seal v. United States (In re
United States Grand Jury Subpoena), 415 F.3d 333 (4 h Cir. 2005) (finding
that a company and an executive had not entered into a common interest
agreement, so that the company alone controlled the privilege.)
c. Disclosure and Consent
Lawyers tempted to engage in multiple representations should carefully
consider the implications, and definitely articulate the exact nature of the
relationship in a document.
Two decisions decided on the very same day highlight the risks of making a
mistake.
Home Care Indus., Inc. v. Murray, 154 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (D.N.J. 2001)
(disqualifying the Skadden, Arps law firm from representing a corporation
after it became adverse to its CEO with whom Skadden had dealt; finding
that the CEO could reasonably have thought that Skadden represented
him too; noting that "[a]n explanation of the Skadden Firm's position as
counsel for HCI exclusive of its officers, would have gone a long way to
avoid the position that said firm finds itself defending in the instant
matter").
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In re Rite-Aid Corp. Sec. Liticj., 139 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(refusing to disqualify the Ballard, Spahr law firm from representing Rite-
Aid adverse to a Rite-Aid executive that the firm had also represented in
preliminary matters; noting that "[t]he engagement letter sent from Ballard
Spahr to Rite Aid.. . could not have been clearer with respect to the
relationship between Ballard Spahr's representation of Rite Aid and its
representation of [the executive]. The letter made it pellucid that Ballard
Spahr would, in the event of a conflict.., cease to represent [the
executive] but continue to represent Rite Aid.").
8. Privilege Implications of Company Employees Using Company E-Mail
Systems
In some situations, company employees assert privilege protection for e-mail
communications (using the company's e-mail system) with the employees'
private lawyers.
Most cases find the privilege inapplicable. Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., Civ. A.
No. 05-cv-1236 (JLL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28149 (D.N.J. May 9, 2006)
(opinion not for publication) (holding that the privilege did not cover
communications between an employee and her personal lawyer that she left on
the company computer when she returned it to the company after she stopped
working there; also finding that even if the privilege applied, the former employee
waived the protection when she did not delete the privileged communications
before returning the computer).
Surprisingly, some courts find that company employees may assert privilege
protection, although the e-mail system and computer obviously belong to the
company.
Curto v. Medical World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) (holding that the privilege
continued to cover an employee's privileged communication with her personal
lawyer; acknowledging that the employee had used a company-owned
computer, but noting that she used it only at her home office, and that it was
not connected to the company's network; pointing to the company's policy
that prohibited personal use of the company's computers, but noting that the
company had not vigorously enforced the policy and therefore could not rely
on it); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005) (finding that a company had not clearly enough warned executives that
they could not use the company e-mail system for personal communications;
noting that "at log on, some business computers, including those used by this
Court's personnel, warn users about personal use and the employers' right to
monitor;" holding that company executives could withhold from the company's
bankruptcy trustee e-mail communications with their personal lawyers).
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9. Former Employees' Right of Access to Privileged Communications in
Which They Engaged While Employees
Courts disagree about former employees' right to obtain discovery (when they
are now adverse to their former employer) of privileged communications to which
they had access while company employees. Inter-Fluve, Inc. v. Montana 18 th
Judicial Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 258, 262 (Mont. 2005) (agreeing with a former
director's argument that "since he was entitled to access these communications
at the time they occurred, it would be a perversion of the attorney-client privilege
to now deny him access to that information simply because he is no longer a
director"); Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P,3d 454, 463
(Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the debate among courts on this issue, and holding
that a former director who is now adverse to the corporation could be denied
access to privileged documents; explaining that "the privilege may be asserted
against an adverse litigant" -- even if the litigant previously had access to the
privileged documents).
10."Fiduciary Exception"
a. Application to Shareholders
Given the fiduciary duty that corporate management owes corporate
shareholders, most courts recognize the latter's limited right to discover
communications between corporate management and corporate lawyers --
under certain circumstances. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
b. Application to Other Situations
Many courts have expanded what is now called this "fiduciary exception" to
include other situations in which the beneficiaries of a fiduciary relationship
seek access to communications between the fiduciary and the fiduciary's
lawyer. Cox v. Adm'r United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1415-16
(1 1h Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995).
Courts have applied this "fiduciary exception" in situations involving:
union members (Cox v. Adm'r United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d
1386, 1415-16 (1 1th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995);
Wessel v. City of Albuguerque, No. 00-00532 (ESH/AK), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17494, at *12, *15 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2000)); ERISA plan
beneficiaries (United States v. Meft, 178 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999);
Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 620 (D. Kan.
2001)); limited partners (Opus Corp. v. IBM Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1503,
1507 (D. Minn. 1996), but see Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.. Civ. A. No. 18023-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS
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153, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2001)); bankruptcy creditors' committee (In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984)); estate
beneficiaries (Alan D. Wingfield, Fiduciary Attorney-Client
Communications: An Illusory Privilege?, 8 Prob. & Prop. 4, July/Aug.
1994, at 61; trust beneficiaries (Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers § 84 (2000)).
This "fiduciary exception" generally is limited to communications that relate to
the fiduciary relationship, and not to (for instance) the possible liability of the
fiduciary. United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
For instance, because "the amendment or termination of plan benefits is
not a fiduciary action," a former employee claiming that the employer
improperly terminated an ERISA plan generally cannot rely on the
"fiduciary exception" to discover communications between the employer
and the employer's law firm. Bland v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc., 401 F.3d 779(7th Cir. 2005).
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C. Participants: Lawyers
1. Communications Not Involving a Lawyer, and Uncommunicated Lawyer
Notes
Although the attorney-client privilege normally protects communications between
clients and lawyers, client-to-client communication may also deserve protection
under certain circumstances.
First, the privilege can protect communications among corporate employees
gathering facts requested by the lawyer. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("In the case of a
corporate client, privileged communications may be shared by non-attorney
employees in order to relay information requested by attorneys.")
" Second, the privilege can protect corporate employees relaying a lawyer's
advice to other employees. Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 03
Civ. 2102 (RCC) (THK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2004) (holding that the attorney-client privilege protected e-mails from one
corporate executive to another, which conveyed outside counsel's advice;
concluding that "[i]t is of no moment that the e-mail was not authored by an
attorney or addressed to an attorney"); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. U.S.
Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., Civ. A. No. 112-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
95, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 9, 2005) (explaining that "communications
originating from non-attorneys can be protected by the attorney-client
privilege, if those communications relay legal advice from counsel to a party
with a common interest").
Although the attorney-client privilege can protect documents prepared by a client
that a client never sends to a lawyer (as long as the client created the documents
with the intent of sending them to a lawyer), the privilege is less likely to protect
uncommunicated lawyer documents.
Sheeks v. El Paso County Sch. Dist. No. 11, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-1 946-ZLW-
CBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27579, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2006)
("Defendant has cited no authority, and the Court has found none, indicating
that internal law firm communications which are not conveyed to the client are
covered by the attorney-client privilege"); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (the attorney-client
privilege does not protect "attorney thought processes"); American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. AXA Client Solutions, LLC, No. 00 C 6786, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4805 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2002) (holding that the attorney-client privilege
did not cover handwritten notes prepared by an in-house lawyer, because the
lawyer had not communicated them to anyone else).
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Of course, the privilege will protect a lawyer's uncommunicated
memorializations of communications between the lawyer and the client.
2. Lawyer-to-Client Communications
Egocentric lawyers normally assume that the privilege will protect their
communications to clients.
However, the law only protects those communications to the extent that they
reveal what the client told the lawyer. Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New
England, 232 F.R.D. 49, 54 (D. Conn. 2005) ("communication running from the
lawyer to the client is not protected unless it reveals what the client has said").
This doctrine sometimes applies to a lawyer's report back to the client of the
lawyer's communications with third parties, government regulators, etc. Tri-State
Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, Civ. A. No. 00-1463 (HHK/JMF), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33156, at *12-13 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2005); Neighborhood Dev.
Collaborative v. Murphy, 233 F.R.D. 436, 443 (D. Md. 2005) ("[T]he attorney-
client privilege does not protect information obtained by the attorney from
sources other than the client, or notes or memoranda summarizing such
information.... Thus, to the extent that certain documents listed in Defendants'
privilege log are not based upon information supplied in confidence by
Defendants, but rather consist of notes and summaries of attorneys'
conversations with third parties, then those documents may in fact be
discoverable."); Schmidt, Long & Assocs., Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
Civ. A. No. 00-CV-3683, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7145, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. May
31, 2001) ("In order for a communication between an attorney to [sic] a client to
be privileged, the communication must be based upon confidential
communications received from the client .... The communication will not be
privileged if the attorney is merely conveying information learned from sources
other than the client.")
3. In-House Lawyers
In the United States, the attorney-client privilege protection can cover
communications to and from inside counsel.
The leading United States Supreme Court decision on the attorney-client privilege
and the District Court decision articulating the most common formulation of the
attorney-client privilege both involved in-house lawyers. Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
The attorney-client privilege protection can cover communications to and from
inside counsel even if they are not licensed in the state in which they
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communicate. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 72 reporter's note
(2000); Boca Investerinqs P'ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.D.C.
1998).
* In-house lawyers practicing in states that do not require them to be licensed
in that state (discussed in the ethics section above) might face what would
seem to be a dangerous risk -- letting their license lapse through inadvertence
or sloppiness.
* Fortunately, because the client's expectations generally govern, even those
lawyers (who are technically no longer licensed anywhere) generally may
continue to have privileged communications with their clients. Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 72 cmt. e (2000).
As mentioned above, most European countries do not recognize an attorney-
client privilege applicable to communications to or from in-house lawyers.
As explained below (in connection with the "legal advice" requirement), in-house
lawyers face a higher burden than outside lawyers in establishing the privilege's
applicability.
4. Foreigners with the Equivalent of a Law Degree
Many American courts hold that foreigners engaged in activities in their home
country that parallel American lawyers' practice of law may engage in privileged
conversations. VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 18 (D. Mass. 2000)
(using principles of comity to protect communications with Japanese patent
agents called "benrishi").
* Determining whether such foreigners deserve privilege protection often
requires testimony about their activities. Orcqanon Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc.,
303 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding that Netherlands patent agents
may engage in privileged conversations).
* Not every court is this generous. Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp.,
No. 01 Civ. 8115 (MBM)(FM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13560 (S.D.N.Y. July
23, 2002).
5. Law Department Staff
Lawyers cannot act without help, and the privilege naturally covers
communications with their secretaries, paralegals, copy clerks, receptionists, etc.
von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015
(1987); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984).
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* These assistants help facilitate communications to and from clients, and also
assist the lawyers in the substantive work of providing legal advice.
However, a recent decision denied privilege protection for communications to
and from a corporation's long-time in-house paralegal because the court found
that the paralegal was giving her own advice, rather than assisting a lawyer.
" HPD Labs., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 417 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege did not protect from disclosure
communications between a long-time Clorox in-house paralegal and Clorox
employees, because the employees were seeking the paralegal's own advice
rather than working with the paralegal to obtain a lawyer's advice; rejecting
Clorox's argument that the privilege applied because the paralegal worked
under the general supervision of a Clorox lawyer and consulted with a lawyer
if any "unusual or novel" issues arose; noting that the paralegal met with
Clorox employees without a lawyer present, and did not copy a lawyer on e-
mails to and from employees; ordering the production of documents reflecting
communications between the paralegal and Clorox employees).
* This case highlights the importance of lawyers' involvement in the pertinent
communications, but so far has not started a trend.
6. Outside Lawyers
Because courts more carefully scrutinize privilege claims asserted by in-house
counsel (given their multiple roles), companies may want to involve outside
lawyers -- especially if they wish to protect material related to corporate
investigations, or if litigation looms.
Involving outside lawyers in these circumstances: increases the odds of
successfully asserting the attorney-client privilege; helps buttress the work
product protection (by showing that the investigation is not in the "ordinary
course" of the company's business, but instead was undertaken in anticipation of
litigation); adds credibility to the investigation if a government agency suspects
management wrongdoing, and therefore mistrusts in-house counsel.
7. Lawyer's Agents and Consultants
As explained above, the law's emphasis on the intimacy of the attorney-client
relationship generally means that a client's agent is outside the attorney-client
relationship -- unless the agent plays some role in facilitating communications to
or from the lawyer.
* Because an agent's role (and the nature of a lawyer's supervisory role over
that agent's activities) can change over time, some courts find that an agent's
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communications deserve attorney-client privilege protection at certain times,
but not at other times. Welland v. Trainer, No. 00 Civ. 0738 (JSM), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15556 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001).
In striking contrast to the role of a client's agent in communications between a
lawyer and client, the attorney-client privilege generally protects communications
to or from (or in the presence of) a lawyer's agents whose role is to help the
lawyer provide legal advice to the client.
Examples include: accountants (United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495,
1499 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir.
2000)); translators (Carter v. Cornell Univ., 173 F.R.D. 92, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1997));
private investigators (Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 72 cmt.
a (2000); Welland v. Trainer, No. 00 Civ. 0738 (JSM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15556, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001)); patent agents (Gorman v. Polar
Electro, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)); psychiatrists
(Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1980));
psychologists (Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993)); environmental consultants (Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip.
Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 26 (Conn. 2000)); client employees interviewing other
employees on the lawyer's behalf (Carter v. Cornell Univ., 173 F.R.D. 92, 94
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)); insurance company employees arranging for insureds to be
represented by a lawyer hired by the insurance company (Restatement (Third)
of Law Governing Lawyers § 70 cmt. f (2000); Long v. Anderson Univ., 204
F.R.D. 129,135 (S.D. Ind. 2001)); actuary (Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue
Shield No. 98 Civ. 8520 (BSJ)(MHD), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17281 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 1999)); investment banking firms. Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner, 124 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Taking this skeptical approach, courts have rejected the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege to communications to and from some people claiming to
have been acting on the lawyer's behalf:
Examples include: engineering firm hired to conduct environmental studies
(United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156,
161, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)); accountant (In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-81
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973)); litigation consultant (Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999)); financial advisor (Bowne of
New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1993)); client's consultant hired to prepare a report for submission to the
government (In re Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D. 82, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1992));
company employees compiling data to assist business decision-makers.
Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ. 8520(BSJ)(MHD), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17281 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,1999).
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One interesting debate involves lawyers' arguments that they need a public
relations consultant to help them give legal advice. One court rejected that
argument (Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)), while a more recent case found that a criminal defense lawyer
actually needed a public relations consultant to help give legal advice. In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging the "artificiality" of distinguishing between
public relations firms hired by the targeted corporate executive client and
public relations firms hired by the lawyers, but nevertheless holding that the
privilege would not have protected communications if the client had hired the
public relations firm directly, even "if her object in doing so had been purely to
affect her legal situation").
Lawyers cannot assure this protection simply by retaining the agent or
consultant, or preparing a self-serving letter explaining that the lawyer needs the
consultant's assistance to help give legal advice.
" Courts look at the bona fides of the arrangement. If the consultant is not
actually assisting the lawyer in providing legal advice, communications with
the consultant will not deserve protection.
* In a good example of how courts address this issue, the Southern District of
New York found that one law firm legitimately needed an investment banking
firm's help in understanding its client's financial situation (Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 124 F. Supp. 2d 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)),
while reiectinq another law firm's claim that it needed a public relations
consultant to assist it in giving legal advice to a client. Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Clients and lawyers cannot "launder" an agent's or consultant's advice through
the lawyer in order to protect the communications with the attorney-client
privilege.
* A recent case involving the well-known Hunton & Williams law firm highlights
the risk of thinking that having the lawyer hire the consultant will assure
privilege protection. Asousa P'ship v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. (In re Asousa
P'ship), Bankr. No. 01-12295DWS, Adversary No. 04-1012, 2005 Bankr.
LEXIS 2373, at *19, *35, *14, *16, *18, *19-20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 17,
2005) (assessing privilege claims by a company being sued under a
successor liability theory after purchasing substantially all of the assets of
another company; assessing privileged and work product claims for an asset
valuation prepared by an outside consultant; explaining that the proposal
letter indicates that the valuation report will be used for "'management
planning' purposes"; noting that the company's business executive sent the
proposal to the company's in-house lawyer, who forwarded it to outside
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counsel; quoting outside counsel's response: "'Curtis [outside lawyer] and/or
I should have discussions with the appraiser beforehand, and if you prefer,
H&W [outside counsel Hunton & Williams] can retain the appraiser directly for
Smithfield's benefit in the hope that we can keep the appraisal privileged.
Even if Smithfield retains the appraiser, we can be the recipient of the
appraisal, then forward it to you, which also should help the case for
maintaining its as privileged."'; using harsh language in describing the
privileged claim: "Smithfield engaged in a blatant subterfuge, i.e., using H&W
[outside law firm] as a mere conduit, in order to make its relationship with
Valuation Research [outside consultant] appear privileged."; "this was a
.qhost-hirin.q' on Smithfield's behalf to create the appearance of attorney-
client privilege over the appraisal, as was H&W's subsequent receipt and
'laying of hands' upon the report"; "contemporaneous e-mails evidence that
H&W's involvement in Valuation Research's work was artifice, used solely to
create the appearance of the now-asserted attorney-client privilege"; "Given
the artifice surrounding the Valuation Research appraisal, I find it more likely
that the reference to 'potential litigation,' like H&W's involvement, was added
solely to give rise to a colorable claim that the report is a protected
document."; concluding that "the purpose of the redacted communication is
not to obtain H&W's legal advice or services. To the contrary, these redacted
e-mail exchanges show that H&W was brought into the Valuation Research
engagement solely to 'lay hands' upon the work of Valuation Research in an
attempt to create an attorney-client privilege around what would be an
otherwise an [sic] unprivileged appraisal report. The privilege clearly does not
attach in this situation." (emphases added)).
Although outside lawyers undoubtedly face more pressure to do so than in-house
lawyers, all lawyers must explain to their clients that it really is "too good to be
true" to assure privilege protection by having the lawyer arrange for retention of
an agent or other consultant that will really be providing independent advice to
the client.
Lawyers (outside or in-house) who legitimately need assistance in providing legal
advice to their client should carefully document this need, and probably should
retain those agents/consultants using a retainer letter that memorializes the
privileged nature of the communications and the basis for the privilege.
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D. Content of the Communication
1. Legal Advice
The attorney-client privilege only protects communications that relate to the
request for or rendering of legal advice.
Many lawyers overlook this key element of the attorney-client privilege.
a. The Four Types of Privileged Communications
Four types of communications can meet this standard: Two types of
communications from a client to a lawyer, and two types of communications
from a lawyer to a client.
(1) A client's request for legal advice from a lawyer (explicit or implicit -- a
client's conveyance of a draft document to a lawyer might be an implicit
request for legal advice about the draft).
(2) A client's communication to a lawyer of facts the lawyer needs to give
legal advice (this might be an implicit request for legal advice itself, or
accompany a request for legal advice).
(3) A lawyer's request for facts that the lawyer needs to give legal advice.
(4) A lawyer's legal advice.
In addition, the privilege can cover communications related to these types of
communication.
For example, the privilege can cover a communication from one non-
lawyer company employee to another non-lawyer company employee
(with no copy to or from a lawyer) if the communication discusses the
collection of facts that the lawyer needs to provide legal advice, or if it
paraphrases the advice that the lawyer has given to the company. LonQ v.
Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129, 134 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
b. Misconceptions about the Privilege's Applicability
This "legal advice" element of the attorney-client privilege is another critical
area in which clients' intuition will lead them in the wrong direction.
Most corporate executives would undoubtedly vote "yes" if asked whether
they could assure the privilege protection merely by putting a "privileged"
legend on a document, or by sending a copy of the document to a lawyer.
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These incorrect (but widely held) misperceptions can lead clients to
include unfortunate statements in documents that will not deserve
privilege protection in later litigation.
The privilege does not apply:
" Just because someone has written "privileged" on the document. On the
other hand, some courts point to the absence of such a legend in finding
the privilege inapplicable. MSF Holdingq, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l,
No. 03 Civ. 1818 (PKL) (JCF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXS 34171, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) ("Neither of the e-mails in question bears any
legend identifying it as an attorney-client communication or as a document
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Had FTIC intended to preserve the
confidentiality of these documents, it should have taken such an
elementary precaution.")
* Just because a client communicates with a lawyer. Maine v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 124 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Me. 2001); Alexander
v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 45-46 (D.D.C. 1998).
* Just because a document is in a lawyer's file. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Valdez, 863 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. 1993).
* Just because the client or lawyer send each other transmittal letters.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., Nos. 97
Civ. 6124 (JGK)(THK) & 98 Civ. 3099 (JGK)(THK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7939, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2000).
* Just because a client sends a non-privileged document to a lawyer.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc.. No. 00 C 2855, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18281, at *4 (N.D. III. Nov. 5, 2001); United States v.
Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997).
* Just because a client sends a lawyer a copy of an internal or external
communication. In re Central Gulf Lines, Inc.. No. 97-3829 c/w 99-1888
SECTION: "E" (4), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18019, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 4,
2000); Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609, 633
(M.D. Pa. 1997).
* Just because a non-privileged document is attached to a privileged
document. Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 238 (N.D.
U.C. III. 2000).
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9/25107)
* Just because a lawyer attends a meeting. Marsh v. Safir, No. 99 Civ.
8605 (JGK)(MHD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5136, at *16-17, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 20, 2000).
* Just because a lawyer prepares the minutes of a meeting. Marten v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 268, at
*30-31 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998).
c. Client's Identity
The attorney-client privilege normally does not even protect the client's
identity. Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1997);
Flannigan v. Cudzik, Civ. A. No. 00-0307 SECTION: "K" (4), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18788, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 2000); United States v. Under Seal (In
re Grand Jury Subpoena), 204 F.3d 516, 519-21, 523 (4th Cir. 2000).
* Some courts recognize a very narrow exception to this rule in the case of
criminal cases in which the client's identity will incriminate the client.
Subpoenaed Witness v. United States (In re Subpoenaed Grand Jury
Witness), 171 F.3d 511, 513, 514 (7th Cir. 1999).
d. Attorney's Fees and Bills
The attorney-client privilege normally does not protect information about a
lawyer's fee arrangement with a client, or the amount of fees paid. United
States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedinqs), 33 F.3d 342, 354 (4th Cir.
1994) ("The attorney-client privilege normally does not extend to the payment of
attorney's fees and expenses."); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904-05 (4th
Cir. 1965); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1290,
Misc. No. 99-276 (TFH/JMF), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, at *17-18 (D.D.C.
July 16, 2001).
The privilege might apply to specific information on a lawyer's bill that
would reveal the substance of the lawyer's communications with the client.
Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1999);
Nesse v. Shaw Pittman, 202 F.R.D. 344, 356 (D.D.C. 2001).
e. Facts and Circumstances of the Communication
The attorney-client privilege normally does not protect the facts and
circumstances of the privileged communication (such as where or when the
communication occurred, how long meetings lasted, etc.). Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Maior League Baseball Ass'n, 199 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Okla. 2001).
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* In some situations, such background information can provide adversaries
some possible insight into the substance of privileged communications.
Miles Distribs. Inc. v. Specialty Constr. Brands, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-561
CAN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11061, at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 3, 2005)
(ordering a defendant to answer the question: "After legal reviewed the
letter, were changes made.. .?"; explaining that "[t]his inquiry does not
encroach upon the attorney-client privilege because it is not addressing
the substance of the communication, but addresses the fact of whether
any changes were made.")
f. General Description of the Lawyer's Services
The attorney-client privilege normally does not cover a general description of
the lawyer's services. United States v. Legal Servs., 249 F.3d 1077, 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
It can be very difficult to draw the line between permissible discovery requests
asking for general information about a lawyer's services, and improper
discovery requests that seek the substance of a client-lawyer communication.
* For instance, an adversary probably will be permitted to ask a client "did
you talk with your lawyer about the contract," but probably will not be able
ask "did you talk with your lawyer about the third sentence in section 6 of
the contract?"
g. Historical Facts
It should go without saying that facts themselves are never privileged.
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 69 cmt. d (2000);
I.L.G.W.U. Nat'l Ret. Fund v. Cuddlecoat, Inc., No. 01 Civ.4019(BSJ)(DFE),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2993, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002).
* For instance, the stop light was either red or green -- that fact does not
become privileged just because a client and a lawyer talk about the light.
However, this simple axiom has generated substantial confusion and some
erroneous case law.
Some courts looking just at the language of the principle have improperly
stripped away the privilege from factual portions of an otherwise privileged
communication between a lawyer and a client. Williams v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4219, at *62
(D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2006) (ordering Sprint to produce "nonprivileged
underlying factual information" in otherwise privileged documents);
Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Tex. 2003);
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PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167
(Conn. 2004) (refusing to protect a lawyer's communications to a client
that "merely reported back to [the client] what he had said to a third party
and how the third party had responded"; because the communication was
not "inextricably linked to the giving of legal advice," the memorandum did
not deserve privilege protection; explaining that the memorandum was
simply "a reconstitution of an event that occurred with third parties
involved," and therefore failed the confidentiality component of the
privilege (internal citations omitted)).
" Courts analyzing this issue properly protect the communication about the
facts. In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003);
VEPCO v. Westmoreland-LG&E Partners, 259 Va. 319, 326 (2000)
(rejecting the argument that a letter providing factual information to a
lawyer and seeking legal advice is discoverable because the adversary "is
only seeking factual material, the contents of the letter, not the advice
counsel gave to [clients] concerning the letter"; explaining that "the
substance of the letter in this case constitutes the very matter for which
legal advice was sought. There is no 'factual material' apart from the
substance of the letter itself.").
" Of course, the party seeking the historical facts can engage in the normal
discovery by seeking documents, deposing witnesses, etc., -- but they
cannot invade the privilege protecting communications between clients
and lawyers about those facts.
h. Information Obtained from Third Parties
Courts also debate whether the privilege protects communications in which
lawyers relay to their clients information that the lawyers have obtained from
third parties.
* Some courts take a very narrow view, and find these communications
undeserving of privilege protection. Schmidt, Long & Assocs., Inc. v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., Civ. A. No. 00-CV-3683, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7145, at *10-12 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2001).
* Courts are more likely to protect the communications if they include some
lawyer input or analysis. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-1 1-189,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *98, 99, 100 n.51 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3,
2001).
i. Most Narrow View of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Some courts take an extremely narrow view of the "legal advice" requirement.
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" See, e.g., Seibu Corp. v. KPMG LLP, No. 3-00-CV-1139-X, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 906, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2002) (in assessing KPMG's
lawyer-run investigation into its audit of a client, finding that KPMG had
failed to establish that "any particular communication in connection with
that investigation facilitated the rendition of legal advice to the client";
noting that the majority of documents relating to the investigation involved
the determination of whether a KPMG partner should be required to
withdraw, and noting that "[e]ven if lawyers were involved in making this
decision, it is primarily an exercise of business judgment"; "The fact that
counsel initiated the investigation that led to [the partner's] withdrawal
does not cloak every communication made in that context with attorney-
client privilege. KPMG still must prove that the communication was made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to the client.").
* Some courts examine the substance of a lawyer's advice in determining
whether it is specific enough to warrant protection. Burton v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661, 673 (D. Kan. 2001).
* Another narrow view of the "legal advice" requirement holds that the
attorney-client privilege by definition will not protect documents prepared
for review both by a lawyer and a non-lawyer. In re Central Gulf Lines,
Inc., No. 97-3829 c/w 99-1888 SECTION: "E" (4), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18019, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2000).
* Some courts parse communications so carefully that they deny privilege
protection to a communication made by the client at a meeting after the
lawyer rendered legal advice, holding that by definition the communication
could not have been made to assist the lawyer in rendering the advice.
Marsh v. Safir, No. 99 Civ. 8605 (JGK)(MHD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5136, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000).
2. Lawyers Playing Other Roles
Both inside and outside counsel can play roles other than as legal advisors, and
the privilege does not protect communications to or from the lawyers acting in
those other roles.
Courts have denied privilege protection for communications to or from a
lawyer acting as: friend (Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 72
cmt. c (2000)); negotiator (Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp.,
No. 93 Civ. 5125, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 671, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996));
arranger of mailings (Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150
F.R.D. 465, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); political advisor (In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998)); committee member
(Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 U.S. Dist.
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LEXIS 268, at *25 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998)); public relations specialist (Amway
Corp. v. P & G Co.. No. 1:98cv 726, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *21-22
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001)); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D.
661 (D. Kan. 2001); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365
(E.D.N.Y. 1996)); lobbyist (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d 270
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring the production of documents by lawyers who
assisted Marc Rich in seeking a pardon from President Clinton); United States
Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 164 (E.D.N.Y.
1994)); corporate officer (Lee v. Engle, Civ. A. Nos. 13323 & 13284, 1995 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 149, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1995)); collection agent (E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 718 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 1998));
accreditation consultant (Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 895
F. Supp. 88, 90-91 (E.D. Pa. 1995)); technical advisor (Fruehauf Trailer Corp.
v. Hagelthorn, 528 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)); expert witness (ABA
LEO 407 (5/13/77)); advisor on "engineering or equipment concerns" (In re
General Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., 190 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. III. 2000));
accountant (United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1999));
tax preparer (United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500, 501 (7th Cir.
1999)); investment advisor (Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.
1981)); agent for the transfer of funds (Rails v. United States, 52 F.3d 223, 226
(9th Cir. 1995)); claims investigator or adjuster (St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v.
Commercial Fin. Corp., 197 F.R.D. 620 (N.D. Iowa 2000)); scrivener (Prevue
Pet Prods., Inc. v. Avian Adventures, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 413,416 (N.D. III. 2001)).
At one time, courts disagreed about the availability of privilege protection for
communications to and from patent lawyers -- some courts held that patent
lawyers simply acted as a "conduit" for submitting factual information to the
government (Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Pharmacia, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 116, 126 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), while other courts found that such communications deserve privilege
protection. Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 633 (W.D.N.Y.
1993).
There has not been much recent case law on this issue, but the trend seems
to be in favor of protecting such communications. Conoco, Inc. v. Warner-
Lambert Co., Civ. A. No. 99-101 (KSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1605, at *29
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2000).
In a key debate about this issue, some courts hold that the privilege does not
protect communications to or from a lawyer acting as an investigator. Finova
Capital Corp. v. Lawrence, No. 3-99-CV-2552-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2087, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2001); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
No. 93-5968-C, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598, at *7, *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov.
29, 2001).
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Most courts take the opposite approach. Better Gov't Bureau v. McGraw (In
re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 602-03 (4t' Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047(1998); Harding v. Dana Transp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.N.J.
1996); United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 405 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3. Mixed Communications
a. Communications with Mixed Legal/Business Purposes
Courts often wrestle with communications that deal with both legal and
business concerns.
" Most courts protect mixed legal-business communications if legal advice
was the "primary purpose" of the communication. Cruz v. Coach Stores,
Inc., 196 F.R.D. 228, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Nesse v. Shaw Pittman, 202
F.R.D. 344, 358 (D.D.C. 2001).
" Courts have applied this approach to in-house lawyers. Kelly v. Ford Motor
Co. (In re Ford Motor Co.), 110 F.3d 954, 966 (3d Cir. 1997); United States
Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
* Some courts have found that even investigations run by corporate law
departments and involving in-house lawyers do not deserve privilege
protection because the investigations were primarily motivated by
business concerns rather than the need for legal advice. Seibu Corp. v.
KPMG LLP, No. 3-00-CV-1 139-X, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 906, at *11 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2002); Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98cv
726, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *26-27 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
Courts sometimes point to wide circulation of privileged communication in
finding that the communication primarily related to business (rather than legal)
matters, and thus did not deserve privilege protection at all. de Espana v.
Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 (LTS) (RLE), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33334, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2005) (assessing a privilege claim;
noting that the email recipients included a number of business executives;
"The inclusion of ABS employees outside the legal department as recipients
further support [sic] the conclusion that the e-mails contain business advice.");
Lyondell-Citgo Refining, LP v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., No. 02 Civ.
0795 (CBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26076, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2004)
(explaining that "the inclusion of people outside the legal department in the
recipient list further supported the conclusion that the email contained
business advice.")
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One court analyzed this issue by comparing the small number of
executives receiving the privileged communications to the total number of
the company's employees -- which weighed against a finding that that the
disclosure indicated a non-privileged purpose. SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Plaintiff has
identified with specificity nearly every person who received each
document.... Each document purportedly served the purpose of either
securing or providing legal advice or legal services - they were not routine
business communications. .. . None of these documents was widely
distributed. The recipient lists were limited to between five and twenty-five
individuals within a 50,000-person organization.").
b. Communications with Mixed Components
If a communication contains both privileged and non-privileged components,
the privilege protects only the former.
In the case of documents, this principle sometimes calls for the producing
party to redact the privileged portion of such a mixed document. Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.D.C. 2004).
, As a practical matter, litigants seem to use such redaction only in
documents containing discrete portions that obviously lend themselves to
such a process (such as agendas or minutes of meetings with clearly
separate sections that can be considered individually).
4. Special Rules for In-House Lawyers
Because in-house lawyers often provide business or other nonlegal advice, most
courts apply a heightened scrutiny to communications to or from in-house
counsel. United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999). B.F.G. of
Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99 C 4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at *15,
16, 16-17, 21 (N.D. II1. Nov. 8, 2001) (explaining that the court "will not tolerate
the use of in-house counsel to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise non-
privileged business communications"; recognizing that there is "a particular
burden" on a corporation to demonstrate why communications with an in-house
lawyer "deserve protection and are not merely business documents"; ordering
certain documents to be produced and awarding attorneys' fees based on an
incomplete and inaccurate privilege log prepared by the Chicago law firm of
Winston & Strawn for its client Ameritech); Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble
Co., No. 1:98cv 726, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *17-18 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3,
2001) ("The mere fact that a certain function is performed by an individual with a
law degree will not render the communications made to the individual privileged..
. Where, as here, in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of an
otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a heavy burden on
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the proponent to make a clear showing that counsel is acting in a professional
legal capacity and that the document reflects legal, as opposed to business,
advice.").
In undertaking this analysis, courts sometimes look at whether the corporate
employee possessing a law degree works as part of the corporation's law
department. Boca Investerinqs P'ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12
(D.D.C. 1998) ("There is a presumption that a lawyer in the legal department
or working for the general counsel is most often giving legal advice, while the
opposite presumption applies to a lawyer. .. who works for the Financial
Group or some other seemingly management or business side of the house..
. . A lawyer's place on the organizational chart is not always dispositive, and
the relative presumption therefore may be rebutted by the party asserting the
privilege").
" Those with law degrees working outside the law department will have even a
more difficult time proving that their communications deserve privilege
protection. Boca Investerincs P'ship v. United States 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12
(D.D.C. 1998).
5. CrimelFraud
The attorney-client privilege obviously does not protect communications relating
to a client's planning for commission of a future crime. Restatement (Third) of
Law Governing Lawyers § 82 (2000).
* Of course, the privilege can cover communications between clients and
lawyers about past crimes, frauds or other wrongdoing (under the right
circumstance).
* The crime-fraud "exception" (which really is not an exception at all) applies
only to communications about future wrongdoing.
Most courts require the party seeking to overcome the attorney-client privilege by
relying on the crime-fraud exception to make some level of an independent
showing of probable cause that a crime or other covered wrongdoing has been
committed or was planned, and that the privileged information related to the
crime or wrongdoing. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217, 219 (3d Cir.
2000); United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 33 F.3d 342,
348 (4th Cir. 1994); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 186 B.R. 219,
222 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Va.
1992); Cocqdill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 276 (1978).
The crime-fraud exception does not apply 'simply because privileged
communications would provide an adversary with evidence of a crime or
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fraud."' United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23180 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2003) (internal citation omitted).
The court also recognized a separate (lower) level of proof required to justify an
in-camera review of the privileged communications to determine if the
crime-fraud exception applies. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 23
(1 st Cir. 2005) (noting that many decisions focus on the level of proof necessary
to justify a court's in camera review of the communications at issue, rather than
on the standard required to actually strip away the privilege; the former analysis
generally requires a "prima facie" finding that the otherwise privileged
communications involved a future crime, while the latter requires that "there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to
foster a crime or fraud.")
Judicial discussion of the crime-fraud exception often involves one of two issues.
First, courts debate what wrongdoing can trigger the crime-fraud exception.
* All courts apply the doctrine to crimes. Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d
143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967).
* Most courts also apply it to fraud. United States v. Richard Roe, Inc. (In re
Richard Roe, Inc.), 168 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1999).
" Other courts have extended the doctrine to: bad faith litigation conduct
(Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puiq, 968 F. Supp. 1227,1241 (N.D. II1. 1996)); "a
conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights" (Horizon of Hope Ministry v.
Clark County, Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1986)); "gross negligence"
(Derrick Mfg. Corp. v. Southwestern Wire Cloth, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 813, 816
(S.D. Tex. 1996)); intentional torts (Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers § 82 cmt. d (2000)); unprofessional or unethical behavior (Blanchard
v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 241 (N. D. II1. 2000)); false discovery
responses and deposition testimony (Patel v. Allison, 54 Va. Cir. 155 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000); electronic document spoliation. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG,
220 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Second, courts disagree about the relationship required between the wrongdoing
and the otherwise privileged communication.
Some courts merely require some connection between the wrongdoing and
the communication (United States v. Paz, 124 F. App'x 743, 746 (3d Cir.
2005) (explaining that the crime fraud exception applied if the otherwise
privileged communication was "related" to the criminal activity); In re Grand
Jury Proceeding Impounded, 241 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2001); while most courts
insist that the otherwise privileged communication have played a role in
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furthering the crime or fraud. Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States,
226 F.R.D. 118, 133 (D.D.C. 2005) (requiring that the client "'made or received
the otherwise privileged communication with the intent to further an unlawful or
fraudulent act"' (internal citation omitted). In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Liticq.,
270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001); Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98
Civ. 926 (CSH), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17920, at *35, 36 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
2001).
* Significantly, most courts do not require that the lawyer realize that his or her
communication is assisting the wrongdoing. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec.
jtc., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001).
Some courts' expansive application of the crime-fraud exception had threatened
to swallow the attorney-client privilege, but a recent case took a welcome narrow
view -- requiring that a securities law plaintiff present some proof of fraudulent
conduct, and criticizing the lower court for failing to conduct an in-camera review
of the pertinent documents. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Liticq., 270 F.3d 639
(8 th Cir. 2001).
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E. Context of the Communication
1. Expectation of Confidentiality
a. Basis of the Requirement
As discussed above, the attorney-client privilege depends on the intimacy of
the attorney-client relationship, and exists only to the extent that the client
expects the communication to remain confidential within that attorney-client
relationship. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. 2001).
b. Treating Privileged Communications Like the "Crown Jewels"
Clients and lawyers must remember that the privilege will survive only if they
treat privileged communications very carefully.
* One court used a colorful but accurate phrase when discussing how
careful clients and their lawyers must be. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d
976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[I]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it
must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like
jewels --if not crown jewels.").
Courts continue to emphasize this concept, even if they do not use that
phrase.
Chase v. City of Portsmouth, Civ. No. 2:05cv446, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29294, at *20 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2006) (holding that a City Attorney's letter
to the City Council and others deserved privilege protection; but finding
that the City had lost the privilege protection by not treating the letter
carefully enough -- pointing to the transmission of the letter in unsealed
plain envelopes and through use of a fax machine in a City Council
member's home (even pointing to the lack of a written policy on the
treatment of privileged documents, and to the lack of any training
programs on the privilege); also finding that the letter deserved work
product protection, which can survive "[I]imited disclosure to third parties"
and therefore continued to protect the letter).
c. Relationship to the Waiver Doctrine
The "expectation of confidentiality" requirement is related to the waiver
doctrine (discussed below).
Communications made with no expectation of confidentiality deserve no
privilege protection from the beginning, while privileged communications
or documents may later lose their privilege protection if they are shared
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with others (the privilege having been "waived"). Griffith v. Davis, 161
F.R.D. 687, 694 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
0 The main difference between these two concepts arises if the
communication is shared with someone outside the attorney-client privilege.
This sharing of privileged communications outside the attorney-client
relationship can cause a subiect matter waiver - requiring the disclosure of
additional documents on the same subject matter (this is explained below).
This sharing of non-privileged documents does not carry this additional risk.
Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191,198 (Colo. 2001).
d. Communications in the Presence of Third Parties
The attorney-client privilege does not protect communications conducted in
the presence of those outside the attorney-client privilege. United States v.
Pelullo, 5 F. Supp. 2d 285, 289 (D.N.J. 1998).
Courts have held that the presence of third parties (outside the intimacy of the
attorney-client relationship) can prevent the privilege from ever arising.
Examples include: friend (United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir.
1997)); family member (D.A.S. v. State, 863 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1993));
outside company accountant attending a board of directors meeting
(Ampa Ltd. v. Kentfield Capital LLC, No. 00 Civ. 0508 (NRB)(AJP), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11638, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000)); independent
contractor or consultant on mental health issues (Crowley v. L.L. Bean,
Inc., No. 00-1 83-P-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3726, at *3 (D. Me. Feb. 1,
2001)); third-party doctor participating in a telephone call between a
lawyer and a client (Cooney v. Booth, 198 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 2000));
investment banker attending a corporate board meeting (Nat'l Educ.
Training Group, Inc. v. SkillSoft Corp.. No. M8-85 (WHP), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8680, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1999)); spouse (Wesp v. Everson,
33 P.3d 191, 199 (Colo. 2001)); employee from another company (Ligget
Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 211
(M.D.N.C. 1986)); co-worker (State v. Longo, 789 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990)); ally (Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 178
F.R.D. 61,72 (E.D. Va.), aff'd in part, modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456
(E.D. Va. 1998)); witness attending a meeting between a client and lawyer
(Jones v. Ada S. McKinley Cmty. Servs., No. 89 C 0319, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14312, at *4 (N.D. III. Nov. 28, 1989)); videographer preparing to
videotape a dying plaintiffs statement.
Courts sometimes apply this principle in surprising situations. Black v.
State, 920 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting a convicted
robber's appeal, which was based on the court's admission of the robber's
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn(9/25/07)
statements during a telephone call he placed from jail to his lawyer; noting
that the robber's sister placed the call and then stayed on the line - thus
destroying any chance of privilege); Grenier v. City of Norwalk,
No. X06CV0001694835, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3719, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2004) (holding that a plaintiff's lawyer waived the
privilege by speaking to his terminally ill client in front of a videographer
setting up to videotape a statement by the client; noting that "[t]he attorney
could have easily and effectively communicated with his client outside of
[the videographer's] presence").
Some courts have held that otherwise privileged communications occurring in
the presence of third parties lose the protection only if someone actually
overheard the privileged communication. Ashkinazi v. Sapir, No. 02 CV 0002
(RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14523, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
2. Expectation of Disclosure
The mirror-image of the "expectation of confidentiality" is of course an
expectation that a communication will be disclosed outside the intimate attorney-
client relationship.
It should go without saying that communications the client expects to reveal to
others do not deserve protection under the attorney-client privilege. Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 71 cmt. d (2000).
0 This includes such common documents as securities filings, offering for proxy
materials, etc. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir.
2000).
Some courts erroneously apply the "expectation of disclosure" principle beyond
just the documents intended to be revealed -- stripping away privilege protection
for all related materials.
This concept does not make much sense, but some state courts and federal
courts have relied on this principle to trip away privilege protection.
Courts taking what seems to be a more common-sense view apply the privilege
to any information that is not ultimately disclosed. Schenet v. Anderson, 678
F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
3. Drafts
Courts' analysis of the "expectation of confidentiality" element of the attorney-
client privilege (and some courts' misapplication of that issue) can be critical
when courts consider the privilege protection applicable to internal drafts of
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documents whose final version will be disclosed outside the attorney-client
relationship.
" Some courts apply the "expectation of confidentiality" doctrine broadly, and
preclude any privilege or work product protection for such drafts. Burton v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Kan. 1997) ("When
documents are prepared for dissemination to third parties, neither the
document itself, nor preliminary drafts, are entitled to immunity. Documents
which the client does not reasonably believe will remain confidential are not
protected."); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 93-5968-C,
2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598, at *9, *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2001).
* Other courts take what is the more logical approach, and protect any drafts
that are not ultimately revealed. Muncy v. City of Dallas, Civ. A. No. 3:99-CV-
2960-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18675, at *10-11 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2001);
Lonq v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Nesse v. Shaw
Pittman, 202 F.R.D. 344, 351 (D.D.C. 2001); Alexander v. FBI, 198 F.R.D. 306,
312 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Drafts of documents that are prepared with the
assistance of counsel for release to a third party are protected under attorney-
client privilege."); N.V. Orcanon v. Elan Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 11674 (JGK)
(RLE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5629, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2000).
Although it should make no difference from a conceptual standpoint, lawyers
might want to consider communicating their thoughts about drafts in separate
documents directed to their clients.
* For example, a lawyer reviewing a draft proxy statement or a client's affidavit
intended to be used in litigation should consider conveying legal advice about
those documents in a memorandum to the client that articulates the privileged
nature of the communication and has a proper legend on it.
" A court conducting an in camera review of documents included on a privilege
log in later litigation might be more inclined to protect such a document, while
the same court might misapply the "expectation of confidentiality" principle
and order the production of a draft of the document itself, which contains a
lawyer's handwritten note scribbled on the margin -- even if the handwritten
marginal note contains the same substantive legal advice as the stand-alone
memorandum.
4. Common Interest Doctrine
The "joint defense" or "common interest" doctrine is in some ways an anomaly in
the law of privilege.
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9125107)
a. History of the Doctrine
Starting with an old Virginia case (Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 822, 841-43 (1871)), court carved out an exception to both the
"expectation of confidentiality" and the "waiver" concepts.
The exception permitted certain outsiders who were not within the
intimacy of the attorney-client relationship to engage in communications
that were privileged from the beginning, or later share privileged
communications -- without causing a waiver.
* Those originally included within this narrow exception were criminal co-
defendant who wanted to cooperate with their fellow co-defendants in
preparing a cooperative defense to the government's criminal charges.
b. Expansion to the "Common Interest" Doctrine
Starting with what was called the "joint defense" doctrine, court eventually
expanded this exception -- most courts ultimately calling it the "common
interest" doctrine to represent this expanded concept. In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990)
(noting that what was called the "joint defense privilege" is "more properly
identified as the 'common interest rule' (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 892
F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989))).
c. Difference between the Common Interest Doctrine and Multiple
Representations
Although some courts get it wrong, the "common interest" doctrine is
fundamentally different from the "multiple representation" situation discussed
above -- which involves the same lawyer representing more than one client
on the same matter.
* In contrast, the "common interest" doctrine applies to communication
among different clients with different lawyers. Restatement (Third) of Law
Governingq Lawyers § 76 cmt. e (2000).
* Surprisingly, some courts use the term "common interest doctrine" when
referring to multiple clients retaining the same lawyer -- although that
situation involves a joint representation, not a "common interest"
arrangement. Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292,
294 (4 th Cir. 2004).
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d. True Nature of the Common Interest Doctrine
Properly considered, the "common interest" doctrine is not a separate
privilege or protection -- it instead merely eliminates what would be the ill
effects of the "expectation of confidentiality" element (which would otherwise
defeat the privilege ab initio if those outside the intimate attorney-client
relationship participate in the original communication) or the "waiver" element
(which would otherwise destroy the privilege if protected communications are
shared outside the intimate attorney-client relationship). McNally Tunneling
Corp. v. City of Evanston, No. 00 C 6979, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170902, at
*6 (N.D. II1. Oct. 16, 2001).
e. Courts Taking a Broad View of the Common Interest Doctrine
Courts taking a broad view of the common interest doctrine protect
communications between co-defendants and co-plaintiffs, whether or not
litigation has actually begun, and whether or not the clients sharing the
common interests also have some adverse interests. Restatement (Third) of
Law Governing Lawyers § 76 cmt. e (2000); United States v. Moscony, 927
F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); United States v.
Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987); Prevue Pet Prods., Inc. v. Avian
Adventures, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 413, 417 (N.D. II1. 2001); Wsol v. Fiduciary Mcqmt.
Assocs., Inc., No. 99 C 1719, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19002, at *14-15 (N.D. Il1.
Dec. 6, 1999).
f. Courts Taking a Narrow View of the Common Interest Doctrine
Many courts take a narrow view of the common interest doctrine, and the
trend appears to be in favor of narrowing the doctrine's reach. United States
v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369,1392 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239
(1997).
First, courts are increasingly likely to find that the "common interest" is
commercial rather than legal, thus rendering the doctrine inapplicable.
In one celebrated case, a well-known New York law firm representing a
bank in a large merger shared privileged communications with J. P.
Morgan and Goldman Sachs, who acted as the bank's investment
advisors. Stenovitch v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). When investors sued the bank, the law firm
attempted to rely on the "common interest" doctrine to protect the
communication shared with the investment advisors -- who otherwise
would have been the kind of client agents who (as explained above) are
outside the attorney-client relationship.
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" A New York court rejected the common interest argument, and found that
the law firm had waived the bank's privilege by sharing protected
communications with investment advisors.
" Even worse, the court found that the sharing caused a subject matter
waiver -- thus requiring the bank to disclose even more protected
communications to the private plaintiffs (the concept of the "subject matter
waiver" is discussed below).
Second, courts are increasingly requiring that participants in a common
interest agreement be involved in or anticipate litigation before applying the
doctrine.
* Some courts apply the doctrine only in the case of pending litigation.
Boston Auction Co. v. Western Farm Credit Bank, 925 F. Supp. 1478,
1482-83 (D. Haw. 1996).
* Some courts require that litigation be a "palpable reality." In re Santa Fe
Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
* One case required the same sort of "anticipation of litigation" necessary
for the work product doctrine protection (discussed below) before it
recognized the efficacy of a "common interest" agreement. United States
v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 383, 390 (M.D.N.C. 2003); American
Legqacy Found. v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Civ. A. No. 19406, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 157 at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004) (finding that a Wilmer Cutler client
had not waived the attorney-client privilege covering that law firm's advice by
sharing the advice with the client's advertising agency, because the client
and the agency could "foresee potential litigation" and therefore could rely
on the "common interest doctrine").
g. Privileged Nature of the Common Interest Agreement Itself
Courts disagree about the privileged nature of the common interest
agreement itself. McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, No. 00 C
6979, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090 (E.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2001); Power Mosfet
Techs. v. Siemens AG, No. 2:99CV1 68, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19898, at *13
n.12 (E.D. Tex. Oct 30, 2000).
h. Later Adversity Among Common Interest Agreement Participants
Later adversity between common interest participants can have differing
effects, depending on the degree of adversity.
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First, litigation adversity among participants in a common interest agreement
normally deprives any of the participants from withholding privileged
communications from their adversary. United States v. Acqnello, 135 F. Supp.
2d 380 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 16 F. App'x 57 (2d Cir. 2001); Hillerich & Bradsby
Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124,127 (D.D.C. 1998).
Second, less serious adversity between common interest participants
generally will not destroy each participant's right to "veto" another participant's
attempt to reveal protected communications.
For instance, a company entering into a common interest agreement with
an executive might lose the sole power to control the privilege if the
company and executive later become adversaries, but not begin litigating
against each other. Under Seal v. United States (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena), 415 F.3d 333 (4 th Cir. 2005) (finding that the executive hoping
to veto the company's disclosure of privileged communications to the
government had not established the existence of a common interest
agreement between the company and executive).
* A law firm representing one member of a common interest agreement
consortium may be prohibited by the conflicts of interest rules from later
taking positions adverse to another member, absent a prospective or
contemporaneous consent after full disclosure. GTE North, Inc. v. Apache
Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. III. 1996).
* One well-known law firm recently lost a battle involving this issue. In re
Gabapentin Patent Litig., 407 F. Supp. 2d 607, 615 (D.N.J. 2005)
(disqualifying Kaye Scholer from representing the plaintiff Pfizer in a large
case, because Kaye Scholer had hired two lawyers who had previously
worked at another firm for one of the defendants in the case; noting that
two lawyers had obtained their former client's consent for Kaye Scholer to
represent the plaintiff, and that Kaye Scholer had completely screened
them from the firm's representation of Pfizer, but concluding that the two
lawyers Kaye Scholer hired had a "fiduciary and implied attorney-client
relationship" with the other defendants who had been part of a common
interest arrangement, so that they could seek Kaye Scholer's
disqualification from representing the plaintiff).
i. Dangers of Common Interest Agreements
Governmental investigators or prosecutors often view with suspicion any
cooperation between companies and their employees, so company lawyers
handling criminal matters should be very careful when entering into joint
defense agreements with company employees.
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Even in civil litigation, if the applicable privilege law does not protect the
common interest agreement itself, there is some danger that an adversary
might rely upon the agreement to bolster some conspiracy claim.
In appropriate circumstances, company lawyers should arrange for a written
common interest agreement with company employees, affiliates, or third
parties with whom the company might share a common legal interest.
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F. Use: Avoiding Waiver of the Privilege
1. General Rules
Lawyers play an especially important role in avoiding waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, because clients cannot be expected to understand some of the waiver
doctrine's subtleties.
Even some of the seemingly basic waiver rules can create complications.
For instance, a waiver usually occurs only if the disclosure is voluntary -- not if it
is compelled. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 79 cmt. g
(2000); Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co. No. 1:98cv 726, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4561 (\/.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
However, a litigant seeking to avoid a finding of waiver might argue that a
hastily ordered document production amounted to a compelled disclosure
(Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650-51 (9th Cir.
1978)), or contend that the production of a privileged document was
"compelled" because they would have lost a fight over privilege. Urban Box
Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P., No. 01 Civ. 8854 (LTS)
(THK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21229 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004) (rejecting this
argument).
Although all courts agree that the privilege's proponent has the burden proof,
courts have debated who has the burden of proving waiver.
Some courts hold that privilege's proponent must prove lack of waiver (Wells
v. Liddy, 37 F. App'x 53, 65 (4 th Cir. 2002)), while other courts place the
burden on the party challenging the privilege. Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 02-3263 Section "M" (2), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1027, at *26 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2004) (holding that "[o]nce a claim of
privilege has been established, the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking
discovery to prove any applicable exception to the privilege, such as waiver").
Many clients (and even lawyers) are surprised by the attorney-client privilege's
fragility.
* The attorney-client privilege is so fragile that Martha Stewart waived the
attorney-client privilege covering an e-mail to her lawyer by later sharing the
e-mail with her own daughter. United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
* Voluntarily disclosing privileged communications to someone outside the
intimacy of the attorney-client relationship generally causes a waiver even if
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the privilege's owner and the third party enter into a strict confidentiality
agreement -- which may create a contractual obligation to keep the
communications secret, but which does not prevent destruction of the
privilege protection. Urban Box Office Network, Inc., v. Interfase Managers,
L.P., No. 01 Civ. 8854 (LTS) (THK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21229 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2004). This means that others who are not bound by the contractual
agreement generally may seek access to the shared communications that
were previously privileged.
2. Who Can Waive the Privilege
One key question is of course who can waive a corporation's attorney-client
privilege -- since many agents of the corporation deal with communication whose
privilege is owned by the intangible institution.
a. Current Company Employees
Some courts hold that only a company's management may waive the
attorney-client privilege. United States v. Aqnello, 135 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384-
85 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
Other courts hold that employees trusted with privileged information may also
waive the attorney-client privilege. Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 638
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696
n.6, 698-99 (E.D. Va. 1987).
Even these courts hold that a disloyal employee may not waive the
corporation's privilege by surreptitiously revealing privileged information.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2000).
b. Former Company Employees
Most courts hold that a corporation's former officers and the directors or
employees cannot waive the corporation's privilege. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001); Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., No.
03AP-1 02, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 15 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004).
* As discussed above, courts have debated whether corporations can deny
requests by now-adverse former executives or directors for access to
privileged communications to which they had access while working for the
corporation.
" Of course, finding that former directors or executives are entitled to see
privileged documents to which they had access while at the company
does not give them the right to waive the company's privilege.
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c. Lawyers
Most courts hold that a company's lawyer may waive the privilege.
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 78 cmt. c (2000).
d. Jointly Represented Clients
Jointly represented clients generally must join in any waiver of the jointly
owned attorney-client privilege. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers § 75 cmt. e (2000).
This is one of the reasons why lawyers should rarely (if ever) enter into a
joint representation of a company and an employee on the same matter.
Under Seal v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 415 F.3d 333
(4 th Cir. 2005) (finding that company lawyers did not jointly represent an
executive, so that the company maintained sole ownership of the privilege
and did not need the executive's permission to provide the government
access to privileged communications with the executive).
If the formerly jointly represented clients become litigation adversaries, either
of the clients generally can use the privileged communications against their
now-adversary. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 75 cmt. d
(2000).
e. Common Interest Agreement Participants
Analyzing who can waive the privilege becomes more complicated in
situations where clients share a lawyer or have entered into a common
interest arrangement.
First, no single client who is jointly represented, and no single member of a
common interest arrangement may waive the privilege covering joint
communications -- all of the clients or all of the common interest participants
generally must join in any waiver. Restatement (Third) of Law Governinq
Lawyers § 76 cmt. g (2000); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913
F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990).
Second, if jointly represented clients become adversaries in a future
proceeding, either one may generally waive the privilege that would otherwise
cover their joint communications with their common lawyer. Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 75 & cmt. d (2000); FDIC v. Ogden
Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000).
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* The former jointly represented client might even be given access to
communications between the other client and the common lawyer to which
the client was not privy at the time.
Third, if participants in a common interest arrangement become adversaries
in a future proceeding, generally any of the participants may use otherwise
privileged communications against the others. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v.
MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Opus
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D. Minn. 1996).
* Unlike a joint defense arrangement, a common interest agreement
participant in such a situation will not be given access to private
communications that the other participants had with their own lawyers.
* However, each participant's lawyer's receipt of confidential information as
part of the common interest arrangement generally will disqualify the
lawyer from adversity to other participants, absent a prospective or
contemporaneous consent. GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F.
Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. III. 1996).
3. Express Waiver Outside the Company
Sharing privileged communications outside the company normally does not
amount to a waiver if they are shared with other companies in the same
corporate family or under some common interest agreement. Tenneco Auto.
Inc. v. El Paso Corp. Civ. A. No. 18810-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138, at *5-6 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 5, 2001); Stroucqo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
On the other hand, common sense would dictate that voluntarily sharing
privileged communications outside the corporation risks waiver of the privilege.
Such disclosure can occur intentionally or inadvertently.
a. Intentional Disclosure
The intentional sharing privileged communications outside the company
normally waives the attorney-client privilege.
* One court used a trite but useful phrase in assessing waiver. United
States v. Morrell-Corrada, 343 F. Supp. 2d 80, 88 (D.P.R. 2004) ("Where
a client chooses to share communications between himself and his
lawyer outside the 'magic circle' of secretaries and interpreters, the courts
have usually found a waiver of the privilege.").
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Courts have found that clients (or their lawyers) sharing privileged
communications with the following third parties causes a waiver:
investment banker (United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999);
National Educ. Traininq Group, Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85 (WHP),
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8680, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999); In re
Consol. Litiq. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666
F. Supp. 1148,1156-57 (N.D. II1. 1987)); investment advisor (Stenovitch v.
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003));
bank (White v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 98 C 50070, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7273, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2000)); public relations firm (Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); ERISA plan
administrator (found to be a fiduciary acting on behalf of the beneficiaries,
and not a company representative) (Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan,
203 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2001)); accountant Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199
F.R.D. 515, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 n.10 (D. Md. 1995); Am. Health
Sys., Inc. v. Liberty Health Sys., No. 90-3112, 1991 WL 42310, at *5-6 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 26,1991); Gramm v. Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 5122,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 773, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 25, 1990).
" Some courts are surprisingly harsh in situations that many companies might
face. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. Ride & Show Enq'q, Inc., 230
F.R.D. 688, 698 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (assessing a litigant's efforts to obtain
the return of inadvertently produced privileged documents; noting that the
litigant had sent the documents to an outside copy service after putting
tabs on the privileged documents, and had directed the copy service to
copy everything but the tabbed documents and send them directly to the
adversary; noting that the litigant had not reviewed the copy service's work
or ordered a copy of what the service had sent the adversary;
emphasizing what the court called the "most serious failure to protect the
privilege" -- the litigant's "knowing and voluntary release of privileged
documents to a third party -- the copying service -- with whom it had no
confidentiality agreement. Having taken the time to review the documents
and tab them for privilege, RSE's counsel should have simply pulled the
documents out before turning them over to the copying service. RSE also
failed to protect its privilege by promptly reviewing the work performed by
the outside copying service."; refusing to order the adversary to return the
inadvertently produced documents).
Clients of large and prestigious law firms have been on the losing end of
such waiver analyses. American Legacy Found. v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,
C.A. No. 19406, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 157 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004) (holding
that Wilmer Cutler's client had waived the privilege by sharing the law firm's
advice with its public relations firm; rejecting the law firm's argument that the
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public relations firm's employees were the "functional equivalent" of the
client's employees, or that they were agents of the client; concluding that the
firm's client and the public relations firm did not share the necessary
"common interest," because the relationship between them was not
"supervised by counsel"); Stenovitch v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
756 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (rejecting Wachtell, Lipton's
argument that its bank client and various investment advisors shared a
''common interest"; holding that disclosure of privileged communications to
the investment advisors waived the client's privilege, and finding a subject
matter waiver).
Clients or their lawyers generally waive the privilege by sharing privileged
communications even during such legally encouraged activities such as
settlement talks. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 951
(W.D.N.Y. 1996).
Normally even a strict confidentiality agreement cannot avoid a waiver.
Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
This is another way that the privilege differs dramatically from the work
product doctrine -- as explained below, a confidentiality agreement can
make all the difference when sharing work product.
Worse yet, waiving the privilege as to one third party outside the intimate
attorney-client relationship almost always waives it as to everyone else --
meaning that the protection disappears forever.
Two recent lines of cases are consistent with this general approach, but might
surprise some clients.
* First, sharing privileged communications with the government in nearly
every case waives the privilege. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Tyco Int'l,
Inc. Multidistrict Litig., MDL Docket No. 02-1335-03, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4541 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2004); Spanierman Gallery v. Merrit, No. 00 Civ.
5712 (LTS)(THK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22141 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2003);
United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003); McKesson
HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004);
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 597 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
* Only a few cases hold out any hope for avoiding a waiver when sharing
privileged communications with the government. In re Natural Gas
Commodities Litig., 232 F.R.D. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (assessing the
waiver effect of a company disclosing to the government documents
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generated in the course of an internal investigation; "Pursuant to the
Second Circuit's holding in Steinhardt, courts in this district have held that
voluntary disclosure to government agencies pursuant to an explicit non-
waiver agreement does not waive the attorney or representative work
product or attorney-client privilege.... Plaintiffs argue that the Order
should be set aside because a majority of Circuits have held that
disclosure of privileged materials constitutes waiver even where disclosure
was pursuant to a non-waiver agreement.... However, Magistrate Judge
Peck correctly held that the Court is bound by Second Circuit authority
and is not free to adopt the opinion of other circuits."; finding no waiver).
" Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,
646 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Salomon Bros. Treasury Litiq. v. Steinhard Partners,
L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
* Second, sharing privileged communications with a company's outside
auditor normally waives the privilege. Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific
Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. South Chicagqo
Bank, No. 97 CR 849 - 1, 2, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17445, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 16, 1998); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr &
Gallaciher, No. M8-85(JSM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2927, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14,1997).
* Clients might also be surprised by the waiver implications of sharing work
product material with the government and auditors (this is discussed
below).
Courts disagree about the waiver implications of intentionally sharing
privileged communications as part of a corporate transaction.
* Some courts find that sharing information as part of pre-transaction "due
diligence" waives the attorney-client privilege. Cheeves v. Southern
Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 130-31 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Oak Indus. v. Zenith
Indus., No. 86 C 4302, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985, at *9 (N.D. III. July 27,
1988).
" Other courts take the opposite approach -- sometimes citing the societal
benefit of such due diligence. Rayman v. Am. Charter Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Neb. 1993); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
b. Inadvertent Disclosure
The inadvertent sharing of privileged communications outside the company
can also waive the privilege. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell
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Semiconductor, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 125, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that two lawyers and a client for one company waived the attorney-
client privilege by failing to hang up a speaker phone when leaving a
message on another company's executive's voicemail -- and accidentally
leaving a message on that voicemail about the possibility that company
executives "might go to jail" for wrongdoing that the company planned);
Bower v. Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that
leaving a privilege document on a table in a hotel room in which another
person would be staying amounts to a waiver).
Such inadvertent sharing can occur because of a mistake in transmission of
privileged communications (outside the litigation setting).
" Such inadvertent transmission might create an ethical duty by the recipient
to return the communication without reading it.
* The ABA first recognized this duty in ABA LEO 368 (11/10/92).
* The ABA has now backed away from its strict approach, and ABA Model
Rule 4.4(b) now indicates that a lawyer receiving a document who "knows
or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender" -- there is no per se requirement if the recipient
returns the inadvertently sent document.
* As a result of these changes in the ABA Model Rules, the ABA recently
took the very unusual step of withdrawing the earlier ABA LEO that
created the "return unread" doctrine. ABA LEO 437 (10/1/05) (citing
February 2002 ABA Model Rules changes, the ABA withdraws ABA LEO
368, and holds that ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) governing the conduct of
lawyers who receive inadvertently transmitted privileged communications
from a third party "only obligates the receiving lawyer to notify the sender
of the inadvertent transmission promptly. The rule does not require the
receiving lawyer either to refrain from examining the materials or to abide
by the instructions of the sending lawyer."; instead, the lawyer must abide
by a court's determination of what to do with the privileged material).
Some bars have recently wrestled with the duties of lawyers sending and
receiving "metadata" (data hidden in documents that are transmitted
electronically, but which allow the recipient to determine who made changes
to the document, when the changes were made, what changes were
proposed and rejected, etc.)
* The New York State Bar has held that lawyers receiving electronic
documents with metadata may not "look behind" the document to "mine"
the metadata. New York LEO 749 (12/14/01).
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" Interestingly, the New York State Bar followed up this legal ethics opinion
with New York LEO 782 (12/8/04), indicating that lawyers have an ethical
duty to "use reasonable care when transmitting documents by e-mail to
prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client confidences or
secrets."
" No state bar seems to have followed New York.
The Florida Bar Board of Governors recently expressed its sentiment that the
recipients of documents containing metadata should not "mine" the metadata.
* The Florida Bar News provided an interesting description of the Board of
Governors' vote: "President-Elect Hank Coxe gave the board a graphic
example of what that means. He said a senior partner in his firm was
working on a brief which was requested by another firm for a case it was
working on. When the partner finished the brief, he offered to fax it, but
the other firm asked that it be e-mailed. That firm then mined it for
metadata. What they got, Coxe said, was a history showing every change
that had been made to the document, as well as who had worked on it. At
one point, the client had been e-mailed for input and the client had replied
by e-mail. Both had been attached to the document as it was being
prepared and later deleted; and both communications were recovered by
the other law firm." (emphasis added).
To be sure, the Florida Bar Board member who made the motion to adopt
such a sentiment did not articulate a very useful intellectual underpinning for
his position.
"I have no doubt that anyone who receives a document and mines it ... is
unethical, unprofessional, and un-everything else,' said board member
Jake Schickel, who made the motion that the board express its
disapproval at the practice." The Florida Bar News.
The same article provided another interesting insight, noting that: "several
board members said that they hadn't heard of it [metadata] until it came up at
their December [2005] meeting."
0 Thus, the issue clearly is driven by generational differences.
Clients or lawyers may also inadvertently disclose privileged communications
to third parties as part of a litigation-related document production.
* In such situations, some courts find that such inadvertent sharing always
waives the privilege (In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir.
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1989)), while others find that it never waives the privilege. Berg Elecs., Inc.
v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995).
* Most courts take a fact-intensive middle approach. Lois Sportswear,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
* This middle approach looks at the procedures established for the
document review, whether the procedures were followed, the number of
documents reviewed and the privileged documents inadvertently revealed,
the speed with which the producing party requested the document's
return, and the breadth of the disclosure before the request.
Most courts seem to honor what are called "non-waiver" agreements entered
into between litigants -- which require the return of any accidentally produced
privileged documents.
* However, one recent case found that a non-waiver agreement requiring
the signatories to return "inadvertently produced" privileged documents
during a commercial litigation case did not require the return of documents
that were sent to the other side through "gross negligence." VLT, Inc. v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 00-11049-PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 723
(D. Mass. January 21, 2003).
* Even worse, the court found that the "grossly negligent" production of
some privileged documents created a subject matter waiver. Id.
Such non-waiver agreements make sense in situations where all of the
possibly interested parties are involved in the litigation and can sign the
agreements (as in many commercial litigation matters).
* They do not make much sense in "pattern litigation" such as products
liability and employment discrimination cases.
* This is because the agreement obviously only binds the signatories, and
does not prevent another plaintiff from arguing waiver (even if the
unintentionally produced document is returned to the company).
4. Express Waiver Inside the Company
At first blush, it might seem that the Upiohn approach (described above) means
that all company employees (at any level) are within the intimate attorney-client
relationship and therefore may share privileged communications without causing
a waiver.
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* However, the UP*ohn rule only applies to communications between the
company's lawyer and those employees with knowledge that the lawyer must
obtain to provide legal advice to the company.
* Thus, Upiohn has a built-in "need to know" test.
Company employees might waive the attorney-client privilege by sharing
communications inside the company -- beyond those with a "need to know."
* Perhaps the best judicial analysis of the "need to know" standard explained it
as follows: "[t]he 'need to know' must be analyzed from two perspectives:
(1) the role in the corporation of the employee or agent who receives the
communication; and (2) the nature of the communication, that is, whether it
necessarily incorporates legal advice. To the extent that the recipient of the
information is a policymaker generally or is responsible for the specific subject
matter at issue in a way that depends upon legal advice, then the
communication is more likely privileged. For example, if an automobile
manufacturer is attempting to remedy a design defect that has created legal
liability, then the vice president for design is surely among those to whom
confidential legal communications can be made. So, too, is the engineer who
will actually redesign the defective part: he or she will necessarily have a
dialogue with counsel so that the lawyers can understand the practical
constraints and the engineer can comprehend the legal ones. By contrast,
the autoworker on the assembly line has no need to be advised of the legal
basis for a charge [sic] in production even though it affects the worker's
routine and thus is within his or her general area of responsibility. The
worker, of course, must be told what new production procedure to implement,
but has no need to know the legal background." Verschoth v. Time Warner
Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1339 (AGS) (JCF), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3174, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001).
* Some of the cases dealing with such waiver implications of intra-corporate
sharing might seem harsh. For instance, one court held that a corporation's
distribution of a privileged memorandum to only six corporate employees
created "serious doubts" as to its privileged nature. Jonathan Corp. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1987).
As with the "expectation of confidentiality" and "waiver" rules governing the
disclosure of documents to other consultants and agents, this waiver principle
would probably surprise most company executives -- who want to keep various
other executives or employees "in the loop" and therefore might share privileged
communications with them.
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9125107)
This danger is most acute when employees communicate via e-mail (because
e-mail is so easy to circulate, and because employees often use outdated
recipient lists).
As explained above, courts sometimes point to an overly wide circulation of a
privileged communication within a company as demonstrating that the
communication was business-related and therefore did not deserve privilege
protection ab initio.
Some courts have noted in the abstract that such an overly wide circulation
might cause a waiver, but few if any courts actually make such a finding --
instead pointing to the overly wide circulation as demonstrating the lack of
any privilege protection at all.
Lawyers should train their clients to treat privileged communications as the
company's "crown jewels" -- not even sharing them with others within the
company, unless they clearly have a "need to know."
Of course, even widely circulated memoranda deserve privilege protection if
they meet this standard. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 116 P.3d 27, 34 (Idaho
2005) (protecting a company's widely circulated orders suspending document
retention guidelines because of litigation.)
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 612
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 612, a federal court may order witnesses to
produce even privileged documents they reviewed before testifying -- if the
documents refreshed their recollection, and the disclosure is in the "interests of
justice." In re Manaqed Care Litiq., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
* Thus, lawyers might waive the privilege even by showing their own clients
copies of privileged documents.
6. Implied Waiver
The attorney-client privilege is so fragile that its holders can waive its protections
not only by intentionally or inadvertently disclosing privileged communications
(express waiver) but also by relying on the fact of privileged communications --
even without actually disclosing them.
This type of waiver is called an implied waiver.
Surprisingly, some courts mistakenly use the term "implied waiver" in
discussing the actual disclosure of privileged information. Hanson v. U.S.
Aqency for Int'l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 294 (4th Cir. 2004).
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As one would expect (because lawyers write the rules), clients attacking their
lawyers impliedly waive the privilege -- thus permitting the lawyers to defend
themselves.
a. Dangerous Nature of Implied Waivers
Implied waivers are inherently more frightening and dangerous than express
waivers.
Clients and their lawyers could be expected to understand that disclosing
privileged communications to third parties might cause a problem, but
intuition might not alert either the client or the lawyer to the waiver
implications of referring to a privileged communication.
b. Explicit Reliance on Legal Advice
The classic example of a client causing an implied waiver is a criminal
defendant relying on the defense of "ineffective assistance of counsel" or a
civil litigant relying on the defense of "advice of counsel." Sedillos v. Board of
Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1094 (D. Colo. 2004); SNK Corp. of Am. v.
Atlus Dream Entm't Co., 188 F.R.D. 566, 571, 574-75 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
* Litigants sometimes stumble into an "advice of counsel" defense.
En.gineered Prod. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Iowa
2004) (finding an implied waiver because a litigant's lawyer allowed the
client to testify that its lawyer was the source of the client's belief that an
adversary had "sat on its rights").
In-house and outside corporate lawyers are likely to face implied waiver
issues in two situations.
First, corporations are often tempted to use the fact (and perhaps the
ultimate result) of an internal investigation in an effort to sway public opinion,
deter governmental sanctions, or defend civil lawsuits.
Depending on the nature of the reliance and the degree to which the client
in seeking some advantage in doing so, such reliance can cause an
implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege that might otherwise cover
communications related to the investigation. In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum Served on Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, No. M8-85, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2927 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (holding that a company had waived
the privilege that otherwise protected the report prepared by its outside
law firm and provided to its auditor by citing the fact of the audit in seeking
to avoid federal regulatory punishment); Harding v. Dana Trans., Inc., 914
F. Supp. 1084, 1096-97 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding that a party waived the
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attorney-client privilege otherwise protecting the results of a corporate
investigation by relying on the investigation (although not its content) in
defending against government allegations of civil rights violations); In re
Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("This
pattern of usage of the report by Kidder amply justifies the conclusion that
it has put in issue the statements made by all interviewees, including
Kidder employees, to Lynch and his colleagues in the course of their
preparation of the report. Waiver necessarily follows .... The fairness
doctrine is still more explicitly triggered by Kidder's use of the Lynch report
in the pending lawsuits and arbitrations. As noted, Kidder has repeatedly
proffered the Lynch report not merely as a signal of its own good faith, but
as a reliable, if not authoritative, source of data on which the court should
rely in reaching whatever conclusion would favor the company. Implicitly,
then, Kidder is proffering the underlying facts on which the Lynch report is
assertedly based, including particularly the statements made to the
investigators by the witnesses whom they interviewed.").
Courts recognize that companies can conduct different (and sometimes
parallel) investigations, one of which will not be privileged because the
company intends to rely on its fruits, and one of which will be protected by
the privilege (and the work product doctrine) because the company
disclaims any intent to rely on its fruits. EEOC v. Rose Casual Dining,
L.P., No. 02-7485, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1983 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2004).
Second, some employment discrimination laws recognize an explicit
affirmative defense allowing a corporation to avoid liability by demonstrating
the fact that it investigated alleged wrongdoing and took reasonable remedial
measures (as in the case of sexual harassment allegations).
Courts uniformly hold that corporations asserting this defense impliedly
waive the attorney-client privilege otherwise covering those investigations.
Austin v. City & County of Denver, Civ. A. No. 05-cv-01313-PSF-CBS,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32048, at * 21-22, *18 (D. Colo. May 19, 2006)
(noting that the Denver Water Department hired an independent
consultant to investigate the plaintiffs claim of age and gender
discrimination; explaining that the plaintiff sought discovery of the
investigator's report and materials, but the Department resisted; finding
that the investigator acted essentially as an in-house human resources
employee, so that his material deserved privilege protection; noting that
the Department had filed an affirmative defense claiming that it had
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any unlawful
behavior by its employees of which it was made aware" (internal
quotations omitted); although acknowledging that the plaintiff had
discussed "only in passing the issue of waiver," finding that this affirmative
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defense created a subject matter waiver that covered the investigator's
report and materials); McGrath v. Nassau County Health Care Corp., 204
F.R.D. 240, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a company had waived the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protections by asserting
an affirmative defense in a sexual harassment case that it was "not liable
because it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any
sexual harassing behavior"); Rivera v. Kmart Corp., 190 F.R.D. 298, 304
(D.P.R. 2000) (holding that in a wrongful termination case defendant
Kmart had waived any privilege protection for documents relating to a
Kmart employee's interview of a store manager because Kmart referred to
the interview in justifying plaintiffs' termination); Brownell v. Roadway Pkq.
Sys., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 19, 25 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The Court finds, however,
that RPS waived its right to invoke the privilege by asserting the adequacy
of its investigation as a defense to Plaintiffs claims of sexual
harassment"); Sealy v. Gruntal & Co., No. 94 Civ. 7948 (KTD)(MHD),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15654, at *15, 16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1998) (finding
that an affirmative defense that defendant conducted an investigation into
plaintiffs sexual harassment case "constitutes a waiver of privilege for
otherwise protected communications"); Pray v. New York City Ballet Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 5723 (RLC)(HBP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6995, at *2-3, 7
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (allowing plaintiff in a sexual harassment case to
depose four partners at the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz &
Mendelsohn; "[w]here, as here, an employer relies on an internal
investigation and subsequent corrective action for its defense, it has
placed that conduct 'in issue'. Thus, an employer may not prevent
discovery of such an investigation based on attorney-client or work
product privileges solely because the employer has hired attorneys to
conduct its investigation .... The employer has waived the protection of
these privileges concerning the investigation and subsequent remedial
action by virtue of its defense."); Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("If a
defendant employer hopes to prevail by showing that it investigated an
employee's complaint and took action appropriate to the findings of the
investigation, then it will have put the adequacy of the investigation directly
at issue, and cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine to preclude a thorough examination of its adequacy. The
defendant cannot have it both ways. If it chooses this course, it does so
with the understanding that the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine are thereby waived.").
c. "At Issue" Doctrine
A number of courts have taken this implied waiver principle to the extreme,
adopting an approach called the "at issue" doctrine.
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* The traditional implied waiver concept involves clients explicitly pointing to
privileged communications to gain some advantage -- it is understandable
how notions of fairness do not permit such clients to withhold the
communications from the adversary's discovery.
* In contrast, the "at issue" doctrine involves a client asserting some other
position (usually affirmatively, but sometime defensively) in litigation -- the
full exploration and consideration of which might require assessment of
privileged communications. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash.
1975); Conklinq v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431,434 (5th Cir. 1989).
* For instance, a litigant might seek to avoid a statute of limitations defense
by contending that it was not aware of some benefit or right -- which
arguably puts its mental state and knowledge "at issue," and might justify
a forced disclosure of communications that client had with a lawyer during
the time period the client claims ignorance. Lama v. Preskill, 818 N.E.2d
443, 450, 449 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (over a strong dissent, holding that a
malpractice plaintiff had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege
otherwise covering communications during a meeting her husband had
with a lawyer several days after her surgery, by alleging in her complaint
that she did not learn of her injury until a date after that meeting; not
explaining whether it would have reached the same result if the plaintiff
had not "voluntarily injected into the case the factual and legal issues of
when she learned of her injury," but instead had waited to respond to the
defendant's statute of limitations affirmative defense).
Courts extending the implied waiver concept this far normally require that the
information at stake be important, and that it be unavailable absent forced
disclosure of privileged communications.
Courts have applied the "at issue" doctrine in situations where a client has
asserted: "good faith belief" in the legality of the client's action or a
government representation (Jones v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3:98-CV-
2108, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18823, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2000)); reliance
on a lawyer's advice (Jones v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 3:98-CV-2108,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18823, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2000)); reliance on
fraudulent representations (Cooney v. Booth, 198 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa.
2000)); lack of notice that relieves the party of the statute of limitations
defense or acts as an estoppel that prevents the adversary from relying on
the statute of limitations defense (Axler v. Scientific Ecoloqy Group, Inc.,
196 F.R.D. 210 (D. Mass. 2000)); absence of a condition precedent
(Medical Waste Techs. L.L.C. v. Alexian Bros. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3805,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10069, at *5-6 (N.D. II1. June 24, 1998)); reliance on
an agreement drafted by the party's lawyer (Mitzner v. Sobol, 136 F.R.D.
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359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); lack of notice that relieves the party of the
statute of limitations defense or acts as an estoppel that prevents the
adversary from relying on the statute of limitations defense (Peterson v.
Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc. 37 Va. Cir. 535, 542 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1994) (holding that
"where the plaintiffs rely on estoppel to combat a plea of statute of
limitations, fairness requires that the attorney-client privilege be deemed
waived" because "what counsel knows and when he knew it are issues
dragged into the case by invoking the defense of estoppel"; explaining that
because "[t]he defendants maintain that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice
of the possibility of fraudulent actions in the previous case more than two
years before this action was filed. [C]ounsel's knowledge, or lack thereof, is
relevant, probative and discoverable")); a claim of "appropriate remedial
action" by an institution in response to the plaintiff's complaint (McGrath v.
Nassau County Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2001));
argument that a law firm did not represent a client at a certain time (E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Conoco, Inc.. Civ. A. No. 17686, 2001 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 99 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2001)); an argument that it was compelled to
participate in a foreign arbitration (which the court found "places their
attorneys' opinions, advice and decision-making directly an issue").
Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, Nos. 00 Civ. 7850 (RMB)(THK) & 01 Civ.
6993 (RMB)(THK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4254, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2004).
Courts take different positions on whether a litigant impliedly waives the
attorney-client privilege covering communications with its lawyer when the
litigant seeks recovery of its attorney's fees from the adversary. (Ideal
Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 151-152 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 633, 635 (D. Minn. 2001); In
re JMP Newcor Int'l, Inc., 204 B.R. 963, 965-66 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1997).
Other courts have criticized a broad "at issue" approach. Remington Arms
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D. Del. 1992).
Company lawyers should carefully advise any company representative
(especially management) about the risk they run in relying upon, or even
talking about, the fact of an investigation -- especially with the government or
another third party outside the company.
7. Subject Matter Waiver
Most courts recognize what is called the "subject matter waiver doctrine," under
which a waiver of some privileged information will require the company to reveal
all privileged communications on the same subject matter.
The subject matter waiver concept comes from notions of fairness.
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For instance, if a litigant introduces into evidence certain privileged
communications with a lawyer in order to advance the litigant's case, it would
not be fair for the litigant to withhold the rest of communications with the
lawyer on that subject.
" Similarly, a litigant pleading "advice of counsel" as a defense should not be
able to resist discovery about the advice, what facts the client gave the lawyer
before receiving the advice, etc.
a. Intentional Express Waiver
The subject matter waiver doctrine often applies in the case of intentional
express waiver. In re Grand Jury Proceedingis, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir.
2000); Adler v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 666, 675 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
Because disclosing a privileged document often causes a subject matter
waiver, in some situations there is a bizarre switch in positions -- with the
party having disclosed a document claiming that it was not privileged (hoping
to avoid a subject matter waiver), and the adversary arguing that the
document was privileged (hoping to trigger a subject matter waiver).
See, e.g., Strongi Capital Mcimt., Inc. v. Land Auth. of P.R., Civ. No. 04-
2088(SEC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36103 (D.P.R. May 30, 2006) (assessing
defendants' argument that plaintiff's voluntary disclosure of a memorandum
caused a subject matter waiver; agreeing with plaintiff that the memorandum
did not deserve privilege protection, and therefore holding that its disclosure
did not cause a subject matter waiver); Static Control Components, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 04-84-GFVT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40612, at *20
(E.D. Ky. June 15, 2006) (assessing defendant's argument that the plaintiff
caused a subject matter waiver by disclosing to its customer a memorandum
from a law professor about the enforceability of a patent; rejecting plaintiffs
argument that the letter was not privileged; explaining that "[a] rose by any
other name smells the same," and finding a subject matter waiver of both the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine that required disclosure
of all documents on that subject).
b. Implied Waiver
The same rules usually apply to implied waiver. United States v. Tagqhilou, 5
F. App'x 694, 695 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion); D.O.T. Connectors,
Inc. v. J.B. Nottingham & Co., No. 4:99cv311-WS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739,
at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2001).
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c. Extra-Judicial Disclosure (von Bulow Doctrine)
Some courts have looked for ways to avoid the harsh results of the subject
matter waiver doctrine.
In an approach articulated for the first time by the Second Circuit, some
court distinguish between disclosure of privileged communication in a
litigation context (which will cause a subject matter waiver) and what
courts call "extrajudicial" settings (which will not cause a subject matter
waiver). McGrath v. Nassau County Health Care Corp., 204 F.R.D. 240,
245 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
" This is called the von Bulow doctrine because it originated with Alan
Dershowitz's publication of a book about his representation of the criminal
defendant von Bulow. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).
* The von Bulow doctrine is now spreading to other courts. Bowman v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., No. 00 C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088, at *5-6 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 13, 2001).
* The von Bulow doctrine can avoid harsh results. In re Polymedica Corp.
Sec. Litig., 235 F.R.D. 28, 33 (D. Mass. 2006) (assessing plaintiffs'
reliance on standard waiver principles in seeking the production of
documents created by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC) in connection
with a report PWC prepared for the defendants, and which defendants had
given to plaintiffs and the SEC; rejecting plaintiffs' waiver arguments,
noting that "there is no evidence that the Defendants sought to make use
of the report in a judicial proceeding," put the report at issue, or sought to
use PWC's testimony; explaining that the plaintiffs could interview
witnesses, review documents, and otherwise conduct their own
investigation and prepare their own report).
d. Inadvertent Express Waiver
Some courts seem to take the subject matter waiver doctrine too far.
* While the subject matter waiver doctrine makes sense if a litigant
expressly or impliedly relies on privileged communications to gain some
advantage in litigation, it seems too harsh to take the same approach if a
litigant instead inadvertently produces privileged documents during
discovery.
" Yet some courts following this simplistic rule that disclosure of some
privileged communications requires the disclosure of other related
privileged communications have blindly found subject matter waivers even
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in the case of an inadvertent production of privileged documents. Texaco
P. R., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84 (1 st Cir.
1995).
e. Scope of the Waiver
Surprisingly, very few courts have tried to define the scope of the subject
matter waiver even when they find such a waiver. Muncy v. City of Dallas,
Civ. A. No. 3:99-CV-2960-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18675, at *14 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2001); D.O.T. Connectors, Inc. v. J.B. Nottingham & Co., No.
4:99cv31 1-WS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739, at *2-3, *8 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2001).
Perhaps the most thoughtful analysis appeared several years ago. United
States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 917, 919 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("Among the
factors which appear to be pertinent in determining whether disclosed and
undisclosed communications relate to the same subject matter are: 1) the
general nature of the lawyer's assignment; 2) the extent to which the
lawyer's activities in fulfilling that assignment are undifferentiated and
unitary or are distinct and severable; 3) the extent to which the disclosed
and undisclosed communications share, or do not share, a common nexus
with a distinct activity; 4) the circumstances in and purposes for which
disclosure originally was made; 5) the circumstances in and purposes for
which further disclosure is sought; 6) the risks to the interests protected by
the privilege if further disclosure were to occur; and 7) the prejudice which
might result if disclosure were not to occur. By applying these factors, and
such other factors as may appear appropriate, a court may be able to
comply with the mandate that it construe 'same subject matter' narrowly
while accommodating fundamental fairness." (internal quotations
omitted)).
Most cases addressing the scope of a subject matter waiver involve a patent
infringement litigant relying on a patent lawyer's non-infringement opinion in
seeking to avoid multiple damages.
* Every court holds that such an affirmative "advice of counsel" defense
causes a subject matter waiver, but they disagree about its scope.
This situation generates very difficult subject matter waiver issues.
* Because patent infringement constitutes a continuing wrong, an infringer
must stop selling the infringing product upon learning of the infringement --
even if the client learns from its trial lawyer on the morning of trial.
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On the other hand, it is easy to see the mischief caused by forcing a
patent litigant relying on a non-infringement opinion to disclose all
communication they had with any patent lawyer at any time.
Courts have taken differing positions on four basic questions.
* First, should the subject matter waiver extend to communications to and
from: just the lawyer providing the opinion; all lawyers other than litigation
counsel in the infringement litigation; or all lawyers (including litigation
counsel)? The Federal Circuit recently held that a subject matter waiver
covered privileged communications to and from outside lawyers and
in-house lawyers. In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2006.
" Second, should the subject matter waiver extend as a temporal matter to:
the date the product was put on the market; the date the infringement
litigation began; or up through and including even the trial?
" Third, because infringement depends on the product seller's knowledge,
should the subject matter waiver extend to opinions and other information
the lawyer has never shared with the product seller client? The Federal
Circuit recently settled this debate. In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448
F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that a party's reliance on advice of
counsel triggered a subject matter waiver that covered: (1) privileged
communications with outside and inside counsel; and (2) work product
conveyed to the client and uncommunicated documents that reflect such
communications -- which presumably include such documents as
memoranda memorializing communications).
" Fourth, if the subject matter waiver extends to other lawyers and
communications after the original opinion, should the waiver cover: all
communications; or just communications that are inconsistent with the
original non-infringement opinion upon which the litigant relies?
Various opinions have adopted nearly every combination and permutation on
these issues.
For instance, one court recently held that because "infringement is a
continuing activity," "all opinions received by the client relating to
infringement must be revealed, even if they come from defendants' trial
attorneys, and even if they pre-date or post-date the advice letter of
opinion counsel." Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423
(M.D.N.C. 2003).
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Federal courts are now sorting out the effect of a recent Federal Circuit
decision protecting clients from any adverse inference based on their reliance
on the attorney-client privilege to shield a lawyer's patent opinion -- the
Federal Circuit raised the issue sua sponte and reversed its earlier approach
to this issue. Knorr-Bremse Systeme FOr Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., No. Civ.
S-02-2669 FCD KJM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20929, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr.
19, 2006) (assessing defendant's efforts to prevent plaintiff from telling the
jury that the defendant had "asserted the attorney-client privilege over the
opinion it received regarding McKesson's patent"; noting that several other
courts recently ruled that a litigant could tell the jury that its adversary had
never sought an opinion on the infringement issue; distinguishing those
cases, and holding that Knorr-Bremse prevented the plaintiff from
introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the defendant's privilege
assertion over the infringement opinion it had received).
8. Efforts to Change the Harsh Waiver Rules
a. Impetus for the Proposals
Several developments have prompted numerous proposals to change the
common law waiver rules.
* First, the government's increasing demand that companies share
privileged communications as a sign of cooperation has prompted efforts
to encourage such good corporate behavior by reducing or eliminating the
risk that such cooperation will allow private plaintiffs to obtain the same
communications (which most courts outside the Second Circuit view as an
inevitable result of common law waiver principles).
" Second, the massive increase in the volume of electronic documents that
must be accumulated, reviewed for privilege and produced has prompted
calls for a rule protecting litigants from the potentially harsh impact of an
inadvertent production of privileged communications.
b. Legislative Proposals
A number of proposed remedies to the first problem have surfaced in
Congress over the past five years, but none of them have made it very far.
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c. Federal Rules Change
An upcoming change at the end of 2006 in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) will
require a party receiving privileged or work product documents claimed to
have been inadvertently produced by the other side to either return or destroy
the documents, or to hold those documents until a court analyzes the
situation.
" Unfortunately, this new rule simply describes a process - leaving any
waiver issue up to a reviewing court. Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005).
• Because some courts take an unforgiving view of any inadvertent
production of privileged documents, litigants in those courts will still lose
their protection.
d. Federal Rules of Evidence Proposal
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (under consideration in 2006 by the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence) would address both
issues.
Proposed Rule 502(a) would define the general waiver rule.
A person waives an attorney-client privilege or work
product protection if that person -- or a predecessor
while its holder -- voluntarily discloses or consents to
disclosure of any significant part of the privileged or
protected information. The waiver extends to
undisclosed information concerning the same
subject matter if that undisclosed information ought
in fairness to be considered with the disclosed
information.
This essentially codifies the common law waiver rule, although it would
presumably protect against a court's adoption of the most extreme
"automatic subject matter waiver" approach.
Proposed Rule 502 contains various exceptions that would dramatically
change the normal waiver approach.
* First, a voluntary disclosure would not operate as a waiver if "the
disclosure is inadvertent and is made during discovery in federal or state
litigation or administrative proceedings -- and if the holder of the privilege
or work product protection took reasonable precautions to prevent
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disclosure and took reasonably prompt measurers, once the holder knew
or should have known of the disclosure, to rectify the effort, including (if
applicable) following the procedures in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B)." This
codifies the "middle ground" fact-intensive inadvertent waiver doctrine.
Second, a voluntary disclosure would not cause a waiver if "the disclosure
is made to a federal, state, or local governmental agency during an
investigation by that agency, and is limited to persons involved in the
investigation." This exception would address the first issue mentioned
above. Although the standard confidentiality agreement currently agreed
to by government authorities is not "limited to persons involved in the
investigation," the proposed Rule presumably would apply to the typical
situation in which a company cooperates with the government by
disclosing privileged communications.
Proposed Rule 502 also contains procedural provisions.
* Proposed Rule 502(c) indicates that "[n]otwithstanding subdivision (a), a
court order concerning the preservation or waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection governs its continuing effect on all
persons or entities, whether or not they were parties to the matter before
the court."
* Another provision makes it clear that any agreement among the parties
does not bind anyone else "unless the agreement is incorporated into a
court order." Proposed Rule 502(d).
" This rule allows every court to mold an appropriate process (apparently
even changing the basic waiver principle articulated in Rule 502(a)) with
the certainty that its order will bind all third parties.
It is unclear how a new federal Rule of Evidence would apply in state courts,
but one might expect state courts to adopt the same approach, or honor a
federal court's order through comity, application of the Supremacy Clause,
etc.
* Unfortunately, even one recalcitrant state court could eliminate the
protection by declining to honor a federal court's order.
e. Sentencing Guidelines
On April 5, 2006, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to
eliminate language in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that essentially
required companies to waive their privilege and work product protections to
obtain more favorable sentencing treatment.
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This change will take effect on November 1, 2006, unless Congress
intervenes. 71 Fed. Reg. 28,063 (May 15, 2006).
The deleted language had been added to the Guidelines in April 2004 at the
height of the Department of Justice's post-Enron efforts to root out corporate
wrongdoing.
f. Department of Justice Policy
Various corporate and bar organizations (including the ABA) have (with
varying degrees of vigor) condemned, criticized or sought to change the
Department of Justice's policy that encourages -- some say "bullies" --
companies into waiving their privilege.
* None of these efforts have proven successful so far.
" However, it would be difficult to detect if the Department of Justice was
less vigorous in its approach, because only anecdotal evidence allows an
assessment of the Department's application of its policy.
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IV. ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. At Common Law
It is well established that no accountant-client privilege exists at common law.
Coach v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) ("no confidential accountant-client
privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been
recognized in federal cases").
B. The Federal Tax Advisor Privilege
1. General Requirements and Scope
Section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1998, created a statutory
privilege for accountants.
Specifically, Section 7525(a) provides: "[w]ith respect to tax advice, the same
common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a communication
between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication
between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the
communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were
between a taxpayer and an attorney."
The privilege applies to federally authorized tax practitioners, which are defined
at I.R.C. § 7525 as any individual who is authorized to practice before the IRS.
Effectively, it applies to certified public accountants, accountants, enrolled
agents, and enrolled actuaries.
The privilege only extends to "tax advice" which is advice given by an individual
within the scope of that individual's authority to practice before the IRS.
2. Limitations To Initial Applicability
The tax advisor privilege only applies in two situations:
Administrative Controversies. In administrative proceedings, the tax advisor
privilege applies only to non-criminal proceedings before the IRS. It does not
apply to criminal tax administrative proceedings or administrative proceedings
before agencies other than the IRS.
Tax Litigation. In court, the tax advisor privilege applies only to non-criminal tax
proceedings brought in federal court by or against the United States. It does not
apply in state court tax cases, non-tax federal court cases, federal criminal tax
cases, or federal tax cases that do not involve the United States.
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3. Exceptions To Accountant Privilege Under Federal Statute
There are at least eight exceptions to Section 7525 that make it difficult to apply
the statute in the manner in which it was originally intended--the work product
doctrine, corporate tax shelters, identity privilege, tax return workpapers, crime-
fraud exception, auditor communications, SEC and criminal matters, and state
actions.
a. Work Product Doctrine
Practitioners and scholars uniformly have accepted the notion that no such
privilege exists under Section 7525. Thus, "[i]t seems clear that most of the work
produced by [accountants] in the context of a tax practice is not and will not be
subject to the work product doctrine ...."(The Common Law Protections, Tax
Planning & Practice Guides 102 (1999); U.S. v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502
(7th Cir. 1999) ("[t]he new statute protects communications between a taxpayer
and a federally authorized tax practitioner ... (It does not protect work product.).")
b. Corporate Tax Shelters
The statute carves out an explicit exception for corporate tax shelters. The
privilege under Section 7525 does not apply to any written communication "in
connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation ... in any tax
shelter." §7525(b)(2).
One of the problems with defining a tax shelter is that all meetings with tax
advisers have as a significant purpose to avoid tax.
The tax shelter regulations have changed significantly since the enactment of
Section 7525 and IRS is continuously updating its list of "listed transactions."
(Rev. Proc. 2004-67, 2004-50 I.R.B. 967.)
The IRS' audit examination guide, however, does provide some guidance on
such characteristics, which "include a lack of meaningful economic risk of loss or
potential for gain; inconsistent financial and accounting treatment; presence of
tax indifferent parties; complexity; unnecessary steps or novel investments;
promotion or marketing; confidentiality; high transaction costs; and risk reduction
arrangements."
A corporation that enters into a transaction for profit may not be able to rely on
Section 7525 with regard to written advice intended to decrease tax liability
resulting from the transaction.
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c. Identity Privilege
Especially in the context of tax shelter litigation, there is no identity privilege
remaining under Section 7525. Although it remains to be seen whether such a
privilege exists with respect to non-tax shelter litigation. U.S. v. BDO Seidman,
337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003).
The BDO case made clear that a client's identity is likely not privileged. The
Seventh Circuit established the following factors to be considered when
determining whether the identity privilege applies:
* the purpose and history of the practitioner's representation of the client with
respect to the tax shelter transactions at issue;
* whether revealing the clients' identity in response to IRS summonses
necessarily would reveal the clients' motive for seeking tax advice or the
substance of that advice;
* whether IRS could determine that the clients had participated in the
transactions without obtaining their names from the practitioners; and
* whether any of the documents at issue were generated for the purpose of
preparing tax returns.
On remand, the district court held that Section 7525 did not protect identity
disclosure.
The court stated that although the clients were correct that Section 7525 protects
identity to the extent it would result in disclosure of client motivation for seeking
tax advice, Section 7525 does not apply to the extent clients were seeking tax
return preparation rather than legal or tax advice.
Since the BDO decision, courts either have applied the BDO factors and found
no identity privilege exists or concluded that BDO stood for the proposition that
no identity privilege exists at all. See e.g., U.S. v. Arthur Andersen, 92 A.F.T.R.
2d 2003-5800 (N.D. III. 2003); and Doe 1 & 2 v. KPMG, 325 F. Supp. 2d 746
(N.D. Tex. 2004)(tax law "destroy[s] any reasonable expectation of confidentiality
as to participation in a tax shelter.")
While the BDO court implied the potential for an identity privilege via its four-
factor test, subsequent cases have held otherwise and the potential to claim this
privilege appears slim.
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d. Tax Return Workpapers
Information furnished by a taxpayer to a tax return preparer for the purpose of
enabling the preparation of a return is not privileged.
In U.S. v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999), tax return workpapers were
not privileged; since this is "accounting" work rather than legal work and even
lawyers are not privileged when doing accounting work.
In Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003), the Court
held that I.R.C. 7525 privilege does not protect communications regarding tax
return preparation. The court stated, "'the privilege does not protect
communications between a tax practitioner and a client simply for the preparation
of a tax return."'
e. Crime-Fraud Exception
The courts and the government will apply the crime-fraud exception to Section
7525 privilege claims when a client has sought legal advice to further a crime or
fraud. "The government is asserting the crime fraud exception to privilege on a
broad basis
As a result, "[t]ax advisors must be careful about how they are creating and
handling documents for clients .... Large accounting firms have long prided
themselves on the presentation issues on tax returns, in terms of analyzing
whether certain presentations increase the likelihood of audit .... In this
environment, evidence of strategizing presentation issues is dangerous and
could fall within one of the court's fraud factors .... "
To apply the exception, the courts must analyze eight potential indicators of
fraud. In determining whether there was a prima facie showing of fraud in the
context of alleged tax shelters, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in BDO (BDO, 95 A.F.T.R. 2d 2005-1725, 2005-1737), considered the
following:
* the marketing of pre-packaged transactions by BDO;
" the communication by BDO's clients to BDO with the purpose of engaging in
a pre-arranged transaction developed by BDO or a third party with the sole
purpose of reducing taxable income;
* BDO and/or the clients attempting to conceal the true nature of the
transaction;
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* knowledge by BDO, or a situation where BDO should have known, that the
clients lacked a legitimate business purpose for entering into the transaction;
* vaguely worded consulting agreements;
* failure by BDO to provide services under the consulting agreement, yet
receipt of payment;
• mention of the alleged tax shelter known as "COBRA" (Currency Options
Bring Reward Alternatives); and
• use of boiler-plate documents.
f. Auditor Communications
A recent article pointed out that a controversy is "brewing between the
accounting and legal professions over the nature of documents and details that
auditors should review to certify the financials of a company ....". Stratton,
Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault on Privilege, 2005 TNT 71-5 (2005).
In fact, this is not a recent controversy because auditors and advisers have
struggled with this topic for many years.
In Arthur Younq, 465 U.S. 805, the Supreme Court held that auditors are "public
watchdogs, which is a public declaration that any communications with them are
not designed for confidentiality ......
The court reasoned that "[a]n independent certified public accountant performs a
different role [than an attorney]. By certifying ... public reports ... , the independent
auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client."
"To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the
client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the
accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations," the
court continued.
This exception to Section 7525 is getting more attention given recent corporate
scandals involving allegedly inappropriate financial statements filed on behalf of
corporate giants.
Pressure from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and guidelines
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are making
it more difficult for taxpayers to maintain the privilege with tax advisers who are
not attorneys - i.e. accountants or other consultants.
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9/25/07)
In addition, IRS is requesting more frequently taxpayers' accrual workpapers,
which can include documents prepared by a taxpayer's independent auditor, as
evidence in its fight against tax shelters.
Disclosing information to outside auditors must be closely monitored by a
taxpayer's advisers to reduce the risk of waiving- potential privilege claims.
g. Tax Accrual Workpapers
1. Definition of Tax Accrual Workpapers.
IRS CCN CC-2004-010 (January 22, 2004).
Tax accrual workpapers are those audit workpapers relating to the tax reserve for
current, deferred, potential, or contingent tax liabilities, however classified or
reported on audited financial statements, and to footnotes disclosing those tax
liabilities appearing on an audited financial statement.
Tax accrual workpapers reflect an estimate of a company's tax liabilities and may
also be referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax liability contingency analysis, tax
cushion analysis, or tax contingency reserve analysis.
This definition does not include documents created prior to or outside of the
consideration of whether reserves should be created, even those documents
may have been subsequently used in the preparation of the tax accrual
workpapers or are attached to workpapers. These pre-existing workpapers,
however, will likely fall within the scope of the general IDRs issued at the start of
an audit and the taxpayer will likely therefore already have provided them to the
IRS.
This definition also does not include workpapers and tax return documents that
reconcile net income per books or financial statements to taxable income,
because these documents are part of the tax return preparation process, and the
information set forth in them is required to be reported on income tax returns.
These documents will also likely fall within the scope of the general IDRs issued
at the start of an audit.
2. Authority to Request.
The Supreme Court has upheld the IRS's authority to summon tax accrual
workpapers. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
3. Announcement 2002-63: IRS Policy to Request Workpapers.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in Arthur Young, the IRS announced
that it would continue its policy of not routinely requesting tax accrual workpapers
during examination. See Announcement 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18.
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As part of the IRS's campaign against abusive tax shelters, in Announcement
2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72, the IRS announced it would begin requesting tax
accrual workpapers when it audits tax returns with benefits claimed from listed
transactions, or if the tax return reveals financial irregularity.
4. Current Policy for Requesting Workpapers.
IRM 4.10.20.3 (July 12, 2004).
5. Non-Listed Transactions.
For tax returns without any listed transactions, the IRS will generally request tax
accrual workpapers only when there are "unusual circumstances." Unusual
circumstances generally exist when factual data supporting the taxpayer's tax
return cannot be obtained from the taxpayer's records or from third parties, and
then only as a collateral source. Unusual circumstances exist when:
* When the IRS identifies a specific issue for there is a need for additional
facts;
• The IRS has requested the facts relating to the specific issue from the
taxpayer and available third-parties; and
" The IRS has sought supplementary analysis (not necessarily contained in the
workpapers) of facts relating to the identified issue and the IRS has
performed a reconciliation of the taxpayer's Schedule M-1 or M-3 with respect
to the identified issue.
6. Listed Transactions.
The IRS policy varies. The IRS has provided additional information on its
website in the form of frequently asked questions.
7. Returns Filed after February 28, 2000 and Before July 1, 2002.
The IRS may request tax accrual workpapers if the taxpayer was required to
disclose the listed transaction and did not do so. In general, the request will be
limited to the workpapers for the years under audit, but it may also extend to
other years that are relevant to the audit years (such as the year the underlying
transaction took place).
8. Returns Filed on or after July 1, 2002.
(a) Disclosed Transactions.
If the transaction was properly disclosed on the tax return, the IRS will only
request the tax accrual workpapers that pertain to the listed transaction for the
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year under audit (although it may extend the request to workpapers relating to
the transaction in other years if the other years are relevant to the audit years).
(b) Undisclosed Transactions.
If a listed transaction was not properly disclosed, the IRS will routinely request all
tax accrual workpapers for the year under examination. The IRS may also
request workpapers that related to other years if the workpapers are directly
relevant to the IRS's audit of any known listed transactions for the years under
audit.
(c) Multiple Listed Transactions.
The IRS may exercise its discretion to request tax accrual workpapers if it
determines that the taxpayer claimed tax benefits from multiple listed
transactions that were all properly disclosed.
(d) Financial Irregularities.
The IRS may exercise its discretion to request tax accrual workpapers in
connection with the examination of a return claiming tax benefits from a single
listed transaction that was disclosed, if there are reported financial irregularities
with respect to the taxpayer.
h. SEC and Criminal Matters
By statutory exception, Section 7525 does not apply in SEC proceedings and
criminal matters.
Although the statute appears clear in its intent, there is some ambiguity in
determining when the privilege applies and when it does not because a civil
examination can progress into a criminal investigation at any time.
In Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum 200008006, IRS considered whether
Section 7525 applied in criminal tax matters where the subject communications
occurred during, or with respect to, earlier civil matters.
Chief Counsel has advised that "the tax advice privilege is not applicable in
criminal tax matters or proceedings even if a subject communication originated in
the context of a civil matter or proceeding."
i. State Actions
The Section 7525 privilege may be asserted in a non-criminal tax proceeding in
federal court brought by or against the United States. This means the privilege
does not apply in proceedings in state court.
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V. WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
1. Courts' Confusion
Some courts mistakenly equate the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine, occasionally using such terms as "attorney work product privilege."
United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Togqether with All BId-as., Improvements,
Appurtenances, & Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 1996).
This is simply incorrect -- the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine are fundamentally different concepts. Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated
Computer Servs., Inc., 195 F.R.D. 610, 613 (N.D. II. 2000).
" In fact, the four-word title "attorney work product privilege" contain two
incorrect words -- the work product doctrine covers more than attorneys, and
is not a privilege.
2. Source of Work Product Protection
Interestingly, one state court essentially created its own work product doctrine in
the 1940s, derived from attorney-client privilege principles. Robertson v.
Commonwealth, 25 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 1943).
* However, this common law development was soon trumped by a rule-based
approach.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the federal formulation of the work
product doctrine in 1970. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
As indicated below, courts applying the work product doctrine exhibit surprising
variation when interpreting a single sentence in the rules -- even more than
courts analyzing the attorney-client privilege, although the privilege comes from
organically developed common law in each state.
3. Choice of Laws
State courts generally apply their own work product rule, finding the protection to
be a procedural matter.
Work product issues in federal court rest on a federal rule, which applies in both
diversity and federal question cases. S.D. Warren Co. v. Eastern Elec. Corp., 201
F.R.D. 280, 282 (D. Me. 2001).
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4. Enormous Variation in Federal Courts' Approach
Ironically, there is a much greater variation among federal courts' approach to the
work product doctrine than among states' approach to the attorney-client
privilege -- even though all federal courts are simply applying the identical single
sentence from the federal rules, while states are interpreting common law
principles organically developed over hundreds of years.
Federal courts have taken dramatically differing positions on such issues as:
" Duration of the work product protection in later litigation.
• The degree of protection given to a lawyer's selection of documents or facts
that arguably reflect the lawyer's opinion.
" The type of "anticipation" of litigation required -- ranging from requiring
"imminent" litigation to protecting materials created "with an eye toward"
possible future litigation.
" The degree of protection given to opinion work product (absolute or simply
higher than that provided fact work product).
One recent case highlighted many of these debates, and cited federal court
decisions on both sides of the issues. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D.
130 (D. Mass. 2004).
5. Differences between the Work Product Doctrine and the Attorney-Client
Privilege
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine:
(1) Is relatively new.
(2) Has a fairly modest purpose. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500
(7th Cir. 1999); Bowman v. Brush Wellman, Inc., No. 00 C 50264, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14088 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 13, 2001).
(3) Is a creature of statute and rule.
(4) Applies to non-lawyers.
(5) Arises only at certain times.
(6) Only protects communications made "because of' litigation.
(7) May be asserted by the client or the lawyer.
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(8) May not last forever.
(9) May be overcome if the adversary really needs the information.
(10) Is not easily waived.
Thomas E. Spahn, Ten Differences Between the Work Product Doctrine and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 Va. Law. 45 (Oct. 1997).
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine:
* Does not rest on the intimacy of the attorney-client relationship -- a lawyer
does not even have to be involved in its creation.
" Does not rest on the confidentiality within that intimate relationship -- it
protects such materials as pictures of accident scenes, measurements of skid
marks, interviews with strangers, etc.
* Does not rest on communications within that intimate relationship -- the
work product doctrine can protect materials that have never been
communicated to anyone.
The work product doctrine is both narrower and broader than the attorney-client
privilege.
* It is narrower because: the work product doctrine only applies at certain
times (during or in anticipation of litigation); and is not actually a privilege, but
rather a qualified immunity that can be overcome under certain
circumstances.
" It is broader because: anyone can create work product (without a lawyer's
involvement); and work product can be shared more easily with third parties
without causing a waiver of its protection.
Lawyers and their clients considering both the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine should remember that both, either or none may apply in
certain circumstances.
" For instance, communications between lawyers and their clients occurring
when no one anticipates litigation can never be work product, but may
deserve privilege protection.
" Materials reflecting lawyers' communications with those other than clients (or
the lawyers' own agents) can rarely if ever be privileged, but may well be work
product -- such as notes of a witness interview.
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* Litigation-related communications between clients and lawyers may well
deserve both protections.
6. Reasons to Assert Both Protections
Lawyers seeking maximum protection for their clients' communications should
always examine both possible protections.
In one concrete example, Martha Stewart was found to have waived the
attorney-client privilege covering one of her e-mails by sharing the e-mail with
her daughter, but was found not to have waived the work product protection --
Stewart could not have resisted discovery if she had relied only on the
privilege and not also asserted the work product protection. United States v.
Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
However, litigants should not blindly seek both protections.
* For instance, companies should assess whether it would reflect poorly on
their motivation if they claim to have anticipated litigation at certain times (for
instance, at the beginning of contract negotiations).
" As explained below, asserting the work product protection might also trigger
the obligation to preserve documents as of that date.
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B. Participants
1. Who Can Create Work Product
On its face, the work product doctrine allows clients or any of their agents to
prepare work product. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co.), 110 F.3d
954, 967 (3d Cir. 1997); S.D. Warren Co. v. Eastern Elec. Corp., 201 F.R.D. 280
(D. Me. 2001); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C.,
Civ. A. No. 112-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 9, 2005) ("The
work-product privilege can apply to documents prepared by non-attorneys, if
those documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation.").
* Some courts inexplicably continue to insist that lawyers be involved in
preparation of materials before they may deserve work product protection.
Minebea Co. v. Pabst, 355 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D.D.C. 2005) (explaining
that "while protected work product can, sometimes, be generated by
non-attorneys, it cannot be created by a client") Heavin v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass, No. 02-2572-KHV-DJW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, at *16 (D.
Kan. Feb. 3, 2004) (applying the Federal Rules, but inexplicably citing a
Kansas state case in refusing to extend work product protection to documents
"which are not prepared under the supervision of an attorney in preparation
for trial" (internal quotations and citation omitted)); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *67 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
3, 2001).
2. Benefits of a Lawyer's Involvement
Although the work product doctrine can protect materials created without a
lawyer's involvement, it is usually wise to have a lawyer involved.
There are several reasons: some courts do not understand the doctrine and
look for a lawyer's involvement; having a lawyer involved might also support
an attorney-client privilege claim; a lawyer's role might rebut an adversary's
argument that the documents were created in the "ordinary course of
business" and therefore undeserving of work product protection; a lawyer's
involvement may help establish anticipation of litigation; a lawyer's opinion
deserves greater protection than mere fact work product.
3. Agents, Consultants and Experts
As explained above, the attorney-client privilege often rises or falls on a proper
characterization of an agent or consultant as assisting the client or assisting the
lawyer.
• This issue is irrelevant in the work product context.
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a. General Rules
As explained above, even non-lawyers can create protected work product.
* Therefore, either the client's or the lawyer's agents should be entitled to
work product protection for materials that the agent prepares.
b. Non-Testifying Experts
Specially employed litigation-related non-testifying experts hold a unique
position in connection with the normally liberal rules of discovery. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
* Ludwiq v. Pilkinqton N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 1086, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17789, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2003) ("non-testifying expert information is
entirely exempt from discovery not on the basis of privilege but, rather, on
the basis of unfairness"; holding that documents withheld under this rule do
not have to be included on any privilege log).
* Some courts frankly admit that litigants can manipulate this rule to avoid
discovery of harmful evidence. Crouse Cartage Co. v. Nat'l Warehouse
Inv. Co., No. IP 02-071 C T/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 478, at *6-7 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 13, 2003) (holding that a party could rely on the rule governing
discovery of non-testifyingexperts to withhold materials prepared by a real
estate appraiser, noting that the "key inquiry" is "whether the consultation
took place in anticipation of litigation"; acknowledging that "[t]he underlying
rule of nondisclosure invites shopping for favorable expert witnesses and
facilitates the concealment of negative test results").
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) specifically restricts discovery of such non-
testifying experts to situations of "exceptional circumstances."
* Such "exceptional circumstances" can include: work by a non-testifying
expert that has destroyed an important bit of evidence, or a situation in
which the evidence has deteriorated or is no longer available for
inspection by the adversary's expert. Disidore v. Mail Contractors of Am.,
Inc. 196 F.R.D. 410, 417 (D. Kan. 2000).
" Given the general immunity of such non-testifying experts to normal
privilege log requirements, it is difficult to imagine how an adversary would
know anything about such an expert's involvement (unless a witness saw
the non-testifying expert performing some test, and was asked about the
incident during discovery).
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c. Testifying Experts
Most courts hold that the work product doctrine does not cover materials
created by a testifying expert.
* Most courts require testifying experts to produce their draft reports. W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18096, at *30 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000); but see Smith v. Transducer
Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 1995-28, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17212, at *7-8 (D.V.I.
Nov. 2, 2000) (unpublished opinion).
Most decisions regarding discovery of testifying experts does not involve
materials created by the expert, but rather opinion work product disclosed to
the testifying expert.
* These issues are discussed below, in connection with the waiver doctrine.
d. Experts with Changing Roles
Experts who change from non-testifying to testifying experts (or vice versa)
can present a complicated analysis.
Courts have debated whether testifying experts must produce documents
they created or received in an earlier role as a non-testifying expert.
* Some courts hold that experts cannot "compartmentalize" their work, and
that experts designated as trial witnesses cannot protect documents
created or received in connection with their parallel work as non-testifying
experts. In re Painted Aluminum Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 95-CV-6557,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9911 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1996).
* Other courts allow the same person to be a non-testifying expert in one
case and a testifying expert in another, thereby limiting discovery to the
latter. Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 206 F.R.D. 72 (W.D.N.Y.
2001).
Courts also disagree about discovery of testifying experts who move in the
other direction (having been removed from the witness list by the litigant who
retained them).
FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (noting
the debate among courts on this issue, and ultimately concluding that
such non-testifying experts enjoy immunity under the "exceptional
circumstances" standard).
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4. Who Can Assert the Work Product Doctrine
Most courts hold that both clients and lawyers can assert the work product
protection. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.
1994).
Most courts hold that the Garner rule and fiduciary exception (discussed above)
do not cover work product prepared by the corporation's lawyer. Cox v. Adm'r
United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1423 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1110 (1995); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
But see Hudson v. General Dynamics Corp., 186 F.R.D. 271, 274 (D. Conn. 1999).
Most courts find that work product can be freely shared under a common interest
arrangement. United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680,
685-86 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
One court has found that a common interest agreement itself deserves work
product protection. McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, No. 00 C
6979, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at *12 (N.D. III. Oct. 16, 2001).
Non-parties to litigation generally cannot claim work product protection because
someone else anticipated litigation. Kline v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 1:01-CV-213,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20603, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2001).
Courts disagree about the duration of the work product protection.
* Some courts apply the work product doctrine protection to material in a later
litigation, as long as it is related to the litigation in which the work product was
prepared. Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 196 F.R.D. 610 (D. Kan. 2000).
* Some courts apply the work product protection even in later unrelated
litigation. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 198 F.R.D. 81 (W.D.N.C.
2000).
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C. Context: Temporal Component
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, context is much more important in the work
product arena than content.
The privilege rests on the substance of the communication between a lawyer and
client; the work product doctrine rests on when and why the client or a client
representative created a document -- the substance might be as mundane as a
laboratory test result and accident scene picture, or list of newspaper articles.
1. Temporal Requirement
The work product doctrine has both a temporal and a motivational component
(which is discussed below).
a. Difference Between the Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine
Although the attorney-client privilege can protect communications between a
lawyer and client at any time, the work product doctrine only protects
materials created at certain times -- in connection with, or in "anticipation" of,
litigation. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 87 cmt. d (2000).
b. "Litigation" Requirement
Courts assessing a work product claim obviously must determine if they are
dealing with "litigation" as contemplated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
In some situations, courts have no trouble with this task. However, some
situations call for a more subtle analysis.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 784, 806,
808 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (holding that administrative proceedings before the
Nuclear Regulatory Agency and two California administrative agencies did
not automatically count as "litigation" -- because the "ultimate objective" of
the administrative process was not adversarial, but rather to set rates or
deal with licenses; noting that the proceedings might become adversarial if
someone intervenes, so the court analyzed each pertinent document to
determine if (as the court put it in one context) the document "would have
been prepared irrespective of the potential adversarial aspects" of a rate
proceeding; explaining that the work product doctrine would not protect
any document that was prepared to obtain a permit or license "rather than
in order to respond to, rebut, strategize for, or otherwise 'litigate' against a
known adversary" -- even if the document "is later used in adversarial
aspects of these proceedings").
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Most courts hold that government investigations do not amount
themselves to "litigation," but that an investigation can result in a
reasonable anticipation of litigation. Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea
Co., 918 F. Supp. 491, 513 (D.N.H. 1996).
c. Subjective and Objective Components
Most courts indicate that the "anticipation" requirement has both a subjective
and objective component.
Somewhat ironically, it might be reasonable for a party to anticipate
litigation even though it never comes, and it might be unreasonable to
anticipate litigation even though it ultimately occurs. Restatement (Third)
of Law Governing Lawyers § 87 cmt. i (2000); Binks Mfg. Co. v. National
Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983).
d. Need for Specific Claim
Courts debate whether a party asserting the work product protection must
identify a specific claim in anticipation of which the party prepared the work
product.
* Some courts require identification of a specific claim. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *55
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001); Schmidt, Long & Assocs., Inc. v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., Civ. A. No. 00-CV-3683, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7145, at
*13 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2001).
* Other courts are more liberal, and do not require a party to identify a
specific claim. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Reno, 154 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18
(D.D.C. 2001).
This distinction can be enormously important for companies which face
"pattern" litigation such as products liability or employment discrimination
cases.
* If the court protects only those documents prepared in connection with or
in anticipation of a specific identifiable claim, the company might lose a
work product fight over such documents as guidelines for handling a pre-
litigation investigation, protocols for responding to threats of litigation, etc.
e. Degree of Anticipation Required
Courts apply widely varying views of what exactly must be "anticipated" to
trigger the work product protection -- varying from the possibility of litigation
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being "real and imminent" (McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 683 (D.
Kan. 2000)) to there being "some possibility of litigation." In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979).
In just a span of a few weeks, one court recently explained that a party
seeking work product protection must show only that "litigation was a real
possibility" (In re OM Group Sec. Litiq., 226 F.R.D. 579, 584-85 (N.D. Ohio
2005), while another court one state away held that the work product
protection could not apply "[i]f litigation is not imminent." Esposito v. Galli,
No. 4:04-CV-475, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1559, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4,
2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Assessing the "anticipation of litigation" requirement can be very complicated.
* For instance, one court held that a company's reasonable anticipation of
government litigation against it dissipated after the lapse of eight months.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646,
at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001).
* Another court refused work product protection for documents created
during a time that companies had entered into a "tolling agreement."
Minebea Co. v. Papst, 229 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that Papst
had sued a company called Western Digital, but later dismissed the
lawsuit without prejudice and entered into a tolling agreement with
Western Digital; holding that documents created after that time were "no
longer created for litigation purposes; rather, they [were] produced to
facilitate a business relationship;" explaining that "[tihis is true even if the
parties eventually end up in litigation because the negotiations fail,"
although acknowledging that "there is clearly a point at which the parties
once again begin 'anticipating litigation' as the relationship decays").
f. "Trigger Events"
Courts have pointed to certain "triggering events" as justifying a reasonable
anticipation of litigation:
Examples include: plaintiff's consultation with a lawyer (Wikel v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Okla. 2000)); plaintiffs retention of a
lawyer (In re Weeks Marine, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. App. 2000));
defendant's receipt of correspondence from plaintiffs lawyer (McNulty v.
Bally's Park Place, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 27, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1988)); defendant's
retention of a lawyer (Gulf Ins. Co. v. Alliance Steel LLC, No. 00 Civ. 2611
(RO), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 992, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001), but see
Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Carrier Haulers, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 564, 571
(W.D.N.C. 2000)); IRS audit (United States v. Ackert, 76 F. Supp. 2d 222,
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227 (D. Conn. 1999)); IRS notice disputing a taxpayer's valuation
(Bernardo v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 677, 688 (T.C. 1995)); filing of a
charge with the EEOC (Miller v. Federal Express Corp., 186 F.R.D. 376,
387-88 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)); filing of OSHA charge (Herman v. Crescent
Pub'g Group, No. 00 Civ. 1665 (SAS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13738, at
"13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2000)); receipt of anonymous employee
complaints about a hostile atmosphere (McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D.
332, 338 (D.D.C. 2001)); receipt of a letter from another party that took a
"litigious tone" (Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 195
F.R.D. 610, 617-18 (N.D. II1. 2000)); litigation in foreign countries
(SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 3952, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13606, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2000)); plaintiffs statement of
an intent to retain a lawyer (Wikel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 493
(N.D. Okla. 2000)); involvement of a corporation's in-house law
department in directing and controlling an accident investigation (Federal
Express Corp. v. Cantway 778 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001));
other litigation against the same defendant (United States v. Gericare
Med. Supply, Inc., No. 99-0366-CB-L, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19662 (S.D.
Ala. Dec. 11, 2000)); a wrongdoer's guilty plea to a criminal charge and
implication of others (United States v. Gericare Med. Supply, Inc., No. 99-
0366-CB-L, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19662, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 11,
2000)); a letter from an experienced Title VII law firm alleging a violation of
the Civil Rights Act and threatening an administrative complaint with the
EEO (McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 332, 339 (D.D.C. 2001)); a
university's termination of an employee (Long v. Anderson Univ., 204
F.R.D. 129 (S.D. Ind. 2001)); a company's retention of a consultant
laboratory to assist in vigorously enforcing its patents (Moore U.S.A. Inc.
v. Standard Register Co., 206 F.R.D. 72, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)); receipt of a
subpoena from a government agency (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No.
M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001)).
0 In one very recent case, the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue. United
States v. Roxworthy, __ F.3d __, No. 05-5776, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
20481, at *7, *12, *13, *17-18, *22-23, *25, *26 (6 th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006)(indicating that Yum! Brands could reasonably have anticipated litigation
with the IRS after treating a transaction in a certain manner on its tax
returns: because 'the tax treatment of captive insurance companies,
including the treatment of premium payments to captive insurance
companies, was very unsettled and had been the subject of considerable
litigation between the Internal Revenue Service ... and other large
corporate tax payers like Yum"' (citation omitted); "because the loss was
recognized for tax purposes but not book purposes;" because "'the IRS
had a history of attacking transactions and litigating cases where a loss
was only recognized for tax purposes"' (citation omitted); "because of the
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certainty of an IRS audit, the conspicuousness of the $112 million
discrepancy between tax and book loss, and the unsettled law
surrounding captive insurance transactions;" reversing a district court's
holding, and protecting a memorandum prepared for Yum! by its
consultant KPMG).
g. Insurance Context
Most courts hold that in the "first party" insurance context, insurance
companies cannot reasonably anticipate litigation with their insureds in every
case -- at least until something triggers such a reasonable anticipation.
Stampley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 23 F. App'x 467, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2001).
* Courts are more generous in the third party insurance context. Urban
Outfitters, Inc. v. DPIC Cos., 203 F.R.D. 376, 379-80 (N.D. II1. 2001).
* Courts take differing approaches as to when an insurance company can
reasonably anticipate bad faith claim litigation by an insured or a third
party. Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 536 (N.D.W.
Va. 2000).
2. Danger: The Duty to Preserve Documents Might Start on the "Trigger" Date
Companies considering whether to claim the work product protection after some
"trigger" event results in the reasonable anticipation of litigation against the
company (discussed below) should remember that the same "trigger" might
require them to start saving potential relevant documents.
The obligation of any litigant (or possible litigant) to preserve potentially
responsive evidence obviously does not present a new issue -- but the enormous
volume of electronic communications clearly makes the analysis more difficult,
and exacerbates the possible burden.
It should go without saying that litigants must preserve potentially responsive
documents (including electronic documents).
* The duty obviously arises before a discovery request arrives -- and can also
arise before litigation begins.
The most widely quoted standard comes from the Southern District of New York.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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* In Zubulake, the court held that: "[t]he obligation to preserve evidence
arises ... when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant
to future litigation." Id. at 216.
* In discussing the scope of a company's duty to preserve, the court rejected a
blanket duty. "Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litigation,
preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and
every backup tape? The answer is clearly, 'no.' Such a rule would cripple
large corporations, like UBS, that are almost always involved in litigation. As
a general rule, then, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it
reasonably anticipates litigation." Id. at 217 (footnotes omitted).
* Instead, the court explained that a company which anticipates being sued
"must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an
adversary." Id. The court held that the preservation duty extends to all "key
players" in the anticipated litigation. Id. at 217-18.
* The Zubulake court found that UBS should have preserved electronic
documents that were ultimately destroyed. It ordered UBS Warburg to pay
the cost of the plaintiffs motion, directed the company to reimburse plaintiff
for the costs of any depositions or re-depositions necessitated by the
document destruction, and approved a jury instruction containing an adverse
inference about the destroyed back-up tapes. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Courts have developed a very stringent rule requiring companies to save
documents when they reasonably anticipate litigation, and severely punishing the
companies that do not.
* E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 587-88 (D. Minn.
2005) (assessing a spoliation claim against Deutsche Bank; explaining that a
litigant asserting a spoliation claim must show bad faith if its adversary
destroyed documents before the appropriate "trigger date," but need not show
bad faith if documents are destroyed after that date; defining the "trigger date"
as the date "when a party knows or should have known that the evidence is
relevant to future or current litigation").
Courts' analyses of the "trigger" date for preserving documents essentially
matches the "trigger" date for the work product doctrine.
* See, e.g., Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 512, 510-11
(D. Md. 2005) (holding that a company had engaged in spoliation, and
approving "an adverse spoliation of evidence instruction in the jury
instructions"; "[Tlhe evidence in this case amply supports the finding that
Echostar was placed on notice of potential litigation arising out of plaintiff's
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allegations of sexual harassment and retaliation as early as January 2001.
Beginning in January 2001, Broccoli informed two of his supervisors at
Echostar, Chip Paulson and Larry Goldman (as each testified on deposition
and at trial), both orally and via email, of Andersen's sexually harassing
behavior. Paulson and Goldman testified that Broccoli made numerous
complaints to them regarding Andersen's inappropriate behavior throughout
2001 and that they subsequently relayed, verbally and via email, the
complaints to their superiors at Echostar."; finding that the company should
have started saving document as of that time).
Large companies have found themselves severely punished for destroying
electronic documents under this standard.
" A court ordered Philip Morris to pay $2.75 million as a sanction for not
preserving relevant e-mails, and also prohibited Philip Morris from relying on
the testimony of any of its executives who had not saved their e-mails. United
States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004).
" Morgan Stanley lost a highly publicized Florida state court case involving
allegations of document spoliation. The verdict against Morgan Stanley was
approximately $1.5 billion. Landon Thomas Jr., Jury Tallies Morgan's Total at
$1.45 Billion, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2005, at Cl; see also Michael Christie,
Morgan Stanley $1.45B Judgment Points to E-Mail Peril, Reuters News, May
20, 2005.
In one recent case, the Southern District of New York pointed to a well-known
law firm's privilege log (which claimed work product protection for an historic
document) as evidence that the company anticipated litigation as of that date --
thus triggering a duty to preserve documents. Ironically, the court had earlier
held that the historic document did not deserve work product protection, because
the company had prepared it in the "ordinary course" of business.
* Anderson v. Sotheby's Inc. Severance Plan, No. 04 Civ. 8180 (SAS), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23517, at *16, *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005) (assessing
an ERISA claim by a former Sotheby's employee; declining to grant plaintiff
an adverse inference instruction based on what he alleged to have been
Sotheby's wrongful spoliation of evidence; noting that the Sotheby's
Severance Plan Committee Secretary routinely destroyed her handwritten
meeting notes after she prepared a typewritten Committee Report, so plaintiff
had not proven that the ERISA Administrator had "intentionally destroyed
notes of the Committee meetings to prevent plaintiff from obtaining them";
however, also noting that the Committee's Chair and the Plan Administrator's
outside lawyer interviewed several employees (of Sotheby's successor
Cendant) regarding the plaintiffs claims, and that Sotheby's lawyers
O'Melveny & Myers had withheld the interview notes during discovery by
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asserting both attorney-client privilege and work product protection; although
the Magistrate Judge had earlier found that the notes were prepared in the
ordinary course of business and therefore did not deserve either protection,
"because the Administrator claimed that it reasonably anticipated litigation as
of July 6, 2004 [the date of the interview], the Administrator's duty to preserve
the documents arose as of that date" (emphases added)).
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D. Context: Motivational Component
In additional to the temporal requirement of the work product doctrine (discussed
above), a party asserting the protection must also satisfy a motivational component.
1. Motivational Requirement
To deserve work product protection, a document must not only have been
created at a time when the preparer anticipated litigation, the document must
have been prepared because of the litigation. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No.
M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001).
Many lawyers fail to recognize the significance of this motivational
requirement. Long v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129,137-38 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
a. Documents Created Pursuant to an External or Internal Requirement
The work product doctrine generally does not extend to documents prepared
pursuant to some law, regulation or internal procedure regardless of whether
litigation is anticipated or not. Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No.
1:98-CV-726, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *18 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
b. Documents Created in the "Ordinary Course of Business"
Documents created in the "ordinary course of business" do not deserve work
product protection. Enerqy Capital Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485
(Fed. Cl. 2000); Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1963).
The following type of documents have been found to be created in the
"ordinary course of business" and thus undeserving of work product
protection: committee minutes (United States v. South Chicago Bank, No.
97 CR 849-1, 2,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17445, at *23 (N.D. III. Oct. 16,
1998)); police reports (Collins v. Mullins, 170 F.R.D. 132, 135 (W.D. Va.
1996); Darnell v. McMurray, 141 F.R.D. 433,435 (W.D. Va. 1992));
insurance investigation reports (St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial
Fin. Corp., 197 F.R.D. 620 (N.D. Iowa 2000)); accident reports (Wikel v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 493, 495 (N.D. Okla. 2000)); computer
databases (Colorado ex rel. Woodard v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. Co., 108
F.R.D. 731, 734 (D. Colo. 1986)); other investigative reports (United States
v. Ernstoff, 183 F.R.D. 148, 156 (D.N.J. 1998)); claims statistics (In re
Bairnco Corp. Sec. Litiq., 148 F.R.D. 91, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); witness
statements taken by insurance adjusters (Holton v. S&W Marine, Inc., No.
00-1427 SECTION "L" (5), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16604, at *8 (E.D. La.
Nov. 9, 2000); Pfender v. Torres, 765 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
2001)); practically any document created by a tobacco company which is
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litigating in Kansas Federal Court, which takes the bizarre approach that
tobacco companies are actually in the "business of litigation." Burton v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661, 676 (D. Kan. 2001).
Significantly, many courts apply this "ordinary course of business" standard
regardless of a lawyer's involvement.
Even materials generated during a lawyer-supervised corporate
investigation will not deserve work product protection if the investigation
would have been conducted in the "ordinary course of business."
Guardsmark, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 206 F.R.D. 202 (W.D.
Tenn. 2002); Poseidon Oil Pipeline Co. v. Transocean Sedco Forex, Inc.,
Civ. A. No. 00-76 c/w 00-2154 SECTION "T"(2), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18553, at *19-21 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001); Welland v. Trainer, No. 00 Civ.
0738 (JSM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15556 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001).
c. Other Documents Not Motivated by Litigation
Focusing on the "ordinary course of business" test can lead the analysis off
track.
Even if materials were not created in the "ordinary course" of a company's
business, they will not deserve work product protection unless they were
motivated by the litigation. Seibu Corp. v. KPMG LLP, No. 3-00-CV-1639-X,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 906 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2002).
0 For instance, a court found that the work product doctrine did not protect
an investigation conducted by GMAC (the loan servicer on World Trade
Center debt) immediately following the September 11 attacks on the World
Trade Center. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Props. LLC,
01 Civ. 9291(JSM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11949 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002).
A number of recent cases highlight this basic principle.
* See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litiq., 230 F.R.D. 433, 435
& n.3 (D. Md. 2005) (assessing Royal Ahold's work product claim for 827
witness interview memoranda prepared by outside counsel during an
investigation; finding that the work product doctrine did not apply because
the investigation was designed to "satisfy the requirement" of the
company's outside accountants, and that "the investigation would have
been undertaken even without the prospect of preparing a defense to a
civil suit"; quoting a statement by the company's board chairman to
shareholders that "[t]he purpose of our internal investigations is to enable
our accountants to resume their audit work at quickly as possible"; also
quoting from the accountant's letter to the company's audit committee,
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which indicated that the company had conducted the investigation "to
address the concerns" raised by the accountant).
" Even more recently, a court held that the work product doctrine did not
protect a company's investigation begun within hours of an industrial
accident in which the plaintiff lost his hand -- because the company had
advised the plaintiff that it was "our standard practice to investigate
accidents," so that the company apparently would have investigated the
accident even if it had not anticipated the obvious litigation that almost
immediately followed. Harpster v. Advanced Elastomer Sys., L.P., 2005
Ohio 6919, at 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, 2006 Ohio 2466
(Ohio 2006).
* This theme appears in many similar cases. Carroll v. Praxair, Inc., No.
2:05-cv-307, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43991, at *3, *10, *11, *12 (W.D. La.
June 28, 2006) (assessing an investigation that resulted from an industrial
accident in which a truck driver at defendant Praxair's facility was found
unconscious; noting that within 24 hours, Praxair's law department created
an investigation team -- instructing the team to report back to the law
department and mark all their documents "Confidential Attorney
Client/Work Product Privilege"; also pointing out that Praxair offered an
affidavit of one of its environmental services managers stating under oath
that the investigation was "lawyer-driven and primarily designed to
address claims of liability and expected litigation against Praxair" (internal
quotations omitted); rejecting Praxair's affidavit and argument, and instead
pointing to testimony that "investigations are routinely done following any
accident that occurs"; also noting that Praxair "made certain changes in its
operations" as a result of the investigation, highlighting the business
nature of the investigation; pointing out that "there is nothing before the
court to indicate whether all investigations of accidents were conducted
under the direction of the Praxair's Law Department.").
d. Types of Documents Protected by the Work Product Doctrine
Courts have debated what types of materials deserve work product
protection.
Courts traditionally only protected documents created to be used in or assist
in litigation. Trustmark Ins. Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re of Am., Case
No. 00 C 1926, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18917, at *10 (N.D. II1. Dec. 19, 2000));
Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98cv 726, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4561, at *26-27 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
* This limited the protection to documents such as draft pleadings, notes
used during a deposition, etc.
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Starting in the Second Circuit, courts began to expand the work product
protection to documents created "because of the litigation or anticipated
litigation, even if they were not to be used in the litigation. United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
A good example would be an analysis of how a company might pay for a
large judgment that might be rendered against it in litigation -- the analysis
would not be used in the litigation, but was clearly created "because of'
the litigation.
The "because of' standard has spread beyond the Second Circuit and now
clearly represents the trend in work product law. United States v. Roxworthy,
___ F.3d __, No. 05-5776, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20481, at *7, *12, *13,
*17-18, *22-23, *25, *26 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006) (assessing a work product
claim by Yum! Brands, Inc., for a memorandum prepared by KPMG, which
was acting as a tax consultant and not as Yum's outside auditor; adopting the
"because of' standard and citing Adlman; also explaining that "the key issue
in determining whether a document should be withheld is the function that the
document serves;" rejecting a test that would require "that the primary or sole
purpose of the KPMG memoranda be in preparation of litigation;" holding that
the district court committed "clear error" in holding that Yum did not anticipate
litigation; reversing and remanding with instructions to protect the KPMG
memoranda as work product).
2. Deceptive Conduct
Some courts find that work product materials prepared through some client or
lawyer wrongdoing (such as wiretapping) are not entitled to work product
protection. Anderson v. Hale, 202 F.R.D. 548, 558 (N.D. III. 2001).
* In assessing a lawyer's conduct, some courts and bars have permitted
lawyers and those working under their direction to engage in deceptive
conduct that is justifiably deemed to have socially worthwhile purposes --
such as housing discrimination tests. Arizona LEO 99-11 (9/1999).
* Some courts have taken an even more expansive approach, and permitted
lawyers to direct their subordinates to engage in knowingly deceptive conduct
that seems to have a purely commercial purpose -- as long as the deception
is not too gross. Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y 15 F. Supp. 2d
456 (D.N.J. 1998).
115
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9125/07)
3. Application to Internal Corporate Investigations
a. Courts' Analysis of Work Product Claims for the Fruits of Internal
Corporate Investigations
Most clients (and many lawyers) believe that the work product doctrine
normally covers lawyer-supervised investigations of some accounting
problem, employee wrongdoing, etc.
* Even if such investigations satisfy the temporal element of the work
product doctrine, they often fail the motivational element.
Courts analyzing work product claims for internal corporate investigations
tend to focus on three aspects.
(1) The initiating documents which describe the corporate investigation.
These documents sometimes reflect a businessperson's description of the
problem, even before the company involves or hires lawyers. Even when
lawyers are involved, the initiating documents sometimes shy away from
mentioning possible litigation -- perhaps for public relations reasons.
(2) The course of the investigation. In some situations the internal corporate
investigation report focuses on business or process issues rather than
litigation issues.
(3) The use of the investigation results. If companies use the investigation
results to make employment decisions, re-tool corporate processes, etc., a
court is more likely to find that the company undertook the investigation as
a business rather than a litigation-related step.
b. Examples
Many large and prestigious law firms have failed in their efforts to protect the
fruits of their corporate investigations.
For example, courts found that materials generated during the following
lawyer-supervised corporate investigations did not deserve work product
protection, because the company and its law firm had failed to show that the
investigation was primarily motivated by litigation reasons.
An investigation undertaken by Weil, Gotshal and Arthur Andersen into
accounting irregularities at Leslie Fay. In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litiq.,
161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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" An investigation undertaken by Davis Polk into alleged fraud at Kidder
Peabody. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litiq., 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
* An investigation undertaken by Willkie Farr into alleged wrongdoing at
Sensormatic. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, No. M8-85 (JSM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2927 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14,1997).
" An investigation undertaken by Gibson, Dunn into alleged wrongdoing at
KPMG. Seibu Corp. v. KPMG LLP, No. 3-00-CV-1639-X, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 906 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2002).
" An investigation undertaken by Weil, Gotshall and forensic accountant
Ten Eyck into alleged wrongdoing at OMG. In re OM Group Sec. Litiq.,
226 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
* An investigation undertaken by White & Case and Price Waterhouse
Coopers into alleged wrongdoing at Royal Ahold. In re Royal Ahold N.Y.
Sec. & ERISA Litiq., 230 F.R.D. 433 (D. Md. 2005).
Although we will never know if these law firms knew from the beginning (and
advised their clients) that their investigations would not deserve work product
protection, we do know that they argued for such protection after the fact --
and lost.
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E. Content: Fact and Opinion
As explained above, the content of work product is far less important than its
context.
1. Scope of the Protection
Although the work product doctrine on its face applies only to "documents and
tangible things" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)), most courts apply the protection to
non-tangible information such as deposition testimony. In re Lorazepam v.
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1290, Misc. No. 99-276 (TFH/JMF),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, at *14 (D.D.C. July 16, 2001).
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, work product comes in two forms -- fact and
opinion.
* Because opinion work product receives dramatically higher protection than
fact work product, litigants often fight about the proper characterization.
2. Fact Work Product
Fact work product includes "tangible materials and intangible equivalents
prepared, collected, or assembled by a lawyer. Tangible materials include
documents, photographs, diagrams, sketches, questionnaires and surveys,
financial and economic analyses, hand-written notes, and material in electronic
and other technologically advanced forms, such as stenographic, mechanical, or
electronic recordings or transmissions, computer data bases, tapes, and
printouts." Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 87 cmt. f (2000).
* The following materials can receive fact work product protection: statements
obtained from witnesses (Horning-Keating v. State, 777 So. 2d 438, 443 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001)); recordings of witness interviews (Jones v. Ada S.
McKinley Cmty. Servs., No. 89 C 0319, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14312, at *7
(N.D. II1. Nov. 28, 1989)); lawyers' notes taken during witness interviews
(Herman v. Crescent Publ'q Group, No. 00 Civ. 1665 (SAS), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13738, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000)); investigation reports
(Herman v. Crescent Publ'q Group No. 00 Civ. 1665 (SAS), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13738, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000)); surveillance tapes (Bradley
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 196 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Mo. 2000)); the details of and
results of laboratory tests (Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 203
F.R.D. 159, 163 (D. Del. 2001); Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,
206 F.R.D. 72, 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)); material generated during a law firm's
investigation (Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 93-5968-
C, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2001));
computer databases of information. Cornelius v. CONRAIL, 169 F.R.D. 250,
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253, 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Maloney v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 165 F.R.D.
26,30 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 309 (M.D. Ga.
1994); Indiana Coal Council v. Hodel, 118 F.R.D. 264, 268 (D.D.C. 1988);
Indiana State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Tioga Pines Living Ctr., Inc., 592 N.E.2d
1274, 1275, 1277-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). But see Colorado ex rel. Woodard
v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 734 (D. Colo. 1985).
Background information about the creation of work product generally will not itself
deserve protection. Amway Corp. v. P&G Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2281, at *16 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2001).
The work product doctrine generally does not protect from disclosure underlying
historical facts. White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 369, 373 (N.D.
II1. 2001).
3. Opinion Work Product
a. General Rule
Opinion work product includes the impressions or opinions of a lawyer or
other client representative.
* Opinion work product communicated to a client might also deserve
attorney-client privilege protection, and it usually is worth asserting both
protections -- the attorney-client privilege can provide absolute assurance
of confidentiality, but the work product doctrine protection is less
susceptible to waiver and therefore may survive the sharing of information
with third parties (discussed below).
* Examples of opinion work product include: a lawyer's memoranda
reflecting legal strategy or analysis (Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers § 89 cmt. b (2000); Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051,
1054 (8th Cir. 2000)); draft settlement agreements (N.V. Orqianon v. Elan
Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 11674 (JGK) (RLE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15394, at *5, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2000)); details of and results of
laboratory tests (SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., No.
00 C 2855, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18281, at *14-15 (N.D. III. Nov. 5,
2001)); draft materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., No. 00 C 2855, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18281, at *14 (N.D. II1. Nov. 5, 2001).
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b. Recurring Issues Involving Opinion Work Product
Unfortunately for litigants and their lawyers seeking some certainty, courts
take widely differing positions on opinion work product protection for
commonly created documents.
For instance, three decisions issued by courts in three different states
within approximately one month of each other show the disagreement
about just one issue -- whether a company's loss reserve figures deserve
opinion work product protection. First, a Massachusetts state court held
that "when the reserve is set during or in anticipation of litigation, it falls
within the rubric of opinion work product." Rhodes v. AIG Domestic
Claims, Inc., No. 05-1306-BLS2, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 19, at *38
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2006). About two weeks later, another court
reached the same conclusion. Bondex Int'l. Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., No. 1:03CV1322, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6044 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 14, 2006). About two weeks after that, another court held just the
opposite -- finding such reserve information unprotected by the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine. Ryan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., No. 3:03-CV-00644 (CFD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7366 (D. Conn.
Feb. 28, 2006).
" A few months later, a court found that the work product doctrine protected
such reserve figures. Lawrence E. Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l,
Inc., No. 02 C 5893, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49319 (N.D. III. July 6, 2006),
(holding that Household's in-lawyers' suggested reserve figure deserved
protection under the work product doctrine).
Courts have debated the applicability of the opinion work product to several
recurring situations worth mentioning.
First, some courts hold that every lawyer-prepared summary of a witness
interview (or similar document) deserves opinion work product protection,
because it necessarily reveals the lawyer's thought process (about what to
ask the witness, what to write down, etc.). Surles v. Air France, No. 88 Civ.
5004 (RMB)(FM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10048, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2001); St. Paul Reinsurace Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 197 F.R.D. 620
(N.D. Iowa 2000).
Other courts are not as generous. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA
Ltc, 230 F.R.D. 433, 437 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that a lawyer's witness
interview memoranda consisted of a "fairly straight forward recitation of
the information provided by the witness," and therefore did not deserve
opinion work product protection); Alexander v. FBI, 198 F.R.D. 306
(D.D.C. 2000); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Aldershoff, C.A. No. OOC-11-048-
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JRS & OOC-12-137-JRS, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 420, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. Sept. 10, 2001); Casella v. Hugh O'Kane Elec. Co., No. 00 Civ. 2481
(LAK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16001, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000).
* Of course, as explained above, every court recognizes that some portions
of such a document could deserve opinion work product protection (if they
explicitly articulate the lawyer's opinion).
Second, some courts hold that the opinion work product protects the identity
of the witnesses the litigant has interviewed (out of the universe of witnesses
who might possess pertinent knowledge). Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v.
Steinqraber, No. 4:02 CV 255, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11816, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
June 27, 2003) ("revealing the identity of witnesses interviewed would permit
opposing counsel to infer which witnesses counsel considers important, thus
revealing mental impressions and trial strategy"); McIntyre v. Main St. & Main
Inc., No. C-99-5328 MJJ (EDL), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19617, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 29, 2000).
• Other courts are not as generous. Lonq v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D.
129, 138 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
Third, most courts hold that the opinion work product doctrine does not cover
factual information obtained by a lawyer from third parties. McCoo v. Denny's
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 695 (D. Kan. 2000).
* This principle generally applies to document collections obtained by a
litigant from a trial advocacy group such as the ATLA. Miller v. Ford Motor
Co., 184 F.R.D. 581, 583 (S.D.W. Va. 1999); Hendrick v. Avis Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 256, 259 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Bartley v. Isuzu Motors
Ltd., 158 F.R.D 165, 167 (D. Colo. 1994); Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D.
301 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536 (D.
Kan. 1989).
* The opinion work product doctrine should protect a lawyer's compilation of
documents or facts from a third party, if the compilation would reveal the
lawyer's opinion (for instance, the opinion work product should protect the
identity of a small number of documents that a lawyer has selected from a
larger collection made available by a third party -- as long as the
adversary can review the third party's documents itself).
Fourth, most courts do not give opinion work product protection to a litigant's
compilation of facts or documents supporting the party's position. Directory
Dividends, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., No. 01-CV-1974, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24296 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2003); Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Finisar Corp.,
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205 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Cal. 2001); ,Axler v. Scientific Ecology Group, Inc., 196
F.R.D. 210, 212 (D. Mass. 2000).
" Thus, most courts do not allow a litigant to claim opinion work product in
response to contention interrogatories. Carver v. Velodyne Acoustics,
Inc 202 F.R.D. 273, 274 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Primetime 24 Joint Venture
v. Echostar Communications Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6738 (RMB) (MHD), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 779, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2000).
" As explained below (in the discussion of "Waiver") litigants cannot refuse
to comply with pretrial requirements that they identify trial exhibits, trial
witnesses, etc.
c. Lawyers' Compilation of Information or Documents as Opinion Work
Product (the Sporck Doctrine)
Most courts recognize that a lawyer's (or other client agent's) compilation of
specific information out of a larger universe of information deserves opinion
work product protection -- because the selection process reflects opinions or
impressions.
This approach is called the Sporck doctrine, based on the first case that
articulated this type of opinion work product protection. Sporck v. Peil,
759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985).
Courts have addressed this type of opinion work product protection in a
number of settings.
First, starting with Sporck itself, some courts protect the identity of specific
documents that a lawyer has asked a deponent to review before testimony.
* Other courts are not as generous. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg,
Inc. v. PEPSICO, Inc., Civ. A. No. 01-2009-KHV, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19935, at *5-8 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2001).
Second, some courts apply this concept to computer databases representing
a specific range of information compiled from a larger collection of data.
Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 309 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Santiago v. Miles,
121 F.R.D. 636, 638 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Indiana State Bd. of Public Welfare v.
Tioga Pines Living Ctr., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); In re
Bloomfield Mfg. Co., 977 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. App. 1998).
If a database contains generic information that does not reflect a studied
opinion of the data, it generally will not deserve such protection. In re
Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844,
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846 (8th Cir. 1988); Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXS 12640 (N.D. III. July 6, 2004); Hines v. Widnall, 183 F.R.D. 596, 601
(N.D. Fla. 1998); Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393, 399
(N.D. II1. 1980).
Third, some courts apply the work product doctrine to a lawyer's selection of
other documents during litigation preparation. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v.
Home Indem. Co., Civ. A. No. 88-9752, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14791, at *27
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1991) (holding that a lawyer's selection of certain public
documents represented work product because picking those documents that
"would best aid in preparing and proving the case" reflected the lawyer's
"thoughts and opinions"); Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., 115 F.R.D. 515,
517 (D.N.J. 1987) (protecting as opinion work product the "selection and
compilation of documents by counsel in preparation for discovery or in
anticipation of litigation" (internal citation omitted)).
Other courts are not as generous. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated
Mar. 19 & Aug. 2, 2002, No. M 11-189, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17079
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2002) (explaining that the Second Circuit has
acknowledged the Sporck rule, but never applied it; finding that the work
product doctrine did not protect pre-existing documents collected by Akin
Gump in anticipation of criminal proceedings).
The trend seems to be against broad application of the opinion work product
doctrine in these and similar situations, unless the compilation clearly reflects
a lawyer's opinions or impressions. Hambarian v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 565
(T.C. 2002) (finding that the Sporck doctrine did not apply to a prosecuting
attorney's selection of 10,000 pages and a petitioner's defense attorney's
selection of 100,000 pages from a larger universe of documents maintained
by the prosecuting attorney; explaining that "[g]iven the large volume of
documents (pages) involved, there is little or no likelihood that the defense
attorney's mental impressions would be discernible."); In re Sealed Case, 124
F.3d 230, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (although recognizing that opinion work
product was entitled to more protection, holding that "[w]here the context
suggests that the lawyer has not sharply focused or weeded the materials,
the ordinary Rule 26(b)(3) standard should apply"; remanding to the district
court for an additional review of the materials), rev'd sub nom. Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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F. Use: Preserving the Work Product Protection
1. Overcoming the Work Product Protection
a. Fact Work Product
Unlike the attorney-client privilege (which is absolute if properly created and
not waived), the work product doctrine provides only limited protection from
disclosure. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 87 cmt. d
(2000); Marsh v. Safir, No. 99 Civ. 8605 (JGK) (MHD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5136, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) allows a party to overcome the work product
protection if the party has "substantial need" for the materials and "is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
* The "substantial need" test focuses on the importance of the information
to the adversary's case. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 150
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
" The "undue hardship" test focuses on whether the information is easily
available elsewhere. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R., 194 F.R.D. 666, 674-75
(S.D. Cal. 2000).
As might be expected, litigants attempting to meet the "substantial need"
standard for overcoming their adversary's work product protection have tried
a number of theories.
(1) If a witness cannot be located or has died, courts often order disclosure of
any witness interview memoranda prepared by an adversary. Trustmark
Ins. Co. v. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am., No. 00 C 1926, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18917, at *10-11 (N.D. III. Dec. 19, 2000); McMillan v. Renal
Treatment Ctr., 45 Va. Cir. 395, 397-98 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998); Larson v.
McGuire, 42 Va. Cir. 40, 42 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997).
This argument generally does not work if the witnesses are available
for interview or discovery by the adversary (because in such a
circumstance the adversary usually cannot establish the necessary
"undue hardship" element. Siddall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F. App'x 522
(9th Cir. 2001); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *74-75 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001).
" One court has held that a party whose tardiness forfeited the chance to
seek discovery from a now-unavailable witness could not point to the
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witness's unavailability in seeking to overcome the work product
protection covering the adversary's witness interview notes. Wsol v.
Fiduciary Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 99 C 1719, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19002, at *7-8 (N.D. II1. Dec. 6, 1999).
Courts ordering the production of a litigant's witness interview notes
under such a standard should normally allow redaction of any opinions
included in the memorandum -- because they are entitled to a
heightened protection.
(2) In another common situation involving a litigant's attempt to prove
"substantial need" sufficient to overcome an adversary's work product
claim, courts sometimes order the production of contemporaneous
pictures, witness statements, etc., created immediately after the pertinent
incident -- holding that such documents cannot be recreated long after the
incident, when memories have faded. Coogan v. Cornet Transp. Co., 199
F.R.D. 166 (D. Md. 2001); Holton v. S&W Marine, Inc., No. 00-1427
SECTION "L" (5), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16604, at *10 (E.D. La. Nov. 9,
2000).
(3) Courts sometimes accept other arguments advanced by litigants hoping to
obtain their adversary's work product. Examples include:
Need to obtain material to impeach an adversary's witness.
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 88 cmt. c (2000);
Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 93-5968-C,
2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 598, at *15-16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29,
2001); In re Papst Licensing GmbH Patent Litig., Civ. A. No. 99-MD-
1298 Section "G" (2), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10012, at *69-70 (E.D. La.
July 12, 2001).
* Witness' lack of memory. Lawrence v. Cohn, No. 90 Civ.
2396(CSH)(MHD), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24),
summary iudgment granted, 197 F. Supp. 2d 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
* Need to obtain an adversary's translation of a document from
Japanese into English, because of the burden of arranging for another
translation. In re Papst Licensing GmbH Patent Litig., Civ. A. No. 99-
MD-1298 Section "G" (2), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10012, at *69-70
(E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
* Need for a client to review its former law firm's files for evidence of
malpractice. Polin v. Wisehart & Koch, No. 00 Civ. 9624 (AGS)(MHD),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9123 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2002).
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(4) On the other hand, some courts have rejected litigants' attempts to
overcome their adversary's work product protection (sometimes taking
views directly opposed to the approach of other courts, identified above).
Examples include:
* Need to obtain impeachment material. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision
v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP. 124 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
* Need to obtain corroborative evidence. Baker v. GMC (In re GMC),
209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
" Witnesses' testimony that they do not recall the exact words they used
during earlier interviews with their corporation's lawyer. In re
Woolworth Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., No. 94 Civ. 2217 (RO), 1996
Dist. LEXIS 7773 (S.D.N.Y. June 6,1996).
* A first-party insurer's need to know "what the insurer knew at the time
of the claim denial" in order to "assert both its defense and
counterclaim." St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp.,
197 F.R.D. 620, 632 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
* Need to obtain material to impeach an adversary's testifying doctors
who were expected to provide expert testimony. Harris v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 198 F.R.D. 26 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
* A former employee's inability to recall facts he had included in an
earlier affidavit. Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp. 197 F.R.D. 303
(E.D. Mich. 2000); Baker v. GMC 197 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
* An adversary's failure to answer questions at a deposition because of
numerous objections and directions not to answer. Madanes v.
Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
* Witnesses' lack of memory on factual matters that are not an essential
element of the requesting party's case. Madanes v. Madanes, No. 96
Civ. 6398 (LBS) (JCF), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17330, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2000); A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97 Civ. 4978
(LMM)(HBP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15820, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27,
2000).
(5) Courts also disagree about a litigant's right to obtain an adversary's
computer database that took a substantial effort to create.
* Some courts have found that a party seeking such a database can
meet the "substantial need" standard without trying to recreate the
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database itself. Nat'l Conq. for Puerto Rican Riqhts v. City of New York,
194 F.R.D. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 186 F.R.D.
354, 358 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Hines v. Widnall, 183 F.R.D. 596, 600-01
(N.D. Fla. 1998); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 174 F.R.D. 386, 389
(E.D. Tex. 1997); Cornelius v. CONRAIL, 169 F.R.D. 250, 254 (N.D.N.Y.
1996).
" Other courts have held that a party may not obtain access to the
adversary's database if the party could create its own database by
reviewing documents or interviewing witnesses. Maloney v. Sisters of
Charity Hosp., 165 F.R.D. 26, 30-31 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 122 F.R.D. 567, 570 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
* Courts have also rejected a litigant's arguments based on an alleged:
need for an adversary's computer database so that a lawyer "could
better frame his discovery requests" (Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 122 F.R.D. 457, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1988)); need to
obtain an adversary's computer database to ensure that the adversary
is producing all relevant documents. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. 122 F.R.D. 457, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
* Some courts ordering the production of a party's computer database to
the adversary required the requesting party to pay part of the cost of
creating the database (Portis v. City of Chicaqo, No. 02 C 3139, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12640 (N.D. III. July 6, 2004); Williams v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co.. 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 (W.D. Ky. 1987)), while one
court was not as generous. Hines v. Widnall, 183 F.R.D. 596, 601 (N.D.
Fla. 1998).
(6) Most courts find that a surveillance videotape deserves work product
protection if it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and motivated by
the litigation (explained above).
* Courts generally require that a party preparing such a videotape must
produce it, because the party that has been videotaped cannot
replicate the videotape (Evan v. Estell, 203 F.R.D. 172, 173 (M.D. Pa.
2001)), or because the party intends to use the videotape at trial. Id. at
175.
* In an unusual twist, courts recognize the obvious benefit of a secret
surveillance videotape in impeaching the party being videotaped (such
as a personal injury plaintiff falsely claiming serious injuries) by
permitting the party making the videotape to withhold it until after that
party has deposed the subject of the videotape. Bradley v. Wal-Mart
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Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Hildebrand v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 432 (D. Conn. 2000).
b. Opinion Work Product
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) requires that a court "shall protect" against the
disclosure of opinion work product.
Some courts apply absolute protection to opinion work product. Federal
Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Va.), affd in part,
modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Va. 1998).
* Some courts offer only "special protection." All W. Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's
Pet Prods. Div., 152 F.R.D. 634, 637 n.5 (D. Kan. 1993).
• Other courts apply every variation in between these two extremes.
c. Shifting Burdens of Proof
Litigants' fight over work product often involves an elaborately choreographed
shifting of burdens back and forth.
In In re OM Group Securities Litigation, 226 F.R.D. 579, 584 (N.D. Ohio
2005), the court explained (as do most courts) that (1) the party seeking
an adversary's work product must establish relevance; (2) the burden then
shifts to the party withholding the work product to show that it meets the
work product standards; (3) the burden then shifts back to the requesting
party to show that it has "substantial need" of the materials and is unable
to obtain the "substantial equivalent" without "undue hardship"; and (4) if
the requesting party carries this burden, the court must nevertheless
protect the protecting party lawyers' and other representatives' opinions.
If a document contains both fact and opinion work product, courts sometimes
require that parts of it be produced while other parts remain protected.
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 89 cmt. c (2000).
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G. Use: Avoiding Waiver of the Work Product Protection
1. Express Waiver
a. General Rule
Most courts hold that both the client and the lawyer may waive the work
product protection. S. N. Phelps & Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K Corp.),
199 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, No. 96 Civ. 5801 (JFK), 1997
WL 31197 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,1997).
Interestingly, at least one court has held that the party challenging an
adversary's work product assertion has the burden of proof -- in contrast to
the majority view that the party asserting the attorney-client privilege has
the burden of proof. Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, LLC v. Mike Mullen
Energy Equip. Res., Inc., No. 03-1496 c/w 03-1664 SECTION: "A" (4),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10048 (E.D. La. June 2, 2004).
b. Waiver Caused by Disclosing Work Product to Adversaries, or Others
Who Might Share It with Adversaries
Although the attorney-client privilege is so fragile that any disclosure outside
the attorney-client relationship generally waives the protection, most courts
find that disclosing work product to third parties does not automatically waive
that protection. Viacom, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust
L , 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Of course, disclosing work product to an adversary generally waives the work
product protection.
Because inadvertently produced documents disclosed during litigation
generally fall into the adversary's hands, most courts apply the same tests
(strict, liberal or fact-intensive) in determining waiver of the work product
protection that they use in assessing waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990).
Disclosing work product to a third party other than an adversary generally
causes a waiver only if the disclosure makes it likely that the work product will
"fall into enemy hands" -- ending up with the adversary. Bowman v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., No. 00 C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088, at *7 (N.D. III.
Sept. 13, 2001); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081, 1082 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
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In essence, sharing work product with a friend or ally does not automatically
waive the work product protection. Sheets v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No.
4:04CV00058, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27060 (W.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2005) (holding
that a personal injury plaintiff did not waive the work product protection by
sharing work product with others involved in a boating accident; noting that
those to whom the plaintiff disclosed the work product shared the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining insurance coverage for the boating accident).
The similarity of interests in this situation does not have to be as tight as
that required for creating a "joint defense" or "common interest"
arrangement (which is the only way to avoid waiving the attorney-client
privilege when disclosing privileged communications to a third party).
In fact, sharing work product with a third party may or may not waive the work
product protection, depending on whether the disclosure makes it more likely
that the adversary will obtain access to the protected work product.
* In such situations, courts often conduct a fact-intensive analysis of this
possibility. Verschoth v. Time Warner Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1339 (AGS) (JCF),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3174, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001) (holding that
Time Warner waived the work product protection covering information about
an employment discrimination case by sharing information with a former
assistant managing editor of Sports Illustrated who continued to perform
freelance editing for the magazine, because the editor was a long-standing
friend of the plaintiff, and "it was not reasonable to discuss with [the editor]
information that may have been gathered in anticipation of that litigation and
expect him not to convey it to [the plaintiff]").
Given this difference between the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine, it makes sense to share work product only under a confidentiality
agreement.
A confidentiality agreement would not prevent waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, but might demonstrate that the party disclosing work product did
not increase the chance the adversary would obtain access to the work
product. Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 237-38 (N.D.
II1. 2000).
c. Disclosure that Waives the Attorney-Client Privilege but not the Work
Product Doctrine
This difference in waiver principles between the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine sometimes means that sharing materials protected
by both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine might
waive the former but not the latter. Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner,
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198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (sharing information with a public relations
firm); Chase v. City of Portsmouth, Civ. No. 2:05cv446, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29294, at *20 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2006) (holding that a City Attorney's letter to
the City Council and others deserved privilege protection; but finding that the
City had lost the privilege protection by not treating the letter carefully
enough; also finding that the letter deserved work product protection, which
can survive "[I]imited disclosure to third parties" and therefore continued to
protect the letter)
In one recent celebrated case, Martha Stewart was found to have waived
the attorney-client privilege protection covering one of her e-mails by
sharing it with her daughter, but was found not to have waived the work
product protection covering the e-mail. United States v. Stewart, 287 F.
Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
d. Selective Disclosure to Gain an Advantage
Selective disclosure of work product materials to gain some advantage
generally waives the privilege. ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs.
Corp., No. C99-1968 CRB (JCS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10585, at *26 (N.D.
Cal. June 16, 2000).
Sharing work product during settlement negotiations can waive the
protection, although not all courts agree. In re Chrysler Motors Corp.
Overniqht Evaluation Program Litiq., 860 F.2d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1988);
Sparton Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 557, 565-66 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
Some courts are quick to find a waiver, even if a company's public disclosure
does not reveal actual work product -- but rather discloses the results of
corporate investigations.
In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litic., 230 F.R.D. 433, 436, 437 (D.
Md. 2005) (finding that Royal Ahold had waived any work product
protection for hundreds of witness interview memoranda prepared by
outside counsel, because the company had included in its Form 20-F filing
"the information obtained from the witness interviews, and the conclusions
expressed in the internal investigative reports"; noting that the "public
disclosure argument is consistent with the position that the driving force
behind the internal investigations was not this litigation but rather the need
to satisfy Royal Ahold's accountants, and thereby the SEC, financial
institutions, and the investing public"; not mentioning if the filing quoted
from any of the interviews or mentioned the lawyers' role, although noting
elsewhere that investigative reports made available to the plaintiffs quoted
from the witness interview memoranda; finding that this amounted to
"testimonial use" of the "material that might otherwise be protected as
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work product"; explaining that "[b]y its public disclosures in the Form 20-F
and the production of several of the internal reports to the plaintiffs, Royal
Ahold has therefore waived the attorney-client privilege and non-opinion
work product protection as to the subject matters discussed in the 20-F
and the reports"; finding that the witness interview memoranda themselves
do not deserve opinion work product protection, "except as to those
portions Royal Ahold can specifically demonstrate would reveal counsel's
mental impressions and legal theories concerning this litigation").
e. Disclosure of Work Product to the Government
Courts have wrestled with the waiver implications of companies sharing work
product with the government.
As a theoretical matter, some courts held out the possibility that sharing
work product with the government does not create a waiver. For instance,
if the private party has an interest allied with the government's interest,
sharing work product with the government may not waive the work product
protection. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litiq., 190 F.R.D. 309,
314 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
° However, a string of recent cases has held that companies always waive
the work product protection by sharing work product with the government.
In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 230 F.R.D. 433, 437 (D. Md.
2005) (requiring Royal Ahold to provide plaintiff 269 interview memoranda
that Royal Ahold had earlier given to the SEC and to the U.S. Attorney's
Office, noting that the confidentiality agreement between Royal Ahold and
these governmental entities "allows substantial discretion" to the
government to use or disclose the memoranda); In re CMS Energy Sec.
Li, No. 02-CV-72004 & 02-CV-72834, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8838
(E.D. Mich. May 13, 2005) (finding that a company's sharing of an internal
investigation report with various government agencies under a
confidentiality agreement waives the attorney-client privilege and work
product protections); In re Tyco Int'l, Inc. Multidistrict Liti.., MDL Dkt. No.
02-1335-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4541 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2004)
(unpublished opinion); Spanierman Gallery v. Merritt, No. 00 Civ. 5712
(LTS)(THK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22141 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2003);
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610 S.E.2d 54, (Ga. 2005); McKesson HBOC,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
The most recent Circuit Court decision found that a company sharing work
product with the government waived that protection (although it affirmed
the lower court's ruling that allowed redaction of opinion work product
before ordering disclosure to a private plaintiff). In re Qwest Commc'ns
Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1187-88, 1199, 1196 (10th Cir. 2006) (assessing
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the waiver implications of Boles Schiller sharing with the SEC and the
DOJ approximately 220,000 pages of material created or collected during
Boies Schiller's internal investigation of Qwest; upholding the district
court's ruling that Boies Schiller had waived the work product protection by
sharing the documents with the government, though permitting Boies
Schiller to redact opinion work product; finding that the First, Second,
Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits had rejected the concept of a "selective
waiver," which would allow companies to share work product with the
government but not force them to disclose the protected materials to
private plaintiffs; noting that some circuits (including the Second, Third and
D.C. Circuits) hold out some hope for selective waiver in the work product
context; but rejecting any selective waiver in either the privilege or work
product contexts; finding that Qwest's confidentiality agreement with the
government did little to restrict the agencies' use of the materials they
received from Qwest; rejecting Owest's and ACC's argument that
companies now litigate in a "culture of waiver" that discourages
corporations' cooperation with the government; noting that Qwest itself
"hedged its bets by choosing to release 220,000 pages of documents [to
the government] but to retain another 390,000 pages of privileged
documents"; concluding that "Qwest perceived an obvious benefit from its
disclosures but did so while weighing the risk of waiver").
" A few recent cases have taken the opposite approach, but it is too early to
tell if these cases are an aberration or represent a new trend. In re
McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litiq., Nos. C-99-20743 RMW & C-00-20030
RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7098 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005); In re
National Gas Commodity Litig., No. 03 Civ 6186 (VM) (AJP), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11950 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005).
* One court has held that sharing work product with the government waives
the protection applicable to fact work product, but not opinion work
product. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989).
* Given this uncertainty, companies should never assume that they can
share work product with the government without waiving that protection.
f. Disclosure of Work Product to Outside Auditors
Courts have also dealt with the waiver implications of sharing protected work
product with outside auditors.
Several earlier cases had indicated that company might be able to share
work product with their auditors without waiving the work product
protection -- because the outside auditors were not the company's
133
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For T"ax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9125107)
adversaries. In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litiq., No. 90 Civ. 1260(SS), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18215, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993); Gramm v.
Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 5122(MJL), 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 773,
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1990).
" One post-Enron case held that a company sharing work product with its
outside auditor waived the work product protection. Medinol, Ltd. v.
Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
" A later case took the opposite position -- finding that a company sharing
work product with its outside auditor did not waive the work product
protection. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441,
444, 447, 448, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging that the earlier
Medinol decision took the opposite approach, but finding that Merrill Lynch
did not have a "tangible adversarial relationship" with its auditor Deloitte &
Touche, so that Merrill Lynch had not waived the work product protection
covering an internal investigation report by sharing that report with Deloitte
& Touche; noting that Deloitte & Touche concluded that the report "did not
impact [Deloitte's] audit work or Merrill Lynch's financial statements";
pointing to Deloitte's "ethical and professional obligation" to maintain the
confidentiality of materials received from Merrill Lynch; concluding that
finding a waiver of the work product protection in such circumstances
"could very well discourage corporations from conducting a critical self-
analysis and sharing the fruits of such an inquiry with the appropriate
actors").
" In an analogous situation, another Southern District of New York decision
declined to follow Medinol, and instead held that a company did not waive
the opinion work product protection by sharing the opinion work product
with an actuary (who used the report in preparing filings with the New York
Insurance Department). Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, No.
04 Civ. 4309 (LAK) (JCF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4265 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2006).
" The most recent Southern District of New York decision took the same
approach, meaning that the last three decisions from that important court
found that a company sharing work product with an outside auditor did not
waive that protection. International Design Concepts, Inc. v. Saks Inc.,
No. 05 Civ. 4754 (PKC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 2006) (holding that Saks did not waive the work product protection
covering an internal investigation report prepared by Wilmer Hale by
disclosing the report to Saks' outside auditor PWC; "[A]llowing the outside
auditor, retained by the client, to know the content of the attorney's
confidential threat assessment does not, in this Court's view, destroy the
134
A Guide to the Attorney-Client McGuireWoods LLP
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine C. Bell
For Tax Practitioners T. Spahn
(9125107)
protection. ... Here, I conclude that the report is protected because it
contains the attorney's mental impressions and professional judgments
concerning the magnitude, scope and/or likely merits of the claims, was
prepared in contemplation of actual and potential litigations or claims, was
created in reliance upon the attorney work product protection and was
communicated to the client's auditor under a strict pledge of confidentiality
for a valid purpose that serves the interest of the client.").
" Another 2006 decision on this issue agreed with the recent trend against
finding a waiver in these circumstances. Lawrence E. Jaffee Pension Plan
v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49319, at
*21, *25-26 (N.D. III. July 6, 2006), (holding that the work product doctrine
protected Household's in-house lawyer's opinion letters to Household's
outside auditor Anderson, and that disclosing the opinion letters did not
waive the work product protection; "In the court's view, the fact that an
independent auditor must remain independent from the company it audits
does not establish that the auditor also has an adversarial relationship
with the client as contemplated by the work product doctrine. Disclosing
documents to an auditor does not substantially increase the opportunity
for potential adversaries to obtain the information."; also finding that
Household did not waive the work product protection covering its litigation
database (which reflected its lawyer's mental impressions) by allowing
Anderson to review a 'sample of cases from the legal database to insure
completeness' (citation omitted); explaining that "disclosing documents to
an auditor does not substantially increase the opportunity for potential
adversaries to obtain the information").
* The newest decision on this issue comes from a case closely watched as
one of the government's first efforts to get tax accrual workpapers through
court proceedings from a financial services subsidiary of conglomerate
Textron, Inc. United States v Textron, Inc., No. 06-198T (D.R.I. August 29,
2007). The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied the
government's petition to get the 2001 tax accrual workpapers from
Textron, Inc.'s financial services subsidiary. Addressing the more specific
facts of the case, Textron, Inc. (Textron), a publicly traded corporation with
approximately 190 subsidiaries, had a subsidiary that provided
commercial lending and financial services (Textron Financial Corp. or
TFC) relied on Textron attorneys, private law firms, and outside
accounting firms for advice regarding tax matters. IRS learned that TFC
had engaged in nine "sale-in, lease-out" (SILO) transactions involving
telecommunications equipment and rail equipment. Because the
transactions were considered to be of a type engaged in for the purpose of
tax avoidance, IRS issued more than 500 IDRs to Textron. In June 2005,
the IRS manager examining Textron's return issued an administrative
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summons for all of the tax accrual work papers for Textron's tax year
ending Dec. 29, 2001. Textron refused to produce its tax accrual work
papers asserting that they were privileged and that the summons was
issued for an improper purpose. During the course of an audit conducted
by Textron's independent auditor, Textron permitted the auditor to
examine the final tax accrual work papers at issue in the case with the
understanding that the information was to be treated as confidential. The
court said determination of any tax owed must be based on factual
information, none of which is contained in the work papers and all of which
is readily available to the IRS through the issuance of information
document requests (IDRs) and by other means. The court said that, in its
view, the papers sought by the IRS would have little bearing on calculating
Textron's tax liability. "The opinions of Textron's counsel, either favorable
or unfavorable, would have little to do with that determination, and forced
disclosure of those opinions would put Textron at an unfair disadvantage
in any dispute that might arise with the IRS," the court found. The court
ruled the requested documents are protected by the work product
privilege, supporting Textron's claims. "The IRS has failed to carry the
burden of demonstrating a 'substantial need' for ordinary work product, let
alone the heightened burden applicable to Textron's tax accrual work
papers, which constitute opinion work product," the court said in a 34-page
opinion.
This new debate has caused great concern to in-house lawyers, who find
themselves pressured by outside auditors to disclose litigation-related
analyses, litigation outcome predictions, etc. -- yet justifiably worry about
waiving the work product protection that would otherwise entitle the
companies to withhold such documents from the private plaintiffs against
whom they are litigating.
IRS releases internal memoranda on FIN 48. "FIN 48 Disclosures... should be
considered by examiners and others when conducting risk assessments."
(Deborah Nolan, LMSB Commissioner). The battle wages on despite such court
decisions like the Textron decision.
The Internal Revenue Service recently released two memoranda issued in May
by Deborah Nolan, the Commissioner of the Large and Mid-Sized Business
Division (LSMB) of the Internal Revenue Service, containing guidance to IRS
personnel regarding Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation
No. 48 (FIN 48). (FIN 48 and Tax Accrual Workpaper (TAW) Policy Update [link
http://www. irs.qov/businesses/corporations/article/O,, id=1 71447,00.html] and FIN
48 Implications LMSB Field Examiners' Guide [link
http://www. irs.qov/businesses/corporations/article/O,,id=171859,00. html].) FIN 48
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is an interpretation of the FASB Statement No. 109 regarding the calculation and
disclosure for uncertain tax positions.
Since its release on July 13, 2006, FIN 48 has generated considerable interest
and concern. Many taxpayers fear that the disclosures required by FIN 48 and
the workpapers prepared in connection therewith will serve as a "roadmap" for
IRS examinations. The IRS Office of Chief Counsel has determined that FIN 48
Workpapers are Tax Accrual Workpapers (TAW), and are therefore subject to the
IRS' current policy of restraint as contained in IRM 4.10.20. IRS officials have
stated, however, that the current TAW Policy is being evaluated to ensure that it
is still appropriate in today's environment.
The memorandum captioned "FIN 48 Implications LMSB Field Examiner's
Guide," lists ten common questions and answers related to the requirements of
FIN 48. The first question, and the one most likely on taxpayers' and IRS
examiner's minds is, "Are FIN 48 Disclosures a Roadmap for the IRS?" The
memorandum does not answer this question with a simple "yes" or "no," but it is
clear from the answer that, at a minimum, IRS examiners should use the FIN 48
disclosures to point them in the right direction. The answer notes that FIN 48
disclosures may lack specificity, and therefore, it may be difficult, for example, to
know whether the disclosure has a U.S. tax or foreign tax implication.
Nevertheless, the answer goes on to state, "Even with the lack of specificity, tax
footnotes included in financial statements, including FIN 48 Disclosures, should
be carefully reviewed and analyzed as part of the audit planning process.
The second question and answer in the memorandum addresses the impact of
FIN 48 on the IRS' TAW Policy. While the answer states that FIN 48
Workpapers are TAWs, and therefore, subject to the policy of restraint, FIN 48
Disclosures are another matter. "On the other hand, FIN 48 Disclosures reported
in quarterly and/or annual financial statements, and any other public documents,
are not subject to the policy of restraint, and should be considered by examiners
and others when conducting risk assessments."
A number of the questions and answers address taxpayers' concerns about
obtaining certainty on tax issues more quickly through closing agreements,
restricted consents to extend the statute of limitations, and the IRS' pre-filing
programs (Industry Issue Resolution, Pre-filing Agreements, Advance Pricing
Agreements, and Compliance Audit Program) and post-filing programs (Joint
Audit Plan, LIFE, Advance Issue Resolution, Appeals Fast Track Program,
Accelerated Issue Resolution, and Early Referral to Appeals). In this regard, the
memorandum notes, "We can remind taxpayers that candor, transparency and
the right motivations, coupled with programs and processes we have in place
today can quickly generate certainty on tax issues."
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Question and Answer #8 addresses the situation in which a transaction that has
closed becomes a Listed Transaction. Under the Jobs Creation Act, the statute
of limitations is extended until one calendar year after the IRS receives proper
disclosure of Listed Transactions. In the case of a closed transaction that
becomes a Listed Transaction, the answer states that, until one year after proper
disclosure to the IRS, interest must be accrued in the P&L on the unrecognized
tax benefit (perhaps all of the benefit because the "more likely than not" threshold
may not have been met) under the rules of FIN 48, and the tax benefit taken on
the tax return will never be recognizable in the financial statements. As a result,
each year the accrued interest increases and the P&L is negatively affected.
The memorandum states that LMSB has consulted FASB on this point and FASB
agrees that this is the result. The memorandum advises that "it may be a good
practice to remind taxpayers about this provision affecting Listed Transactions
and the way they impact on the application of FIN 48 in their financial
statements."
It is clear from the memoranda that the IRS is preparing its LMSB examiners to
focus carefully on FIN 48 Disclosures. The statement that LMSB is evaluating
the policy of restraint with respect to FIN 48 Workpapers suggests that LMSB
examiners may be increasing their requests for FIN 48 Workpapers. LMSB has
created a "TAW Cadre whose members are available to assist with the review of
documents received in response to TAW IDRs [information document requests].
The primary objective of the Cadre is to assist LMSB examiners in determining
whether items received fulfill the IDR, whether additional documents should be
requested, and in considering the risk assessment related to the review of those
tax accrual workpapers."
g. Disclosure of Work Product to Non-Testifying Experts
As explained above, specially retained litigation-related non-testifying experts
are subject to discovery only under "exceptional circumstances." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4)(B).
This very narrow discovery standard generally allows the sharing of work
product (even opinion work product) with a non-testifying expert without
fear of waiver.
h. Disclosure of Work Product to Testifying Experts
Courts have always recognized that fact work product provided to a testifying
expert may be discovered by the adversary.
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The key uncertainly involves the discoverability of opinion work product (a
distinction discussed above) that a lawyer or client shares with a testifying
expert.
* The work product rule clearly provides heightened protection from
discovery for opinion work product (discussed above).
* However, the rules also permit discovery (to one extent or another) of a
testifying expert.
" Moreover, simple fairness might indicate that a litigant should be entitled
to explore all of the information that has been provided to the adversary's
testifying expert.
Before 1993, federal courts debated whether opinion work product shared
with a testifying expert was subject to discovery -- the majority of federal
courts answered "yes."
A 1993 amendment to the Federal Rules now requires that testifying experts
disclose "the data or other information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
* A vast majority of federal courts hold that this disclosure requirement
trumps the heightened protection provided to opinion work product. Karn
v. Ingqersoll Rand Co., 168 F.R.D. 633, 635-36 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Lamonds v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302 (W.D. Va. 1998).
Under this approach, the only grounds for withholding from discovery any
opinion work product shared with the testifying expert is that the expert did
not review the material. Constr. Indus. Servs. Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 206
F.R.D. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
However, a litigant relying on this exception must clearly establish that the
testifying expert never reviewed the material. Tri-State Outdoor Media
Group, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors to Tri-State Outdoor
Media Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 365 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
Some states did not change their rules to match the 1993 Federal Rules
change -- so the situation in those states is much like the pre-1993 situation
under the Federal Rules.
Crowe Countryside Realty Assocs., Co. v. Novare Enq'rs, Inc., 891 A.2d
838 (R.I. 2006) (holding that under Rhode Island law sharing opinion work
product with a testifying expert did not cause a waiver); Helton v. Kincaid,
2005 Ohio 2794, at 1 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (noting the debate, and
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concluding that "we agree with those courts who have determined that
work product does not lose its protected status simply because it is
disseminated to an expert").
Litigants in states which did not change their rules might face differing
standards in Federal court and state court.
2. Implied Waiver
Most courts apply the implied waiver doctrine to work product, meaning that
taking certain positions can waive the work product protection.
Examples include: relying on advice of counsel (Brennan v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D. 660 (D.S.D. 2001)); putting a lawyer's advice "at issue"
(Cooney v. Booth, 198 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 2000)); placing a lawyer's agent's
mental state "at issue" (Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, No. 93CIV.7222 LAP THK,
1997 WL 10924, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1997)); relying on the fact of an
investigation of a sexual harassment charge as a defense to the allegations
(Harding v. Dana Transp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1996)); listing a
lawyer as a factual or expert witness (Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., 197 F.R.D.
206 (D. Mass. 2000)); asserting a "qualified immunity" affirmative defense
(Mitzner v. Sobol, 136 F.R.D. 359, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); taking positions in
a bad faith insurance case that implicate a lawyer's activities (Charlotte Motor
Speedway, Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127 (M.D.N.C. 1989)); asserting a
defense based on the adequacy of an investigation (Jones v. Scientific Colors,
Inc., Nos. 99 C 1959 & 00 C 1071, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10633 (N.D. II1. July 9,
2001)); arguing ignorance of a claim that would start the statute of limitations
running (Axler v. Scientific Ecology Group, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 210 (D. Mass.
2000)); suing a former lawyer for malpractice (thus waiving the opinion work
product that would otherwise cover successor counsel's work) (Rutgard v.
Haynes, 185 F.R.D. 596, 601 (S.D. Cal. 1999)); seeking attorney fees. Tonti
Props. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 99-892 Section "E" (2), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5748, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 2000).
* A recent case took a very broad and troubling view of this issue. In re Royal
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litic., 230 F.R.D. 433, 437, 438 (D. Md. 2005)
(finding that Royal Ahold had waived the work product doctrine covering
witness interview memoranda by disclosing "information obtained from the
witness interviews" to: (1) "the public in [Royal Ahold's] Form 20-F filing with
the SEC"; and (2) to the plaintiffs by giving them some of the reports;
explaining that "to the extent that Royal Ahold offensively has disclosed
information pertaining to its internal investigation in order to improve its
position with investors, financial institutions, and the regulatory agencies, it
also implicitly has waived its right to assert work product privilege as to the
underlying memoranda supporting its disclosures"; ordering the company to
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produce all interview memoranda "containing factual information underlying
the public disclosures, including the 20-F and the investigative reports
provided to plaintiffs" -- "unless a specific showing of opinion work product
can be made to the court").
3. Subject Matter Waiver
As explained above, many differences between the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege reflect themselves in differing rules governing such
important matters as the level of protection and waiver.
0 These differences are also reflected in the doctrine of subject matter waiver.
Some courts find that waiver of the work product protection results in a subject
matter waiver, while others do not. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179
F. Supp. 2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2001); In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc.. 238 F.3d
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
4. Inapplicability of the Work Product Doctrine to Trial Documents
Whether analyzed under the work product doctrine's applicability ab inito or as an
implied waiver issue, it is obvious that the work product doctrine does not protect
the identity of documents that a litigant intends to use at trial -- such as a list of
intended exhibits. Northup v. Acken, 865 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2004).
* If an adversary requests such information early in the pre-trial process,
perhaps a timing objection would be appropriate -- but a litigant cannot refuse
to comply with mandated pre-trial disclosures by arguing that the selection of
exhibits reflects opinion work product.
" Only one court seems to have taken this concept to the logical extreme,
prohibiting a litigant from putting on evidence at trial if the litigant claimed
some protection in refusing to provide the evidence during discovery.
Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Del.
2004).
5. Efforts to Change the Harsh Waiver Rules
At the end of the section on attorney-client privilege waiver (above), this outline
addresses recent efforts to avoid the current harsh waiver rules.
Most of these efforts would also reduce or eliminate the waiver effect of
intentionally sharing work product with the government or inadvertently
producing work product during litigation.
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Although sharing work product does not automatically cause a waive of that
protection, the changes discussed above apply in contexts in which the
disclosure would normally waive both the work product protection and the
attorney-client privilege (disclosing work product to an adversary -- an
investigating governmental agency or a litigation adversary seeking the
production of documents).
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